Ch. 6
Against those who lament over being pitied.
I am grieved, a man says, at being pitied. Whether then
is the fact of your being pitied a thing which concerns
you or those who pity you? Well, is it in your power to
stop this pity?It is in my power, if I show them that
I do not require pity.And whether then are you in the
condition of not deserving (requiring) pity, or are you not
in that condition?I think that I am not: but these
persons do not pity me, for the things for which, if they
ought to pity me, it would be proper, I mean, for my
faults; but they pity me for my poverty, for not pos-
sessing honourable offices, for diseases and deaths and
other such thingsWhether then are you prepared to convince the many, that not one of these things is an evil, but
that it is possible for a man who is poor and has no office
(ἀνάρχοντι) and enjoys no honour to be happy; or to shew
yourself to them as rich and in power? For the second of
these things belong to a man who is boastful, silly and
good for nothing. And consider by what means the pre-
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tence must be supported. It will be necessary for you to
hire slaves an I to possess a few silver vessels, and to exhibit them in public, if it is possible, though they are
often the same, and to attempt to conceal the fact that
they are the same, and to have splendid garments, and all
other things for display, and to show that you are a man
honoured by the great, and to try to sup at their houses,
or to be supposed to sup there, and as to your person
to employ some mean arts, that you may appear to be
more handsome and nobler than you are. These things
you must contrive, if you choose to go by the second path
in order not to be pitied. But the first way is both impracticable and long, to attempt the very thing which Zeus
has not been able to do, to convince all men what things
are good and bad.722 Is this power given to you? This
only is given to you, to convince yourself; and you have
not convinced yourself. Then I ask you, do you attempt
to persuade other men? and who has lived so long with
you as you with yourself? and who has so much power of
convincing you as you have of convincing yourself; and
who is better disposed and nearer to you than you are to
yourself? How then have you not yet convinced yourself
in order to learn? At present are not things upside down?
Is this what you have been earnest about doing,723 to learn
to be free from grief and free from disturbance, and not to
be humbled (abject), and to be free? Have you not heard
then that there is only one way which leads to this end,
to give up (dismiss) the things which do not depend on
the will, to withdraw from them, and to admit that they
belong to others? For another man then to have an opinion
about you, of what kind is it?It is a thing independent
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of the willThen is it nothing to you?-It is nothing-
When then you are still vexed at this and disturbed, do
you think that you are convinced about good and evil?
Will you not then letting others alone be to yourself
both scholar and teacher?The rest of mankind will look
after this, whether it is to their interest to be and to pass
their lives in a state contrary to nature: but to me no man
is nearer than myself. What then is the meaning of this,
that I have listened to the words of the philosophers and I
assent to them, but in fact I am no way made easier (more
content)? Am I so stupid? And yet in all other things
such as I have chosen, I have not been found very stupid;
but I learned letters quickly, and to wrestle, and geometry,
and to resolve syllogisms. Has not then reason convinced
me? and indeed no other things have I from the beginning
so approved and chosen (as the things which are rational):
and now I read about these things, hear about them, write
about them; I have so far discovered no reason stronger
than this (living according to nature). In what then am
I deficient? Have the contrary opinions not been eradicated from me? Have the notions (opinions) themselves
not been exercised nor used to be applied to action, but as
armour are laid aside and rusted and cannot fit me? And
yet neither in the exercises of the palaestra, nor in writing
or reading am I satisfied with learning, but I turn up and
down the syllogisms which are proposed, and I make
others, and sophistical syllogisms also.724 But the necessary
theorems by proceeding from which a man can become
free from grief, fear, passions (affects), hindrance, and a
free man, these I do not exercise myself in nor do I practise in these the proper practice (study). Then I care
about what others will say of me, whether I shall appear
to them worth notice, whether I shall appear happy.
Wretched man, will you not see what you are saying
about yourself? What do you appear to yourself to be? in
your opinions, in your desires, in your aversions from
things (ἐν τῷ ἐκκλίνειν), in your movements (purposes,
ἐν ὁρμῇ) in your preparation (for anything), in your de-
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signs (plans), and in other acts suitable to a man? But do
you trouble yourself about this, whether others pity you?
Yes, but I am pitied not as I ought to be.Are you then
pained at this? and is he who is pained, an object of pity?
YesHow then are you pitied not as you ought to be?
For by the very act that you feel (suffer) about being
pitied, you make yourself deserving of pity. What then
says Antisthenes? Have you not heard? 'It is a royal
thing, O Cyrus, to do right (well) and to be ill spoken of.725
My head is sound, and all think that I have the head ache.
What do I care for that? I am free from fever, and people
sympathize with me as if I had a fever, (and say), Poor
man, for so long a time you have not ceased to have fever.
I also say with a sorrowful countenance, In truth it is now
a long time that I have been ill. What will happen then?
As God may please: and at the same time I secretly laugh
at those who are pitying me. What then hinders the
same being done in this case also? I am poor, but I have
a right opinion about poverty. Why then do I care if
they pity me for my poverty? I am not in power (not a
magistrate); but others are: and I have the opinion which
I ought to have about having and not having power. Let
them look to it who pity me:726 but I am neither hungry
nor thirsty nor do I suffer cold; but because they are
hungry or thirsty they think that I too am. What then
shall I do for them? Shall I go about and proclaim and
say, Be not mistaken, men, I am very well, I do not trouble
myself about poverty, nor want of power, nor in a word
about anything else than right opinions. These I have
free from restraint, I care for nothing at all.What foolish
talk is this? How do I possess right opinions when I am
not content with being what I am, but am uneasy about
what I am supposed to be?
But you say, others will get more and be preferred to
meWhat then is more reasonable than for those who
have laboured about any thing to have more in that thing
in which they have laboured? They have laboured for
power, you have laboured about opinions; and they have
laboured for wealth, you for the proper use of appearances.
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See if they have more than you in this about which you
have laboured, and which they neglect; if they assent
better than you with respect to the natural rules (measures)
of things; if they are less disappointed than you in their
desires; if they fall less into things which they would
avoid than you do; if in their intentions, if in the things
which they propose to themselves, if in their purposes, if in
their motions towards an object they take a better aim; if
they better observe a proper behaviour, as men, as sons, as
parents, and so on as to the other names by which we
express the relations of life. But if they exercise power,
and you do not, will you not choose to tell yourself the
truth, that you do nothing for the sake of this (power), and
they do all? But it is most unreasonable that he who
looks after anything should obtain less than he who does
not look after it.
Not so: but since I care about right opinions, it is more
reasonable for me to have power.Yes in the matter about
which you do care, in opinions. But in a matter in which
they have cared more than you, give way to them. The
case is just the same as if because you have right opinions,
you thought that in using the bow you should hit the
mark better than an archer, and in working in metal you
should succeed better than a smith. Give up then your
earnestness about opinions and employ yourself about the
things which you wish to acquire; and then lament, if
you do not succeed; for you deserve to lament. But now
you say that you are occupied with other things, that you
are looking after other things; but the many say this
truly, that one act has no community with another.727 He
who has risen in the morning seeks whom (of the house of
Caesar) he shall salute, to whom he shall say something
agreeable, to whom he shall send a present, how he shall
please the dancing man, how by bad behaviour to one he
may please another. When he prays, he prays about
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these things; when he sacrifices, he sacrifices for these
things: the saying of Pythagoras
Let sleep not come upon thy languid eyes728
he transfers to these things. Where have I failed in the
matters pertaining to flattery? What have I done? Any
thing like a free man, any thing like a noble minded man?
And if he finds any thing of the kind, he blames and accuses
himself: Why did you say this? Was it not in your power
to lie? Even the philosophers say that nothing hinders
us from telling a lie. But do you, if indeed you have
cared about nothing else except the proper use of appearances, as soon as you have risen in the morning reflect,
What do I want in order to be free from passion (affects),
and free from perturbation? What am I? Am I a poor
body, a piece of property, a thing of which something is
said? 1 am none of these. But what am I? I am a
rational animal. What then is required of me? Reflect
on your acts. Where have I omitted the things which
conduce to happiness (εὔροιαν)? What have I done which
is either unfriendly or unsocial? what have I not done as
to these things which I ought to have done?
So great then being the difference in desires, actions,
wishes, would you still have the same share with others in
those things about which you have not laboured, and they
have laboured? Then are you surprised if they pity you,
and are you vexed? But they are not vexed if you pity
them. Why? Because they are convinced that they have
that which is good, and you are not convinced. For this
reason you are not satisfied with your own, but you desire
that which they have: but they are satisfied with their
own, and do not desire what you have: since if you were
really convinced, that with respect to what is good, it is
you who are the possessor of it and that they have missed
it, you would not even have thought of what they say
about you.
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