Ch. 7
On freedom from fear.
WHAT makes the tyrant formidable? The guards, you
say, and their swords, and the men of the bedchamber and
those who exclude them who would enter. Why then if
you bring a boy (child) to the tyrant when he is with his
guards, is he not afraid; or is it because the child does
not understand these things? If then any man does
understand what guards are and that they have swords,
and comes to the tyrant for this very purpose because he
wishes to die on account of some circumstance and seeks
to die easily by the hand of another, is he afraid of the
guards? No, for he wishes for the thing which makes the
guards formidable. If then any man neither wishing to
die nor to live by all means, but only as it may be permitted, approaches the tyrant, what hinders him from
approaching the tyrant without fear? Nothing. If then
a man has the same opinion about his property as the man
whom I have instanced has about his body; and also about
his children and his wife: and in a word is so affected by
some madness or despair that he cares not whether he
possesses them or not, but like children who are playing
with shells care (quarrel) about the play, but do not trouble
themselves about the shells, so he too has set no value on
the materials (things), but values the pleasure that he has
with them and the occupation, what tyrant is then formidable to him or what guards or what swords?
Then through madness is it possible for a man to be so
disposed towards these things, and the Galilaeans through
habit,729 and is it possible that no man can learn from reason
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and from demonstration that God has made all the things
in the universe and the universe itself completely free
from hindrance and perfect, and the parts of it for the use
of the whole? All other animals indeed are incapable of
comprehending the administration of it; but the rational
animal man has faculties for the consideration of all these
things, and for understanding that it is a part, and what
kind of a part it is, and that it is right for the parts to be
subordinate to the whole. And besides this being naturally
noble, magnanimous and free, man sees that of the things
which surround him some are free from hindrance and in
his power, and the other things are subject to hindrance
and in the power of others; that the things which are free
from hindrance are in the power of the will; and those
which are subject to hindrance are the things which are
not in the power of the will. And for this reason if he
thinks that his good and his interest be in these things
only which are free from hindrance and in his own power,
he will be free, prosperous, happy, free from harm, magnanimous, pious, thankful to God730 for all things; in no
matter finding fault with any of the things which have
not been put in his power, nor blaming any of them.731
But if he thinks that his good and his interest are in
externals and in things which are not in the power of his
will, he must of necessity be hindered, be impeded, be a
slave to those who have the power over the things which
he admires (desires) and fears; and he must of necessity be
impious because he thinks that he is harmed by God, and
he must be unjust because he always claims more than
belongs to him; and he must of necessity be abject and
mean.
What hinders a man, who has clearly separated (comprehended) these things, from living with a light heart
and bearing easily the reins, quietly expecting every thing
which can happen, and enduring that which has already
happened? Would you have me to bear poverty? Come
and you will know what poverty is when it has found one
who can act well the part of a poor man. Would you
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have me to possess power? Let me have power, and also
the trouble of it. Well, banishment? Wherever I shall go,
there it will be well with me; for here also where I am, it
was not because of the place that it was well with me, but
because of my opinions which I shall carry off with me:
for neither can any man deprive me of them; but my
opinions alone are mine and they cannot be taken from
me, and I am satisfied while I have them, wherever I may
be and whatever I am doing. But now it is time to die.
Why do you say to die? Make no tragedy show of the
thing, but speak of it as it is: it is now time for the
matter (of the body) to be resolved into the things out of
which it was composed. And what is the formidable
thing here? what is going to perish of the things which
are in the universe?732 what new thing or wondrous is
going to happen? Is it for this reason that a tyrant is
formidable? Is it for this reason that the guards appear
to have swords which are large and sharp? Say this to
others; but I have considered about all these things; no
man has power over me. I have been made free; I know
his commands, no man can now lead me as a slave. I
have a proper person to assert my freedom;733 I have proper
judges. (I say) are you not the master of my body?
What then is that to me? Are you not the master of my
property? What then is that to me? Are you not the
master of my exile or of my chains? Well, from all these
things and all the poor body itself I depart at your
bidding, when you please. Make trial of your power, and
you will know how far it reaches.
Whom then can I still fear? Those who are over the
bedchamber?734 Lest they should do, what? Shut me
out? If they find that I wish to enter, let them shut me
out. Why then do you go to the doors? Because I think
it befits me, while the play (sport) lasts, to join in it.
How then are you not shut out? Because unless some
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one allows me to go in, I do not choose to go in, but am
always content with that which happens; for I think that
what God chooses is better than what I choose.735 I will
attach myself as a minister and follower to him; I have
the same movements (pursuits) as he has, I have the same
desires; in a word, I have the same will (συνφέλω). There
is no shutting out for me, but for those who would force
their way in. Why then do not I force my way in?
Because I know that nothing good is distributed within
to those who enter. But when I hear any man called
fortunate because he is honoured by Caesar, I say, what
does he happen to get? A province (the government of a
province). Does he also obtain an opinion such as he
ought? The office of a Prefect. Does he also obtain the
power of using his office well? Why do I still strive to
enter (Caesar's chamber)? A man scatters dried figs and
nuts: the children seize them, and fight with one another;
men do not, for they think them to be a small matter.
But if a man should throw about shells, even the children
do not seize them. Provinces are distributed: let children look to that. Money is distributed: let children
look to that. Praetorships, consulships are distributed:
let children scramble for them, let them be shut out,
beaten, kiss the hands of the giver, of the slaves: but to
me these are only dried figs and nuts. What then? If
you fail to get them, while Caesar is scattering them
about, do not be troubled: if a dried fig come into your
lap, take it and eat it; for so far you may value even a
fig. But if I shall stoop down and turn another over, or
be turned over by another, and shall flatter those who
have got into (Caesar's) chamber, neither is a dried fig
worth the trouble, nor any thing else of the things which
are not good, which the philosophers have persuaded me
not to think good.
Show me the swords of the guards. See how big they
are, and how sharp. What then do these big and sharp
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swords do? They kill. And what does a fever do?
Nothing else. And what else a (falling) tile? Nothing
else. Would you then have me to wonder at these things
and worship them, and go about as the slave of all of
them? I hope that this will not happen: but when I
have once learned that every thing which has come into
existence must also go out of it, that the universe may not
stand still nor be impeded, I no longer consider it any
difference whether a fever shall do it or a tile, or a soldier.
But if a man must make a comparison between these
things, I know that the soldier will do it with less
trouble (to me), and quicker. When then I neither fear
any thing which a tyrant can do to me, nor desire any
thing which he can give, why do I still look on with
wonder (admiration)? Why am I still confounded?
Why do I fear the guards? Why am I pleased if he
speaks to me in a friendly way, and receives me, and
why do I tell others how he spoke to me? Is he a
Socrates, is he a Diogenes that his praise should be a proof
of what I am? Have I been eager to imitate his morals?
But I keep up the play and go to him, and serve him so
long as he does not bid me to do any thing foolish or unreasonable. But if he says to me, Go and bring Leon736 of
Salamis, I say to him, Seek another, for I am no longer
playing. (The tyrant says): Lead him away (to prison).
I follow; that is part of the play. But your head will
be taken offDoes the tyrant's head always remain where
it is, and the heads of you who obey him?But you will
be cast out unburied?If the corpse is I, I shall be cast
out; but if I am different from the corpse, speak more
properly according as the fact is, and do not think of
frightening me. These things are formidable to children
and fools. But if any man has once entered a philosopher's
school and knows not what he is, he deserves to be full of
fear and to flatter those whom afterwards737 he used to
flatter; (and) if he has not yet learned that he is not flesh
nor bones nor sinews (νεῦρα), but he is that which makes
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use of these parts of the body and governs there and
follows (understands) the appearances of things.738
Yes, but this talk makes us despise the lawsAnd what
kind of talk makes men more obedient to the laws who
employ such talk? And the things which are in the
power of a fool are not law.739 And yet see how this talk
makes us disposed as we ought to be even to these men'
(fools); since it teaches us to claim in opposition to them
none of the things in which they are able to surpass us.
This talk teaches us as to the body to give it up, as to
property to give that up also, as to children, parents,
brothers, to retire from these, to give up all; it only
makes an exception of the opinions, which even Zeus has
willed to be the select property of every man. What
transgression of the laws is there here, what folly?
Where you are superior and stronger, there I gave way to
you: on the other hand, where I am superior, do you
yield to me; for I have studied (cared for) this, and you
have not. It is your study to live in houses with floors
formed of various stones,740 how your slaves and dependents
shall serve you, how you shall wear fine clothing, have
many hunting men, lute players, and tragic actors. Do I
claim any of these? have you made any study of opinions,
and of your own rational faculty? Do you know of what
parts it is composed, how they are brought together, how
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they are connected, what powers it has, and of what kind?
Why then are you vexed, if another who has made it his
study, has the advantage over you in these things? But
these things are the greatest. And who hinders you from
being employed about these things and looking after them?
And who has a better stock of books, of leisure, of persons
to aid you? Only turn your mind at last to these things,
attend, if it be only a short time, to your own ruling
faculty741 (ἡγεμονικόν): consider what this is that you possess, and whence it came, this which uses all other (faculties), and tries them, and selects and rejects. But so long
as you employ yourself about externals you will possess
them (externals) as no man else does; but you will have
this (the ruling faculty) such as you choose to have it,
sordid and neglected.
