Ch. 13
Against or to those who readily tell their own affairs.
WHEN a man has seemed to us to have talked with simplicity
candour) about his own affairs, how is it that at last we
are ourselves also induced to discover to him794 our own
secrets and we think this to be candid behaviour? In the
first place because it seems unfair for a man to have
listened to the affairs of his neighbour, and not to communicate to him also in turn our own affairs: next,
because we think that we shall not present to them the
appearance of candid men when we are silent about our
own affairs. Indeed men are often accustomed to say,
I have told you all my affairs, will you tell me nothing
of your own? where is this done?Besides, we have also
this opinion that we can safely trust him who has already
told us his own affairs; for the notion rises in our mind
that this man could never divulge our affairs because he
would be cautious that we also should not divulge his. In
this way also the incautious are caught by the soldiers at
Rome. A soldier sits by you in a common dress and
begins to speak ill of Caesar; then you, as if you had
received a pledge of his fidelity by his having begun the
abuse, utter yourself also what you think, and then you
are carried off in chains.795
Something of this kind happens to us also generally.
Now as this man has confidently intrusted his affairs to
me, shall I also do so to any man whom I meet? (No),
[p. 376]
for when I have heard, I keep silence, if I am of such a dis-
position; but he goes forth and tells all men what he has
heard. Then if I hear what has been done, if I be a man
like him, I resolve to be revenged, I divulge what he has
told me; I both disturb others and am disturbed myself.
But if I remember that one man does not injure another,
and that every man's acts injure and profit him, I secure
this, that I do not any thing like him, but still I suffer
what I do suffer through my own silly talk.
True: but it is unfair when you have heard the secrets
of your neighbour for you in your turn to communicate
nothing to him.Did I ask you for your secrets, my man?
did you communicate your affairs on certain terms, that
you should in return hear mine also? If you are a babbler
and think that all who meet you are friends, do you wish
me also to be like you? But why, if you did well in
intrusting your affairs to me, and it is not well for me to
intrust mine to you, do you wish me to be so rash? It is
just the same as if I had a cask which is water-tight, and
you one with a hole in it, and you should come and
deposit with me your wine that I might put it into my
cask, and then should complain that I also did not intrust
my wine to you, for you have a cask with a hole in it.
How then is there any equality here? You intrusted
your affairs to a man who is faithful, and modest, to a
man who thinks that his own actions alone are injurious
and (or) useful, and that nothing external is. Would you
have me intrust mine to you, a man who has dishonoured
his own faculty of will, and who wishes to gain some
small bit of money or some office or promotion in the
court (emperor's palace), even if you should be going to
murder your own children, like Medea? Where (in what)
is this equality (fairness)? But show yourself to me to
be faithful, modest, and steady: show me that you have
friendly opinions; show that your cask has no hole in it;
and you will see how I shall not wait for you to trust me
with your affairs, but I myself shall come to you and ask
you to hear mine. For who does not choose to make use
of a good vessel? Who does not value a benevolent and
faithful adviser? who will not willingly receive a man
[p. 377]
who is ready to bear a share, as we may say, of the diffi-
culty of his circumstances, and by this very act to ease the
burden, by taking a part of it.
True: but I trust you; you do not trust me.In the
first place, not even do you trust me, but you are a
babbler, and for this reason you cannot hold any thing;
for indeed, if it is true that you trust me, trust your
affairs to me only; but now whenever you see a man at
leisure, you seat yourself by him and say: Brother, I
have no friend more benevolent than you nor dearer; I
request you to listen to my affairs. And you do this even
to those who are not known to you at all. But if you
really trust me, it is plain that you trust me because I am
faithful and modest, not because I have told my affairs to
you. Allow me then to have the same opinion about you.
Show me that if one man tells his affairs to another, he
who tells them is faithful and modest. For if this were
so, I would go about and tell my affairs to every man, if
that would make me faithful and modest. But the thing
is not so, and it requires no common opinions (principles).
If then you see a man who is busy about things not dependent on his will and subjecting his will to them, you
must know that this man has ten thousand persons to
compel and hinder him. He has no need of pitch or the
wheel to compel him to declare what he knows:796 but a
little girl's nod, if it should so happen, will move him, the
blandishment of one who belongs to Caesar's court, desire
of a magistracy or of an inheritance, and things without
end of that sort. You must remember then among general
principles that secret discourses (discourses about secret
matters) require fidelity and corresponding opinions. But
where can we now find these easily? Or if you cannot
answer that question, let some one point out to me a man
who can say: I care only about the things which are my
own, the things which are not subject to hindrance, the
things which are by nature free. This I hold to be the
nature of the good: but let all other things be as they are
allowed; I do not concern myself.
[p. 378]
[p. 379]
