Ch. 25
On the same.
IF these things are true, and if we are not silly, and are
not acting hypocritically when we say that the good of
man is in the will, and the evil too, and that every thing
else does not concern us, why are we still disturbed, why
are we still afraid? The things about which we have been
busied are in no man's power: and the things which are in
the power of others, we care not for. What kind of trouble
have we still?
But give me directions. Why should I give you directions? has not Zeus given you directions? Has he not
given to you what is your own free from hindrance and
free from impediment, and what is not your own subject to hindrance and impediment? What directions then,
what kind of orders did you bring when you came
from him? Keep by every means what is your own; do
not desire what belongs to others. Fidelity (integrity)
is your own, virtuous shame is your own; who then can
take these things from you? who else than yourself will
hinder you from using them? But how do you act? when
you seek what is not your own, you lose that which is your
own. Having such promptings and commands from Zeus,
what kind do you still ask from me? Am I more powerful
than he, am I more worthy of confidence? But if you
observe these, do you want any others besides? Well, but
he has not given these orders, you will say. Produce your
praecognitions (προλήψεις), produce the proofs of philosophers, produce what you have often heard, and produce
what you have said yourself, produce what you have read,
produce what you have meditated on; and you will then
see that all these things are from God.157 How long then is
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it fit to observe these precepts from God, and not to break
up the play?158 As long as the play is continued with propriety. In the Saturnalia159 a king is chosen by lot, for it
has been the custom to play at this game. The king commands: Do you drink, Do you mix the wine, Do you sing,
Do you go, Do you come. I obey that the game may not
be broken up through me.But if he says, think that you
are in evil plight: I answer, I do not think so; and who
will compel me to think so? Further, we agreed to play
Agamemnon and Achilles. He who is appointed to play
Agamemnon says to me, Go to Achilles and tear from him
Briseis. I go. He says, Come, and I come.
For as we behave in the matter of hypothetical arguments, so ought we to do in life. Suppose it to be
night. I suppose that it is night. Well then; is it day?
No, for I admitted the hypothesis that it was night. Suppose that you think that it is night? Suppose that I do.
But also think that it is night. That is not consistent with
the hypothesis. So in this case also: Suppose that you
are unfortunate. Well, suppose so. Are you then unhappy? Yes. Well then are you troubled with an
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unfavorable daemon (fortune)? Yes. But think also
that you are in misery. This is not consistent with the
hypothesis; and another (Zeus) forbids me to think so.
How long then must we obey such orders? As long as it
is profitable; and this means as long as I maintain that
which is becoming and consistent. Further, some men are
sour and of bad temper, and they say, I cannot sup with
this man to be obliged to hear him telling daily how he
fought in Mysia: I told you, brother, how I ascended the
hill: then I began to be besieged again. But another says,
I prefer to get my supper and to hear him talk as much as
he likes. And do you compare these estimates (judgments): only do nothing in a depressed mood, nor as one
afflicted, nor as thinking that you are in misery, for no man
compels you to that.Has it smoked in the chamber? If
the smoke is moderate, I will stay; if it is excessive, I go
out: for you must always remember this and hold it fast,
that the door is open.Well, but you say to me, Do not
live in Nicopolis. I will not live there.Nor in Athens.
I will not live in Athens.Nor in Rome.I will not live
in Rome.Live in Gyarus.160 I will live in Gyarus, but
it seems like a great smoke to live in Gyarus; and
I depart to the place where no man will hinder me from
living, for that dwelling place is open to all; and as to the
last garment,161 that is the poor body, no one has any power
over me beyond this. This was the reason why Demetrius162
said to Nero, You threaten me with death, but nature
threatens you. If I set my admiration on the poor body,
I have given myself up to be a slave: if on my little possessions, I also make myself a slave: for I immediately
make it plain with what I may be caught; as if the snake
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draws in his head, I tell you to strike that part of him
which be guards; and do you be assured that whatever
part you choose to guard, that part your master will attack.
Remembering this whom will you still flatter or fear?
But I should like to sit where the Senators sit.163 Do
you see that you are putting yourself in straits, you are
squeezing yourself.How then shall I see well in any
other way in the amphitheatre? Man, do not be a spectator at all; and you will not be squeezed. Why do you
give yourself trouble? Or wait a little, and when the
spectacle is over, seat yourself in the place reserved for the
Senators and sun yourself. For remember this general
truth, that it is we who squeeze ourselves, who put ourselves in straits; that is our opinions squeeze us and put
us in straits. For what is it to be reviled? Stand by a
stone and revile it; and what will you gain? If then a
man listens like a stone, what profit is there to the reviler?
But if the reviler has as a stepping-stone (or ladder)
the weakness of him who is reviled, then he accomplishes
something.Strip him.What do you mean by him?164
Lay hold of his garment, strip it off. I have insulted you.
Much good may it do you.
This was the practice of Socrates: this was the reason
why he always had one face. But we choose to practise
and study any thing rather than the means by which we
shall be unimpeded and free. You say, Philosophers talk
paradoxes.165 But are there no paradoxes in the other arts?
and what is more paradoxical than to puncture a man's eye
in order that he may see? If any one said this to a man ignorant of the surgical art, would he not ridicule the speaker?
Where is the wonder then if in philosophy also many things
which are true appear paradoxical to the inexperienced?
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