Ch. 8
That the faculties57 are not safe to the uninstructed
IN as many ways as we can change things58 which are
equivalent to one another, in just so many ways we
can change the forms of arguments (ἐπιχειρήματα) and
enthymemes59 (ἐνθυμήματα) in argumentation. This is an
instance: if you have borrowed and not repaid, you owe
me the money: you have not borrowed and you have not
repaid; then you do not owe me the money. To do this
skilfully is suitable to no man more than to the philosopher; for if the enthymeme is an imperfect syllogism,
it is plain that he who has been exercised in the perfect
syllogism must be equally expert in the imperfect also.
Why then do we not exercise ourselves and one another
in this manner? Because, I reply, at present, though we are
not exercised in these things and not distracted from the
study of morality, by me at least, still we make no progress
in virtue. What then must we expect if we should add
this occupation? and particularly as this would not only
be an occupation which would withdraw us from more
necessary things, but would also be a cause of self-conceit
and arrogance, and no small cause. For great is the
power of arguing and the faculty of persuasion, and particularly if it should be much exercised, and also receive
additional ornament from language: and so universally,
every faculty acquired by the uninstructed and weak
brings with it the danger of these persons being elated
[p. 29]
and inflated by it. For by what means could one persuade
a young man who excels in these matters, that he ought
not to become an appendage60 to them, but to make them
an appendage to himself? Does he not trample on all such
reasons, and strut before us elated and inflated, not enduring that any man should reprove him and remind
him of what he has neglected and to what he has turned
aside?
What then was not Plato a philosopher?61 I reply,
and was not Hippocrates a physician? but you see how
Hippocrates speaks. Does Hippocrates then speak thus in
respect of being a physician? Why do you mingle things
which have been accidentally united in the same men?
And if Plato was handsome and strong, ought I also to set
to work and endeavour to become handsome or strong, as if
this was necessary for philosophy, because a certain philosopher was at the same time handsome and a philosopher?
Will you not choose to see and to distinguish in respect
to what men become philosophers, and what things belong
to them in other respects? And if I were a philosopher,
ought you also to be made lame?62 What then? Do 1 take
away these faculties which you possess? By no means;
for neither do I take away the faculty of seeing. But if
you ask me what is the good of man, I cannot mention to
you anything else than that it is a certain disposition of
the will with respect to appearances.63
[p. 30]