Ch. 20
About reason, how it contemplates itself.
134
EVERY art and faculty contemplates certain things especially.135 When then it is itself of the same kind with the
objects which it contemplates, it must of necessity contemplate itself also: but when it is of an unlike kind, it
cannot contemplate itself. For instance, the shoemaker's
art is employed on skins, but itself is entirely distinct
from the material of skins: for this reason it does not
contemplate itself. Again, the grammarian's art is em-
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ployed about articulate speech;136 is then the art also
articulate speech? By no means. For this reason it
is not able to contemplate itself. Now reason, for what
purpose has it been given by nature? For the right use
of appearances. What is it then itself? A system (combination) of certain appearances. So by its nature it has
the faculty of contemplating itself also. Again, sound
sense, for the contemplation of what things does it belong
to us? Good and evil, and things which are neither.
What is it then itself? Good. And want of sense, what
is it? Evil. Do you see then that good sense necessarily
contemplates both itself and the opposite? For this reason
it is the chief and the first work of a philosopher to examine appearances, and to distinguish them, and to admit
none without examination. You see even in the matter
of coin, in which our interest appears to be somewhat concerned, how we have invented an art, and how many
means the assayer uses to try the value of coin, the sight,
the touch, the smell, and lastly the hearing. He throws
the coin (denarius) down, and observes the sound, and he
is not content with its sounding once, but through his
great attention he becomes a musician. In like manner,
where we think that to be mistaken and not to be mistaken make a great difference, there we apply great attention to discovering the things which can deceive. But
in the matter of our miserable ruling faculty, yawning and
sleeping, we carelessly admit every appearance, for the
harm is not noticed.
When then you would know how careless you are
with respect to good and evil, and how active with respect to things which are indifferent137 (neither good nor
evil), observe how you feel with respect to being deprived
of the sight of the eyes, and how with respect to being
deceived, and you will discover that you are far from
feeling as you ought to do in relation to good and evil.
But this is a matter which requires much preparation,
and much labour and study. Well then do you expect
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to acquire the greatest of arts with small labour? And
yet the chief doctrine of philosophers is very brief. If
you would know, read Zeno's138 writings and you will see
For how few words it requires to say that man's end (or
object) is to follow139 the gods, and that the nature of
good is a proper use of appearances. But if you say
What is God, what is appearance, and what is particular
and what is universal140 nature? then indeed many words
are necessary. If then Epicurus should come and say,
that the good must be in the body; in this case also many
words become necessary, and we must be taught what is
the leading principle in us, and the fundamental and the
substantial; and as it is not probable that the good of
a snail is in the shell, is it probable that the good of a
man is in the body? But you yourself, Epicurus, possess
something better than this. What is that in you which
deliberates, what is that which examines every thing, what
is that which forms a judgment about the body itself, that
it is the principal part? and why do you light your lamp
and labour for us, and write so many141 books? is it that
we may not be ignorant of the truth, who we are, and
what we are with respect to you? Thus the discussion
requires many words.
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