Ch. 28
That we ought not to be angry with men; and what are the small and the great things among men.
181
WHAT is the cause of assenting to any thing? The fact
that it appears to be true. It is not possible then to
assent to that which appears not to be true. Why?
Because this is the nature of the understanding, to incline
to the true, to be dissatisfied with the false, and in matters
uncertain to withhold assent. What is the proof of this?
Imagine (persuade yourself), if you can, that it is now
night. It is not possible. Take away your persuasion that
it is day. It is not possible. Persuade yourself or take
away your persuasion that the stars are even in number.182
It is impossible. When then any man assents to that
which is false, be assured that he did not intend to assent
to it as false, for every soul is unwillingly deprived of the
truth, as Plato says; but the falsity seemed to him to be
true. Well, in acts what have we of the like kind as we
have here truth or falsehood? We have the fit and the
not fit (duty and not duty), the profitable and the unprofitable, that which is suitable to a person and that which is
not, and whatever is like these. Can then a man think
that a thing is useful to him and not choose it? He cannot. How says Medea?183
'Tis true I know what evil I shall do,
But passion overpowers the better counsel.
She thought that to indulge her passion and take vengeance on her husband was more profitable than to spare
her children. It was so; but she was deceived. Show her
plainly that she is deceived, and she will not do it; but so
long as you do not show it, what can she follow except
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that which appears to herself (her opinion)? Nothing
else. Why then are you angry with the unhappy
woman that she has been bewildered about the most important things, and is become a viper instead of human
creature? And why not, if it is possible, rather pity, as
we pity the blind and the lame, so those who are blinded
and maimed in the faculties which are supreme?
Whoever then clearly remembers this, that to man the
measure of every act is the appearance (the opinion),
whether the thing appears good or bad: if good, he is free
from blame; if bad, himself suffers the penalty, for it is
impossible that he who is deceived can be one person, and
he who suffers another personwhoever remembers this
will not be angry with any man, will not be vexed at any
man, will not revile or blame any man, nor hate nor
quarrel with any man.
So then all these great and dreadful deeds have this
origin, in the appearance (opinion)? Yes, this origin and
no other. The Iliad is nothing else than appearance and
the use of appearances. It appeared184 to Alexander to carry
off the wife of Menelaus: it appeared to Helene to follow
him. If then it had appeared to Menelaus to feel that it
was a gain to be deprived of such a wife, what would have
happened? Not only would the Iliad have been lost,
but the Odyssey also. On so small a matter then did
such great things depend? But what do you mean by such
great things? Wars and civil commotions, and the destruction of many men and cities. And what great matter
is this? Is it nothing?But what great matter is the
death of many oxen, and many sheep, and many nests of
swallows or storks being burnt or destroyed? Are these
things then like those? Very like. Bodies of men are
destroyed, and the bodies of oxen and sheep; the dwellings of men are burnt, and the nests of storks. What is
there in this great or dreadful? Or show me what is the
difference between a man's house and a stork's nest, as far
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as each is a dwelling; except that man builds his little
houses of beams and tiles and bricks, and the stork builds
them of sticks and mud. Are a stork and a man then
like things? What say you?In body they are very much
alike.
Does a man then differ in no respect from a stork?
Don't suppose that I say so; but there is no difference in
these matters (which I have mentioned). In what then
is the difference? Seek and you will find that there is a
difference in another matter. See whether it is not in a
man the understanding of what he does, see if it is not in
social community, in fidelity, in modesty, in steadfastness,
in intelligence. Where then is the great good and evil in
men? It is where the difference is. If the difference is
preserved and remains fenced round, and neither modesty
is destroyed, nor fidelity, nor intelligence, then the man
also is preserved; but if any of these things is destroyed
and stormed like a city, then the man too perishes;
and in this consist the great things. Alexander, you
say, sustained great damage then when the Hellenes
invaded and when they ravaged Troy, and when his
brothers perished. By no means; for no man is damaged
by an action which is not his own; but what happened
at that time was only the destruction of storks' nests:
now the ruin of Alexander was when he lost the character of modesty, fidelity, regard to hospitality, and to
decency. When was Achilles ruined? Was it when
Patroclus died? Not so. But it happened when he began
to be angry, when he wept for a girl, when he forgot that
he was at Troy not to get mistresses, but to fight. These
things are the ruin of men, this is being besieged, this is
the destruction of cities, when right opinions are destroyed,
when they are corrupted.
When then women are carried off, when children are
made captives, and when the men are killed, are these not
evils? How is it then that you add to the facts these
opinions? Explain this to me also.I shall not do that;
but how is it that you say that these are not evils?Let
us come to the rules: produce the praecognitions (προλήψεις): for it is because this is neglected that we can not
sufficiently wonder at what men do. When we intend to
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judge of weights, we do not judge by guess: where we
intend to judge of straight and crooked, we do not judge
by guess. In all cases where it is our interest to know
what is true in any matter, never will any man among us
do anything by guess. But in things which depend on
the first and on the only cause of doing right or wrong, of
happiness or unhappiness, of being unfortunate or fortunate, there only we are inconsiderate and rash. There
is then nothing like scales (balance), nothing like a rule:
but some appearance is presented, and straightway I act
according to it. Must I then suppose that I am superior to
Achilles or Agamemnon, so that they by following appearances do and suffer so many evils: and shall not the
appearance be sufficient for me?185 And what tragedy has
any other beginning? The Atreus of Euripides, what is
it? An appearance.186 The Oedipus of Sophocles, what is
it? An appearance. The Phoenix? An appearance.
The Hippolytus? An appearance. What kind of a man
then do you suppose him to be who pays no regard to this
matter? And what is the name of those who follow every
appearance? They are called madmen. Do we then act
at all differently?
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