Ch. 5
Against the quarrelsome and ferocious.
THE wise and good man neither himself fights with any
person, nor does he allow another, so far as he can prevent it. And an example of this as well as of all other
things is proposed to us in the life of Socrates, who not
only himself on all occasions avoided fights (quarrels), but
would not allow even others to quarrel. See in Xenophon's
Symposium703 how many quarrels he settled, how further
he endured Thrasymachus and Polus and Callicles; how
he tolerated his wife, and how he tolerated his son704 who
attempted to confute him and to cavil with him. For he
remembered well that no man has in his power another
man's ruling principle. He wished therefore for nothing
else than that which was his own. And what is this?
Not that this or that man may act according to nature;
for that is a thing which belongs to another; but that
while others are doing their own acts, as they choose, he
may never the less be in a condition conformable to
nature and live in it, only doing what is his own to the
end that others also may be in a state conformable to
nature. For this is the object always set before him by
the wise and good man. Is it to be commander (a
praetor)705 of an army? No: but if it is permitted him,
his object is in this matter to maintain his own ruling
principle. Is it to marry? No; but if marriage is allowed
to him, in this matter his object is to maintain himself in
a condition conformable to nature. But if he would have
his son not to do wrong or his wife, he would have what
belongs to another not to belong to another: and to be
instructed is this, to learn what things are a man's own
and what belongs to another.
How then is there left any place for fighting (quarrel-
ling) to a man who has this opinion (which he ought to
have)? Is he surprised at any thing which happens,
[p. 334]
and does it appear new to him?706 Does he not expect
that which comes from the bad to be worse and more
grievous than what actually befals him? And does he not
reckon as pure gain whatever they (the bad) may do
which falls short of extreme wickedness? Such a person
has reviled you. Great thanks to him for not having
struck you. But he has struck me also. Great thanks
that he did not wound you. But he wounded me also.
Great thanks that he did not kill you. For when did he
learn or in what school that man is a tame707 animal, that
men love one another, that an act of injustice is a great
harm to him who does it. Since then he has not learned
this and is not convinced of it, why shall he not follow
that which seems to be for his own interest? Your
neighbour has thrown stones. Have you then done any
thing wrong? But the things in the house have been
broken. Are you then a utensil? No; but a free power
of will.708 What then is given to you (to do) in answer to
this? If you are like a wolf, you must bite in return, and
throw more stones. But if you consider what is proper
for a man, examine your storehouse, see with what faculties you came into the world. Have you the disposition
of a wild beast, have you the disposition of revenge for an
injury? When is a horse wretched? When he is deprived
of his natural faculties, not when he cannot crow like a
cock, but when he cannot run. When is a dog wretched?
Not when he cannot fly, but when he cannot track his
game. Is then a man also unhappy in this way, not
because he cannot strangle lions or embrace statues,709 for
he did not come into the world in the possession of certain
powers from nature for this purpose, but because he has
lost his probity and his fidelity? People ought to meet
and lament such a man for the misfortunes into which he
[p. 335]
has fallen; not indeed to lament because a man has been
born or has died,710 but because it has happened to him in
his life time to have lost the things which are his own,
not that which he received from his father, not his land
and house, and his inn,711 and his slaves; for not one of
these things is a man's own, but all belong to others, are
servile, and subject to account (ὑπεύθυνα), at different
times given to different persons by those who have them
in their power: but I mean the things which belong to
him as a man, the marks (stamps) in his mind with which
he came into the world, such as we seek also on coins, and
if we find them, we approve of the coins, and if we do not
find the marks, we reject them. What is the stamp on
this Sestertius?712 The stamp of Trajan. Present it. It
is the stamp of Nero. Throw it away: it cannot be
accepted, it is counterfeit.713 So also in this case: What is
[p. 336]
the stamp of his opinions? It is gentleness, a sociable disposition, a tolerant temper,
a disposition to mutual affection. Produce these qualities. I accept them: I consider
this man a citizen, I accept him as a neighbour, a com-
panion in my voyages. Only see that he has not Nero's
stamp. Is he passionate, is he full of resentment, is he
fault-finding? If the whim seizes him, does he break the
heads of those who come in his way? (If so), why then
did you say that he is a man? Is every thing judged
(determined) by the bare form? If that is so, say that the
form in wax714 is an apple and has the smell and the taste
of an apple. But the external figure is not enough:
neither then is the nose enough and the eyes to make the
man, but he must have the opinions of a man. Here is
a man who does not listen to reason, who does not know
when he is refuted: he is an ass: in another man the
sense of shame is become dead: he is good for nothing, he
is any thing rather than a man. This man seeks whom
he may meet and kick or bite, so that he is not even a
sheep or an ass, but a kind of wild beast.
What then? would you have me to be despised?By
whom? by those who know you? and how shall those
who know you despise a man who is gentle and modest?
Perhaps you mean by those who do not know you? What
is that to you? For no other artisan cares for the opinion
of those who know not his art.But they will be more
hostile to me715 for this reason.Why do you say 'me'?
Can any man injure your will, or prevent you from using
in a natural way the appearances which are presented to
[p. 337]
you? In no way can he. Why then are you still dis-
turbed and why do you choose to show yourself afraid?716
And why do you not come forth and proclaim that you
are at peace with all men whatever they may do, and
laugh at those chiefly who think that they can harm you?
These slaves, you can say, know not either who I am, nor
where lies my good or my evil, because they have no
access to the things which are mine.
In this way also those who occupy a strong city mock the
besiegers, (and say): What trouble these men are now taking
for nothing: our wall is secure, we have food for a very
long time, and all other resources. These are the things
which make a city strong and impregnable: but nothing
else than his opinions makes a man's soul impregnable.
For what wall is so strong, or what body is so hard, or
what possession is so safe, or what honour (rank, character)
so free from assault (as a man's opinions)? All (other)
things every where are perishable, easily taken by assault,
and if any man in any way is attached to them, he must
be disturbed, expect what is bad, he must fear, lament,
find his desires disappointed, and fall into things which
he would avoid. Then do we not choose to make secure
the only means of safety which are offered to us, and do
we not choose to withdraw ourselves from that which is
perishable and servile and to labour at the things which
are imperishable and by nature free; and do we not remember that no man either hurts another or does good to
another, but that a man's opinion about each thing, is that
which hurts him, is that which overturns him; this is
fighting, this is civil discord, this is war? That which
made Eteocles and Polynices717 enemies was nothing else
than this opinion which they had about royal power, their
opinion about exile, that the one is the extreme of evils,
the other the greatest good. Now this is the nature of
[p. 338]
every man to seek the good, to avoid the bad;718 to con-
sider him who deprives us of the one and involves us in
the other an enemy and treacherous, even if he be a
brother, or a son or a father. For nothing is more akin
to us than the good: therefore if these things (externals)
are good and evil, neither is a father a friend to sons, nor
a brother to a brother, but all the world is every where
full of enemies, treacherous men, and sycophants. But if
the will (προαίρεσις, the purpose, the intention) being what
it ought to be, is the only good; and if the will being
such as it ought not to be, is the only evil, where is there
any strife, where is there reviling? about what? about the
things which do not concern us? and strife with whom?
with the ignorant, the unhappy, with those who are deceived about the chief things?
Remembering this Socrates managed his own house and
endured a very ill tempered wife and a foolish (ungrateful?) son.719 For in what did she show her bad
temper? In pouring water on his head as much as she
liked, and in trampling on the cake (sent to Socrates).
And what is this to me, if I think that these things are
nothing to me? But this is my business; and neither
tyrant shall check my will nor a master; nor shall the
many check me who am only one, nor shall the stronger
check me who am the weaker; for this power of being
free from check (hindrance) is given by God to every
man. For these opinions make love in a house (family),
[p. 339]
concord in a state, among nations peace, and gratitude to
God; they make a man in all things cheerful (confident)
in externals as about things which belong to others, as
about things which are of no value.720 We indeed are
able to write and to read these things, and to praise them
when they are read, but we do not even come near to
being convinced of them. Therefore what is said of the
Lacedaemonians, Lions at home, but in Ephesus foxes,
will fit in our case also, Lions in the school, but out of it
foxes.721
