Book 1
Ch. 1
Of the things which are in our power, and not in our power.
OF all the faculties (except that which I shall soon mention), you will find not one which is capable of contemplating itself, and, consequently, not capable either of
approving or disapproving.2 How far does the grammatic
art possess the contemplating power? As far as forming
a judgment about what is written and spoken. And how
far music? As far as judging about melody. Does
either of them then contemplate itself? By no means.
But when you must write something to your friend,
grammar will tell you what words you should write; but
whether you should write or not, grammar will not tell
you. And so it is with music as to musical sounds; but
whether you should sing at the present time and play on
the lute, or do neither, music will not tell you. What
faculty then will tell you? That which contemplates
both itself and all other things. And what is this faculty?
The rational faculty;3 for this is the only faculty that we
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have received which examines itself, what it is, and what
power it has, and what is the value of this gift, and examines all other faculties: for what else is there which
tells us that golden things are beautiful, for they do not
say so themselves? Evidently it is the faculty which is
capable of judging of appearances.4 What else judges of
music, grammar, and the other faculties, proves their uses,
and points out the occasions for using them? Nothing
else.
As then it was fit to be so, that which is best of
all and supreme over all is the only thing which the
gods have placed in our power, the right use of appearances; but all other things they have not placed in our
power. Was it because they did not choose? I indeed
think that, if they had been able, they would have put
these other things also in our power, but they certainly
could not.5 For as we exist on the earth, and are bound
to such a body and to such companions, how was it possible for us not to be hindered as to these things by
externals?
But what says Zeus? Epictetus, if it were possible,
I would have made both your little body and your little
property free and not exposed to hindrance. But now be
not ignorant of this: this body is not yours, but it is clay
finely tempered. And since I was not able to do for you
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what I have mentioned, I have given you a small portion
of us,6 this faculty of pursuing an object and avoiding it,
and the faculty of desire and aversion, and, in a word, the
faculty of using the appearances of things; and if you will
take care of this faculty and consider it your only possession, you will never be hindered, never meet with impediments; you will not lament, you will not blame, you will
not flatter any person.
Well, do these seem to you small matters? I hope
not. Be content with them then and pray to the
gods. But now when it is in our power to look after
one thing, and to attach ourselves to it, we prefer to look
after many things, and to be bound to many things, to
the body and to property, and to brother and to friend,
and to child and to slave. Since then we are bound to
many things, we are depressed by them and dragged down.
For this reason, when the weather is not fit for sailing, we
sit down and torment ourselves, and continually look out
to see what wind is blowing. It is north. What is that
to us? When will the west wind blow? When it shall
choose, my good man, or when it shall please Aeolus; for
God has not made you the manager of the winds, but
Aeolus.7 What then? We must make the best use that
we can of the things which are in our power, and use the
rest according to their nature. What is their nature
then? As God may please.
Must I then alone have my head cut off? What, would
you have all men lose their heads that you may be consoled?
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Will you not stretch out your neck as Lateranus8
did at Rome when Nero ordered him to be beheaded?
For when he had stretched out his neck, and received a
feeble blow, which made him draw it in for a moment, he
stretched it out again. And a little before, when he was
visited by Epaphroditus,9 Nero's freedman, who asked him
about the cause of offence which he had given, he said, If
I choose to tell anything, I will tell your master.
What then should a man have in readiness in such circumstances? What else than this? What is mine, and
what is not mine; and what is permitted to me, and what
is not permitted to me. I must die. Must I then die
lamenting? I must be put in chains. Must I then also
lament? I must go into exile. Does any man then
hinder me from going with smiles and cheerfulness and
contentment? Tell me the secret which you possess. I
will not, for this is in my power. But I will put you in
chains.10 Man,
what are you talking about? Me in
chains? You may fetter my leg, but my will11 not even
Zeus himself can overpower. I will throw you into prison.
My poor body, you mean. I will cut your head off. When
then have I told you that my head alone cannot be cut
off? These are the things which philosophers should meditate on, which they should write daily, in which they
should exercise themselves.
Thrasea12 used to say, I would rather be killed to-day
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than banished to-morrow. What then did Rufus13 say to
him? If you choose death as the heavier misfortune,
how great is the folly of your choice? But if, as the
lighter, who has given you the choice? Will you not
study to be content with that which has been given to
you?
What then did Agrippinus14 say? He said, I am not
a hindrance to myself. When it was reported to him
that his trial was going on in the Senate, he said, I hope
it may turn out well; but it is the fifth hour of the day
this was the time when he was used to exercise himself
and then take the cold bathlet us go and take our
exercise. After he had taken his exercise, one comes
and tells him, You have been condemned. To banishment, he replies, or to death? To banishment. What
about my property? It is not taken from you. Let us
go to Aricia then,15 he said, and dine.
This it is to have studied what a man ought to study;
to have made desire, aversion, free from hindrance, and
free from all that a man would avoid. I must die. If
now, I am ready to die. If, after a short time, I now dine
because it is the dinner-hour; after this I will then die.
How? Like a man who gives up16 what belongs to
another.
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