Works


Works
By Epictetus
Edited by: George Long

London George Bell and Sons 1890


Perseus Documents Collection Table of Contents


Arrian's Discourses of Epictetus
   Arrian to Lucius Gellius, with wishes for his happiness.
   Of the things which are in our power, and not in our power.
   How a man on every occasion can maintain his proper character.
   How a man should proceed from the principle of god being the father of all men to the rest.
   Of progress or improvement.
   Against the academics.
   Of Providence.
   Of the use of sophistical arguments and hypothetical and the like.
   That the faculties57 are not safe to the uninstructed
   How from the fact that we are akin to God a man may proceed to the consequences.
   Against those who eagerly seek preferment at Rome.
   Of natural affection.
   Of contentment.
   How everything may be done acceptably to the gods.
   That the deity oversees all things.
   What philosophy promises.
   Of Providence.
   That the logical art is necessary.
   That we ought not to be angry with the errors (faults) of others.
   How we should behave to tyrants.
   About reason, how it contemplates itself.
   Against those who wish to be admired.
   On praecognitions.
   Against Epicurus.
   How we should struggle with circumstances.
   On the same.
   What is the law of life.
   In how many ways appearances exist, and what aids we should provide against them.
   That we ought not to be angry with men; and what are the small and the great things among men.
   On constancy (or firmness).
   What we ought to have ready in difficult circumstances.
   That confidence (courage) is not inconsistent with caution.
   Of tranquillity (freedom from perturbation).
   To those who recommend persons to philosophers.
   Against a person who had once been detected in adultery.
   How magnanimity is consistent with care.
   Of indifference.
   How we ought to use divination.
   What is the nature (ἡ οὐσία) of the Good
   That when we cannot fulfil that which the character of a man promises, we assume the character of a philosopher.
   How we may discover the duties of life from names.
   What the beginning of philosophy is.
   Of disputation or discussion.
   On anxiety (solicitude).
   To Naso.
   To or against those who obstinately persist in what they have determined.
   That we do not strive to use our opinions about good and evil.
   How we must adapt preconceptions to particular cases.
   How we should struggle against appearances.
   Against those who embrace philosophical opinions only in words.
   Against the Epicureans and Academics.
   Of inconsistency.
   On friendship.
   On the power of speaking.
   To (or against) a person who was one of those who were not valued (esteemed) by him.
   That logic is necessary.
   What is the property of error.
   Of finery in dress.
   In what a man ought to be exercised who has made proficiency;441 and that we neglect the chief things.
   What is the matter on which a good man should be employed, and in what we ought chiefly to practise ourselves.
   Against a person who showed his partizanship in an unseemly way in a theatre.
   Against those who on account of sickness go away home.
   Miscellaneous.
   To the administrator of the free cities who was an Epicurean.
   How we must exercise ourselves against appearances (φαντασίας).
   To a certain rhetorician who was going up to Rome on a suit.
   In what manner we ought to bear sickness.
   Certain miscellaneous matters
   About exercise.
   What solitude is, and what kind of person a solitary man is.
   Certain miscellaneous matters.
   That we ought to proceed with circumspection to every thing.
   That we ought with caution to enter into familiar intercourse with men.
   On Providence.
   That we ought not to be disturbed by any news.
   What is the condition of a common kind of man and of a philosopher.
   That we can derive advantage from all external things.
   Against those who readily come to the profession of sophists.
   About Cynism.
   To those who read and discuss for the sake of ostentation.
   That we ought not to be moved by a desire of those things which are not in our power.
   To those who fall off (desist) from their purpose.
   To those who fear want.
   About freedom.
   On familiar intimacy.
   What things we should exchange for other things.
   To those who are desirous of passing life in tranquillity.
   Against the quarrelsome and ferocious.
   Against those who lament over being pitied.
   On freedom from fear.
   Against those who hastily rush into the use of the philosophic dress.
   To a person who had been changed to a character of shamelessness.
   What things we ought to despise, and what things we ought to value.
   About purity (cleanliness).
   On attention
   Against or to those who readily tell their own affairs.

The Encheiridion, or Manual.

Fragments of Epictetus

Some fragments of Epictetus omitted by Upton and by Meibomius.

Index.

Advertisements
   WORKS BY GEORGE LONG, M. A.
   THE THOUGHTS OF THE EMPEROR M. AURELIUS ANTONINUS. Translated. Revised Edition, Post 8vo., 3s. 6d.
   CATALOGUE OF BOHN'S LIBRARIES.
   BOHN'S LIBRARIES.
   STANDARD LIBRARY.
   HISTORICAL LIBRARY.
   PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY.
   THEOLOGICAL LIBRARY.
   ANTIQUARIAN LIBRARY.
   ILLUSTRATED LIBRARY.
   CLASSICAL LIBRARY.
   TRANSLATIONS FROM THE GREEK AND LATIN.
   COLLEGIATE SERIES.
   SCIENTIFIC LIBRARY.
   ECONOMICS AND FINANCE.
   REFERENCE LIBRARY.
   NOVELISTS' LIBRARY.
   ARTISTS' LIBRARY.
   LIBRARY OF SPORTS AND GAMES.
   BOHN'S CHEAP SERIES.
   Bohn's Select Library of Standard Works.

Arrian's Discourses of Epictetus
   Arrian to Lucius Gellius, with wishes for his happiness.
   Of the things which are in our power, and not in our power.
   How a man on every occasion can maintain his proper character.
   How a man should proceed from the principle of god being the father of all men to the rest.
   Of progress or improvement.
   Against the academics.
   Of Providence.
   Of the use of sophistical arguments and hypothetical and the like.
   That the faculties57 are not safe to the uninstructed
   How from the fact that we are akin to God a man may proceed to the consequences.
   Against those who eagerly seek preferment at Rome.
   Of natural affection.
   Of contentment.
   How everything may be done acceptably to the gods.
   That the deity oversees all things.
   What philosophy promises.
   Of Providence.
   That the logical art is necessary.
   That we ought not to be angry with the errors (faults) of others.
   How we should behave to tyrants.
   About reason, how it contemplates itself.
   Against those who wish to be admired.
   On praecognitions.
   Against Epicurus.
   How we should struggle with circumstances.
   On the same.
   What is the law of life.
   In how many ways appearances exist, and what aids we should provide against them.
   That we ought not to be angry with men; and what are the small and the great things among men.
   On constancy (or firmness).
   What we ought to have ready in difficult circumstances.
   That confidence (courage) is not inconsistent with caution.
   Of tranquillity (freedom from perturbation).
   To those who recommend persons to philosophers.
   Against a person who had once been detected in adultery.
   How magnanimity is consistent with care.
   Of indifference.
   How we ought to use divination.
   What is the nature (ἡ οὐσία) of the Good
   That when we cannot fulfil that which the character of a man promises, we assume the character of a philosopher.
   How we may discover the duties of life from names.
   What the beginning of philosophy is.
   Of disputation or discussion.
   On anxiety (solicitude).
   To Naso.
   To or against those who obstinately persist in what they have determined.
   That we do not strive to use our opinions about good and evil.
   How we must adapt preconceptions to particular cases.
   How we should struggle against appearances.
   Against those who embrace philosophical opinions only in words.
   Against the Epicureans and Academics.
   Of inconsistency.
   On friendship.
   On the power of speaking.
   To (or against) a person who was one of those who were not valued (esteemed) by him.
   That logic is necessary.
   What is the property of error.
   Of finery in dress.
   In what a man ought to be exercised who has made proficiency;441 and that we neglect the chief things.
   What is the matter on which a good man should be employed, and in what we ought chiefly to practise ourselves.
   Against a person who showed his partizanship in an unseemly way in a theatre.
   Against those who on account of sickness go away home.
   Miscellaneous.
   To the administrator of the free cities who was an Epicurean.
   How we must exercise ourselves against appearances (φαντασίας).
   To a certain rhetorician who was going up to Rome on a suit.
   In what manner we ought to bear sickness.
   Certain miscellaneous matters
   About exercise.
   What solitude is, and what kind of person a solitary man is.
   Certain miscellaneous matters.
   That we ought to proceed with circumspection to every thing.
   That we ought with caution to enter into familiar intercourse with men.
   On Providence.
   That we ought not to be disturbed by any news.
   What is the condition of a common kind of man and of a philosopher.
   That we can derive advantage from all external things.
   Against those who readily come to the profession of sophists.
   About Cynism.
   To those who read and discuss for the sake of ostentation.
   That we ought not to be moved by a desire of those things which are not in our power.
   To those who fall off (desist) from their purpose.
   To those who fear want.
   About freedom.
   On familiar intimacy.
   What things we should exchange for other things.
   To those who are desirous of passing life in tranquillity.
   Against the quarrelsome and ferocious.
   Against those who lament over being pitied.
   On freedom from fear.
   Against those who hastily rush into the use of the philosophic dress.
   To a person who had been changed to a character of shamelessness.
   What things we ought to despise, and what things we ought to value.
   About purity (cleanliness).
   On attention
   Against or to those who readily tell their own affairs.

The Encheiridion, or Manual.

Fragments of Epictetus

Some fragments of Epictetus omitted by Upton and by Meibomius.

Index.

Advertisements
   WORKS BY GEORGE LONG, M. A.
   THE THOUGHTS OF THE EMPEROR M. AURELIUS ANTONINUS. Translated. Revised Edition, Post 8vo., 3s. 6d.
   CATALOGUE OF BOHN'S LIBRARIES.
   BOHN'S LIBRARIES.
   STANDARD LIBRARY.
   HISTORICAL LIBRARY.
   PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY.
   THEOLOGICAL LIBRARY.
   ANTIQUARIAN LIBRARY.
   ILLUSTRATED LIBRARY.
   CLASSICAL LIBRARY.
   TRANSLATIONS FROM THE GREEK AND LATIN.
   COLLEGIATE SERIES.
   SCIENTIFIC LIBRARY.
   ECONOMICS AND FINANCE.
   REFERENCE LIBRARY.
   NOVELISTS' LIBRARY.
   ARTISTS' LIBRARY.
   LIBRARY OF SPORTS AND GAMES.
   BOHN'S CHEAP SERIES.
   Bohn's Select Library of Standard Works.

Funded by The Annenberg CPB/Project

Arrian's Discourses of Epictetus
 

Ch. 24

To (or against) a person who was one of those who were not valued (esteemed) by him.

A CERTAIN person said to him (Epictetus): Frequently I desired to hear you and came to you, and you never gave me any answer: and now, if it is possible, I intreat you to say something to me. Do you think, said Epictetus, that as there is an art in any thing else, so there is also an art in speaking, and that he who has the art, will speak skilfully, and he who has not, will speak unskilfully? I do think so.He then who by speaking receives benefit [p. 189] himself, and is able to benefit others, will speak skilfully: but he who is rather damaged by speaking and does damage to others, will he be unskilled in this art of speaking? And you may find that some are damaged and others benefited by speaking. And are all who hear benefited by what they hear? Or will you find that among them also some are benefited and some damaged?There are both among these also, he said.In this case also then those who hear skilfully are benefited, and those who hear unskilfully are damaged? He admitted this. Is there then a skill in hearing also, as there is in speaking? It seems so.If you choose, consider the matter in this way also. The practice of music, to whom does it belong? To a musician. And the proper making of a statue, to whom do you think that it belongs? To a statuary. And the looking at a statue skilfully, does this appear to you to require the aid of no art?This also requires the aid of art.Then if speaking properly is the business of the skilful man, do you see that to hear also with benefit is the business of the skilful man.? Now as to speaking and hearing perfectly, and usefully,425 let us for the present, if you please, say no more, for both of us are a long way from every thing of the kind. But I think that every man will allow this, that he who is going to hear philosophers requires some amount of practice in hearing. Is it not so?

Tell me then about what I should talk to you: about what matter are you able to listen?About good and evil. Good and evil in what? In a horse? No. Well, in an ox? No. What then? In a man? Yes. Do we know then what a man is, what the notion is which we have of him, or have we our ears in any degree practised about this matter? But do you understand what nature is? or can you even in any degree understand me when I say, I shall use demonstration to you? How? Do you understand his very thing, what demonstration is, or how any thing i, demonstrated, or by what means; or what things are [p. 190] like demonstration, but are not demonstration? Do you know what is true or what is false? What is consequent on a thing, what is repugnant to a thing, or not consistent, or in- consistent?426 But must I excite you to philosophy, and how? Shall I show to you the repugnance in the opinions of most men, through which they differ about things good and evil, and about things which are profitable and unprofitable, when you know not this very thing, what repugnance (contradiction) is? Show me then what I shall accomplish by discoursing with you: excite my inclination to do this. As the grass which is suitable, when it is presented to a sheep, moves its inclination to eat, but if you present to it a stone or bread, it will not be moved to eat; so there are in us certain natural inclinations also to speak, when the hearer shall appear to be somebody, when he himself shall excite us: but when he shall sit by us like a stone or like grass, how can he excite a man's desire (to speak)? Does the vine say to the husbandman, Take care of me? No, but the vine by showing in itself that it will be profitable to the husbandman, if he does take care of it, invites him to exercise care. When children are attractive and lively, whom do they not invite to play with them, and crawl with them, and lisp with them? But who is eager to play with an ass or to bray with it? for though it is small, it is still a little ass.

Why then do you say nothing to me? I can only say this to you, that he who knows not who he is, and for what purpose he exists, and what is this world, and with whom he is associated, and what things are the good and the bad, and the beautiful and the ugly, and who neither understands discourse nor demonstration, nor what is true nor what is false, and who is not able to distinguish them, will neither desire according to nature nor turn away nor move towards, nor intend (to act), nor assent, nor dissent nor suspend his judgment: to say all in a few words, he will go about dumb and blind, thinking that he is somebody, but being nobody. Is this so now for the first time? Is it not the fact that ever since the human race existed, all errors and misfortunes have arisen through this igno- [p. 191] rance? Why did Agamemnon and Achilles quarrel with one another? Was it not through not knowing what things are profitable and not profitable? Does not the one say it is profitable to restore Chryseis to her father, and does not the other say that it is not profitable? does not the one say that he ought to take the prize of another, and does not the other say that he ought not? Did they not for these reasons forget, both who they were and for what purpose they had come there? Oh, man, for what purpose did you come? to gain mistresses or to fight? To fight. With whom? the Trojans or the Hellenes? With the Trojans. Do you then leave Hector alone and draw your sword against your own king? And do you, most excellent Sir, neglect the duties of the king, you who are the people's guardian and have such cares; and are you quarrelling about a little girl with the most warlike of your allies, whom you ought by every means to take care of and protect? and do you become worse than (inferior to) a well behaved priest who treats you these fine gladiators with all respect? Do you see what kind of things ignorance of what is profitable does?

But I also am rich. Are you then richer than Agamemnon? But I am also handsome. Are you then more handsome than Achilles? But I have also beautiful hair. But had not Achilles more beautiful hair and gold coloured? and he did not comb it elegantly nor dress it. But I am also strong. Can you then lift so great a stone as Hector or Ajax? But I am also of noble birth. Are you the son of a goddess mother? are you the son of a father sprung from Zeus? What good then do these things do to him, when he sits and weeps for a girl? But I am an orator. And was he not? Do you not see how he handled the most skilful of the Hellenes in oratory, Odysseus and Phoenix? how he stopped their mouths?427

This is all that I have to say to you; and I say even this not willingly. Why? Because you have not roused me. For what must I look to in order to be roused, as men who are expert in riding are roused by generous [p. 192] horses? Must I look to your body? You treat it dis- gracefully. To your dress? That is luxurious. To your behaviour, to your look? That is the same as nothing. When you would listen to a philosopher, do not say to him, You tell me nothing; but only show yourself worthy of hearing or fit for hearing; and you will see how you will move the speaker.