Works


Works
By Epictetus
Edited by: George Long

London George Bell and Sons 1890



Perseus Documents Collection Table of Contents



Arrian's Discourses of Epictetus
   Arrian to Lucius Gellius, with wishes for his happiness.
   Of the things which are in our power, and not in our power.
   How a man on every occasion can maintain his proper character.
   How a man should proceed from the principle of god being the father of all men to the rest.
   Of progress or improvement.
   Against the academics.
   Of Providence.
   Of the use of sophistical arguments and hypothetical and the like.
   That the faculties57 are not safe to the uninstructed
   How from the fact that we are akin to God a man may proceed to the consequences.
   Against those who eagerly seek preferment at Rome.
   Of natural affection.
   Of contentment.
   How everything may be done acceptably to the gods.
   That the deity oversees all things.
   What philosophy promises.
   Of Providence.
   That the logical art is necessary.
   That we ought not to be angry with the errors (faults) of others.
   How we should behave to tyrants.
   About reason, how it contemplates itself.
   Against those who wish to be admired.
   On praecognitions.
   Against Epicurus.
   How we should struggle with circumstances.
   On the same.
   What is the law of life.
   In how many ways appearances exist, and what aids we should provide against them.
   That we ought not to be angry with men; and what are the small and the great things among men.
   On constancy (or firmness).
   What we ought to have ready in difficult circumstances.
   That confidence (courage) is not inconsistent with caution.
   Of tranquillity (freedom from perturbation).
   To those who recommend persons to philosophers.
   Against a person who had once been detected in adultery.
   How magnanimity is consistent with care.
   Of indifference.
   How we ought to use divination.
   What is the nature (ἡ οὐσία) of the Good
   That when we cannot fulfil that which the character of a man promises, we assume the character of a philosopher.
   How we may discover the duties of life from names.
   What the beginning of philosophy is.
   Of disputation or discussion.
   On anxiety (solicitude).
   To Naso.
   To or against those who obstinately persist in what they have determined.
   That we do not strive to use our opinions about good and evil.
   How we must adapt preconceptions to particular cases.
   How we should struggle against appearances.
   Against those who embrace philosophical opinions only in words.
   Against the Epicureans and Academics.
   Of inconsistency.
   On friendship.
   On the power of speaking.
   To (or against) a person who was one of those who were not valued (esteemed) by him.
   That logic is necessary.
   What is the property of error.
   Of finery in dress.
   In what a man ought to be exercised who has made proficiency;441 and that we neglect the chief things.
   What is the matter on which a good man should be employed, and in what we ought chiefly to practise ourselves.
   Against a person who showed his partizanship in an unseemly way in a theatre.
   Against those who on account of sickness go away home.
   Miscellaneous.
   To the administrator of the free cities who was an Epicurean.
   How we must exercise ourselves against appearances (φαντασίας).
   To a certain rhetorician who was going up to Rome on a suit.
   In what manner we ought to bear sickness.
   Certain miscellaneous matters
   About exercise.
   What solitude is, and what kind of person a solitary man is.
   Certain miscellaneous matters.
   That we ought to proceed with circumspection to every thing.
   That we ought with caution to enter into familiar intercourse with men.
   On Providence.
   That we ought not to be disturbed by any news.
   What is the condition of a common kind of man and of a philosopher.
   That we can derive advantage from all external things.
   Against those who readily come to the profession of sophists.
   About Cynism.
   To those who read and discuss for the sake of ostentation.
   That we ought not to be moved by a desire of those things which are not in our power.
   To those who fall off (desist) from their purpose.
   To those who fear want.
   About freedom.
   On familiar intimacy.
   What things we should exchange for other things.
   To those who are desirous of passing life in tranquillity.
   Against the quarrelsome and ferocious.
   Against those who lament over being pitied.
   On freedom from fear.
   Against those who hastily rush into the use of the philosophic dress.
   To a person who had been changed to a character of shamelessness.
   What things we ought to despise, and what things we ought to value.
   About purity (cleanliness).
   On attention
   Against or to those who readily tell their own affairs.

The Encheiridion, or Manual.

Fragments of Epictetus

Some fragments of Epictetus omitted by Upton and by Meibomius.

Index.

Advertisements
   WORKS BY GEORGE LONG, M. A.
   THE THOUGHTS OF THE EMPEROR M. AURELIUS ANTONINUS. Translated. Revised Edition, Post 8vo., 3s. 6d.
   CATALOGUE OF BOHN'S LIBRARIES.
   BOHN'S LIBRARIES.
   STANDARD LIBRARY.
   HISTORICAL LIBRARY.
   PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY.
   THEOLOGICAL LIBRARY.
   ANTIQUARIAN LIBRARY.
   ILLUSTRATED LIBRARY.
   CLASSICAL LIBRARY.
   TRANSLATIONS FROM THE GREEK AND LATIN.
   COLLEGIATE SERIES.
   SCIENTIFIC LIBRARY.
   ECONOMICS AND FINANCE.
   REFERENCE LIBRARY.
   NOVELISTS' LIBRARY.
   ARTISTS' LIBRARY.
   LIBRARY OF SPORTS AND GAMES.
   BOHN'S CHEAP SERIES.
   Bohn's Select Library of Standard Works.

Arrian's Discourses of Epictetus
   Arrian to Lucius Gellius, with wishes for his happiness.
   Of the things which are in our power, and not in our power.
   How a man on every occasion can maintain his proper character.
   How a man should proceed from the principle of god being the father of all men to the rest.
   Of progress or improvement.
   Against the academics.
   Of Providence.
   Of the use of sophistical arguments and hypothetical and the like.
   That the faculties57 are not safe to the uninstructed
   How from the fact that we are akin to God a man may proceed to the consequences.
   Against those who eagerly seek preferment at Rome.
   Of natural affection.
   Of contentment.
   How everything may be done acceptably to the gods.
   That the deity oversees all things.
   What philosophy promises.
   Of Providence.
   That the logical art is necessary.
   That we ought not to be angry with the errors (faults) of others.
   How we should behave to tyrants.
   About reason, how it contemplates itself.
   Against those who wish to be admired.
   On praecognitions.
   Against Epicurus.
   How we should struggle with circumstances.
   On the same.
   What is the law of life.
   In how many ways appearances exist, and what aids we should provide against them.
   That we ought not to be angry with men; and what are the small and the great things among men.
   On constancy (or firmness).
   What we ought to have ready in difficult circumstances.
   That confidence (courage) is not inconsistent with caution.
   Of tranquillity (freedom from perturbation).
   To those who recommend persons to philosophers.
   Against a person who had once been detected in adultery.
   How magnanimity is consistent with care.
   Of indifference.
   How we ought to use divination.
   What is the nature (ἡ οὐσία) of the Good
   That when we cannot fulfil that which the character of a man promises, we assume the character of a philosopher.
   How we may discover the duties of life from names.
   What the beginning of philosophy is.
   Of disputation or discussion.
   On anxiety (solicitude).
   To Naso.
   To or against those who obstinately persist in what they have determined.
   That we do not strive to use our opinions about good and evil.
   How we must adapt preconceptions to particular cases.
   How we should struggle against appearances.
   Against those who embrace philosophical opinions only in words.
   Against the Epicureans and Academics.
   Of inconsistency.
   On friendship.
   On the power of speaking.
   To (or against) a person who was one of those who were not valued (esteemed) by him.
   That logic is necessary.
   What is the property of error.
   Of finery in dress.
   In what a man ought to be exercised who has made proficiency;441 and that we neglect the chief things.
   What is the matter on which a good man should be employed, and in what we ought chiefly to practise ourselves.
   Against a person who showed his partizanship in an unseemly way in a theatre.
   Against those who on account of sickness go away home.
   Miscellaneous.
   To the administrator of the free cities who was an Epicurean.
   How we must exercise ourselves against appearances (φαντασίας).
   To a certain rhetorician who was going up to Rome on a suit.
   In what manner we ought to bear sickness.
   Certain miscellaneous matters
   About exercise.
   What solitude is, and what kind of person a solitary man is.
   Certain miscellaneous matters.
   That we ought to proceed with circumspection to every thing.
   That we ought with caution to enter into familiar intercourse with men.
   On Providence.
   That we ought not to be disturbed by any news.
   What is the condition of a common kind of man and of a philosopher.
   That we can derive advantage from all external things.
   Against those who readily come to the profession of sophists.
   About Cynism.
   To those who read and discuss for the sake of ostentation.
   That we ought not to be moved by a desire of those things which are not in our power.
   To those who fall off (desist) from their purpose.
   To those who fear want.
   About freedom.
   On familiar intimacy.
   What things we should exchange for other things.
   To those who are desirous of passing life in tranquillity.
   Against the quarrelsome and ferocious.
   Against those who lament over being pitied.
   On freedom from fear.
   Against those who hastily rush into the use of the philosophic dress.
   To a person who had been changed to a character of shamelessness.
   What things we ought to despise, and what things we ought to value.
   About purity (cleanliness).
   On attention
   Against or to those who readily tell their own affairs.

The Encheiridion, or Manual.

Fragments of Epictetus

Some fragments of Epictetus omitted by Upton and by Meibomius.

Index.

Advertisements
   WORKS BY GEORGE LONG, M. A.
   THE THOUGHTS OF THE EMPEROR M. AURELIUS ANTONINUS. Translated. Revised Edition, Post 8vo., 3s. 6d.
   CATALOGUE OF BOHN'S LIBRARIES.
   BOHN'S LIBRARIES.
   STANDARD LIBRARY.
   HISTORICAL LIBRARY.
   PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY.
   THEOLOGICAL LIBRARY.
   ANTIQUARIAN LIBRARY.
   ILLUSTRATED LIBRARY.
   CLASSICAL LIBRARY.
   TRANSLATIONS FROM THE GREEK AND LATIN.
   COLLEGIATE SERIES.
   SCIENTIFIC LIBRARY.
   ECONOMICS AND FINANCE.
   REFERENCE LIBRARY.
   NOVELISTS' LIBRARY.
   ARTISTS' LIBRARY.
   LIBRARY OF SPORTS AND GAMES.
   BOHN'S CHEAP SERIES.
   Bohn's Select Library of Standard Works.


Funded by The Annenberg CPB/Project

Arrian's Discourses of Epictetus

 

Ch. 24

That we ought not to be moved by a desire of those things which are not in our power.

LET not that which in another is contrary to nature be an evil to you: for you are not formed by nature to be depressed with others nor to be unhappy with others, but to be happy with them. If a man is unhappy, remember that his unhappiness is his own fault: for God has made all men to be happy, to be free from perturbations. For this purpose he has given means to them, some things to each person as his own, and other things not as his own: some things subject to hindrance and compulsion and deprivation; and these things are not a man's own: but the things which are not subject to hindrances, are his own; and the nature of good and evil, as it was fit to be done by him who takes care of us and protects us like a father, he has made our own.But you say, I have parted from a certain person, and he is grieved.Why did he consider as his own that which belongs to another? why, when he looked on you and was rejoiced, did he not also reckon that you are mortal, that it is natural for you to part from him for a foreign country? Therefore he suffers the consequences of his own folly. But why do you570 or for what purpose bewail yourself? Is it that you also have not thought of these things? but like poor women who are good for nothing, you have enjoyed all things in which you took pleasure, as if you would always enjoy them, both places and men and conversation; and now you sit and weep because you do not see the same persons and do not live in the same places.Indeed you deserve this, to be more wretched than crows and ravens who have the power of flying where they please and changing their nests for others, and crossing the seas without lamenting or regretting their former condition. Yes, but this happens to them because they are irrational creatures.Was reason then given to us by the gods for [p. 271] the purpose of unhappiness and misery, that we may pass our lives in wretchedness and lamentation? Must all persons be immortal and must no man go abroad, and must we ourselves not go abroad, but remain rooted like plants; and if any of our familiar friends goes abroad, must we sit and weep; and on the contrary, when he returns, must we dance and clap our hands like children?

Shall we not now wean ourselves and remember what we have heard from the philosophers? if we did not listen to them as if they were jugglers: they tell us that this world is one city,571 and the substance out of which it has been formed is one, and that there must be a certain period, and that some things must give way to others, that some must be dissolved, and others come in their place; some to remain in the same place, and others to be moved; and that all things are full of friendship, first of the gods,572 and then of men who by nature are made to be of one family; and some must be with one another, and others must be separated, rejoicing in those who are with them, and not grieving for those who are removed from them; and man in addition to being by nature of a noble temper and having a contempt of all things which are not in the power of his will, also possesses this property not to be rooted nor to be naturally fixed to the earth, but to go at different times to different places, sometimes from the urgency of certain occasions, and at others merely for the sake of seeing. So it was with Ulysses, who saw Of many men the states, and learned their ways.573 And still earlier it was the fortune of Hercules to visit all the inhabited world Seeing men's lawless deeds and their good rules of law574 casting out and clearing away their lawlessness and introducing in their place good rules of law. And yet how many friends do you think that he had in Thebes, bow many in Argos, how many in Athens? and how many do [p. 272] you think that he gained by going about? And he married also, when it seemed to him a proper occasion, and begot children, and left them without lamenting or regretting or leaving them as orphans; for he knew that no man is an orphan; but it is the father who takes care of all men always and continuously. For it was not as mere report that he had heard that Zeus is the father of men, for he thought that Zeus was his own father, and he called him so, and to him he looked when he was doing what he did. Therefore he was enabled to live happily in all places. And it is never possible for happiness and desire of what is not present to come together. For that which is happy must have all575 that it desires, must resemble a person who is filled with food, and must have neither thirst nor hunger.But Ulysses felt a desire for his wife and wept as he sat on a rock.Do you attend to Homer and his stories in every thing? Or if Ulysses really wept, what was he else than an unhappy man? and what good man is unhappy? In truth the whole is badly administered, if Zeus does not take care of his own citizens that they may be happy like himself. But these things are not lawful nor right to think of: and if Ulysses did weep and lament, he was not a good man. For who is good if he knows not who he is? and who knows what he is, if he forgets that things which have been made are perishable, and that it is not possible for one human being to be with another always? To desire then things which are impossible is to have a slavish character, and is foolish: it is the part of a stranger, of a man who fights against God in the only way that he can, by his opinions.

But my mother laments when she does not see me. Why has she not learned these principles? and I do not say this, that we should not take care that she may not lament, but I say that we ought not to desire in every way what is not our own. And the sorrow of another is another's sorrow: but my sorrow is my own. I then will stop my own sorrow by every means, for it is in my power: and the sorrow of another I will endeavour to stop as far as I can; but I will not attempt to do it by every means; [p. 273] for if I do, I shall be fighting against God, I shall be opposing Zeus and shall be placing myself against him in the administration of the universe; and the reward (the punishment) of this fighting against God and of this disobedience not only will the children of my children pay, but I also shall myself, both by day and by night, startled by dreams, perturbed, trembling at every piece of news, and having my tranquillity depending on the letters of others.Some person has arrived from Rome. I only hope that there is no harm. But what harm can happen to you, where you are not?From Hellas (Greece) some one is come: I hope that there is no harm.In this way every place may be the cause of misfortune to you. Is it not enough for you to be unfortunate there where you are, and must you be so even beyond sea, and by the report of letters? Is this the way in which your affairs are in a state of security?Well then suppose that my friends have died in the places which are far from me.What else have they suffered than that which is the condition of mortals? Or how are you desirous at the same time to live to old age, and at the same time not to see the death of any person whom you love? Know you not that in the course of a long time many and various kinds of things must happen; that a fever shall overpower one, a robber another, and a third a tyrant? Such is the condition of things around us, such are those who live with us in the world: cold and heat, and unsuitable ways of living, and journeys by land, and voyages by sea, and winds, and various circumstances which surround us, destroy one man, and banish another, and throw one upon an embassy and another into an army. Sit down then in a flutter at all these things, lamenting, unhappy, unfortunate, dependent on another, and dependent not on one or two, but on ten thousands upon ten thousands.

Did you hear this when you were with the philosophers? did you learn this? do you not know that human life is a warfare? that one mail must keep watch, another must go out as a spy, and a third must fight? and it is not pos- sible that all should be in one place, nor is it better that it should be so. But you neglecting to do the commands of the general complain when any thing more hard than [p. 274] usual is imposed on you, and you do not observe what you make the army become as far as it is in your power; that if all imitate you, no man will dig a trench, no man will put a rampart round, nor keep watch, nor expose himself to danger, but will appear to be useless for the purposes of an army. Again, in a vessel if you go as a sailor, keep to one place and stick to it. And if you are ordered to climb the mast, refuse; if to run to the head of the ship, refuse; and what master of a ship will endure you? and will he not pitch you overboard as a useless thing, an impediment only and bad example to the other sailors? And so it is here also: every man's life is a kind of warfare, and it is long and diversified. You must observe the duty of a soldier and do every thing at the nod of the general; if it is possible, divining what his wishes are: for there is no resemblance between that general and this, neither in strength nor in superiority of character. You are placed in a great office of command and not in any mean place; but you are always a senator. Do you not know that such a man must give little time to the affairs of his household, but be often away from home, either as a governor or one who is governed, or discharging some office, or serving in war or acting as a judge? Then do you tell me that you wish, as a plant, to be fixed to the same places and to be rooted?Yes, for it is pleasant.Who says that it is not? but a soup is pleasant, and a handsome woman is pleasant. What else do those say who make pleasure their end? Do you not see of what men you have uttered the language? that it is the language of Epicureans and catamites? Next while you are doing what they do and holding their opinions, do you speak to us the words of Zeno and of Socrates? Will you not throw away as far as you can the things belonging to others with which you decorate yourself, though they do not fit you at all? For what else do they desire than to sleep without hindrance and free from compulsion, and when they have risen to yawn at their leisure, and to wash the face, then write and read what they choose, and then talk about some trifling matter being praised by their friends whatever they may say, then to go forth for a walk, and having walked about a little to bathe, and then [p. 275] eat and sleep, such sleep as is the fashion of such men? why need we say how? for one can easily conjecture. Come, do you also tell your own way of passing the time which you desire, you who are an admirer of truth and of Socrates and Diogenes. What do you wish to do in Athens? the same (that others do), or something else? Why then do you call yourself a Stoic? Well, but they who falsely call themselves Roman citizens,576 are severely punished; and should those, who falsely claim so great and reverend a thing and name, get off unpunished? or is this not possible, but the law divine and strong and inevitable is this, which exacts the severest punishments from those who commit the greatest crimes? For what does this law say? Let him who pretends to things which do not belong to him be a boaster, a vain-glorious man:577 let him who disobeys the divine administration be base, and a slave; let him suffer grief, let him be envious, let him pity;578 and in a word let him be unhappy and lament.

Well then; do you wish me to pay court to a certain person? to go to his doors?579 If reason requires this to be done for the sake of country, for the sake of kinsmen, for the sake of mankind, why should you not go? You are not ashamed to go to the doors of a shoemaker, when you are in want of shoes, nor to the door of a gardener, when you want lettuces; and are you ashamed to go to the doors of the rich when you want any thing?Yes, for I have no awe of a shoemakerDon't feel any awe of the richNor [p. 276] will I flatter the gardenerAnd do not flatter the rich How then shall I get what I want?Do I say to you, go as if you were certain to get what you want? And do not I only tell you, that you may do what is becoming to yourself? Why then should I still go? That you may have gone, that you may have discharged the duty of a citizen, of a brother, of a friend. And further remember that you have gone to the shoemaker, to the seller of vegetables, who have no power in any thing great or noble, though he may sell dear. You go to buy lettuces: they cost an obolus (penny), but not a talent. So it is here also. The matter is worth going for to the rich man's doorWell, I will go It is worth talking aboutLet it be so; I will talk with himBut you must also kiss his hand and flatter him with praiseAway with that, it is a talent's worth: it is not profitable to me, nor to the state nor to my friends, to have done that which spoils a good citizen and a friend.But you will seem not to have been eager about the matter, if you do not succeed. Have you again forgotten why you went? Know you not that a good man does nothing for the sake of appearance, but for the sake of doing right? What advantage is it then to him to have done right?And what advantage is it to a man who writes the name of Dion to write it as he ought?The advantage is to have written it.Is there no reward then580 ?Do you seek a reward for a good man greater than doing what is good and just? At Olympia you wish for nothing more, but it seems to you enough to be crowned at the games. Does it seem to you so small and worthless a thing to be good and [p. 277] happy? For these purposes being introduced by the gods into this city (the world), and it being now your duty to undertake the work of a man, do you still want nurses also and a mamma, and do foolish women by their weeping move you and make you effeminate? Will you thus never cease to be a foolish child? know you not that he who does the acts of a child, the older he is, the more ridiculous he is?

In Athens did you see no one by going to his house? I visited any man that I pleasedHere also be ready to see, and you will see whom you please: only let it be without meanness, neither with desire nor with aversion, and your affairs will be well managed. But this result does not depend on going nor on standing at the doors, but it depends on what is within, on your opinions. When you have learned not to value things which are external and not dependent on the will, and to consider that not one of them is your own, but that these things only are your own, to exercise the judgment well, to form opinions, to move towards an object, to desire, to turn from a thing, 'where is there any longer room for flattery, where for meanness? why do you still long for the quiet there (at Athens), and for the places to which you are accustomed? Wait a little and you will again find these places familiar: then, if you are of so ignoble a nature, again if you leave these also, weep and lament.

How then shall I become of an affectionate temper? By being of a noble disposition, and happy. For it is not reasonable to be mean-spirited nor to lament yourself, nor to depend on another, nor ever to blame God or man. I entreat you, become an affectionate person in this way, by observing these rules. But if through this affection, as you name it, you are going to be a slave and wretched, there is no profit in being affectionate. And what prevents you from loving another as a person subject to mortality, as one who may go away from you. Did not Socrates love his own children? He did; but it was as a free man, as one who remembered that he must first be a friend to the gods. For this reason he violated nothing which was becoming to a good man, neither in making his defence nor [p. 278] by fixing a penalty on himself,581 nor even in the former part of his life when he was a senator or when he was a soldier. But we are fully supplied with every pretext for being of ignoble temper, some for the sake of a child, some for a mother, and others for brethren's sake. But it is not fit for us to be unhappy on account of any person, but to be happy on account of all, but chiefly on account of God who has made us for this end. Well, did Diogenes582 love nobody, who was so kind and so much a lover of all that for mankind in general he willingly undertook so much labour and bodily sufferings? He did love mankind, but how? As became a minister of God, at the same time caring for men, and being also subject to God. For this reason all the earth was his country, and no particular place; and when he was taken prisoner he did not regret Athens nor his associates and friends there, but even he became familiar with the pirates and tried to improve them; and being sold afterwards he lived in Corinth as before at Athens; and he would have behaved the same, if he had gone to the country of the Perrhaebi.583 Thus is freedom acquired. For this reason he used to say, Ever since Antisthenes made me free, I have not been a slave. How did Antisthenes make him free? Hear what he says: Antisthenes taught me what is my own, and what is not my own; possessions are not my own, nor kinsmen, domestics, friends, nor reputation, nor places familiar, nor mode of life; all these belong to others. What then is your own? The use of appearances. This he showed to me, that I possess it free from hindrance, and from com- [p. 279] pulsion, no person can put an obstacle in my way, no person can force me to use appearances otherwise than I wish. Who then has any power over me? Philip or Alexander, or Perdiccas or the great king? How have they this power? For if a man is going to be overpowered by a man, he must long before be overpowered by things. If then pleasure is not able to subdue a man, nor pain, nor fame, nor wealth, but he is able, when he chooses, to spit out all his poor body in a man's face and depart from life, whose slave can he still be? But if he dwelt with pleasure in Athens, and was overpowered by this manner of life, his affairs would have been at every man's command; the stronger would have had the power of grieving him. How do you think that Diogenes would have flattered the pirates that they might sell him to some Athenian, that some time he might see that beautiful Piraeus, and the Long Walls and the Acropolis? In what condition would you see them? As a captive, a slave and mean: and what would be the use of it for you?Not so: but I should see them as a free manShow me, how you would be free. Observe, some person has caught you, who leads you away from your accustomed place of abode and says, You are my slave, for it is in my power to hinder you from living as you please, it is in my power to treat you gently, and to humble you: when I choose, on the contrary you are cheerful and go elated to Athens. What do you say to him who treats you as a slave? What means have you of finding one who will rescue you from slavery?584 Or cannot you even look him in the face, but without saying more do you intreat to be set free? Man, you ought to go gladly to prison, hastening, going before those who lead you there. Then, I ask you, are you unwilling to live in Rome and desire to live in Hellas (Greece)? And when you must die, will you then also fill us with your lamentations, because you will not see Athens nor walk about in the Lyceion? Have you gone abroad for this? was it for this reason you have sought to find some person from whom you might receive benefit? What benefit? That you may [p. 280] solve syllogisms more readily, or handle hypothotical arguments? and for this reason did you leave brother, country, friends, your family, that you might return when you had learned these things? So you did not go abroad to obtain constancy of mind, nor freedom from perturbation, nor in order that being secure from harm you may never complain of any person, accuse no person, and no man may wrong you, and thus you may maintain your relative position without impediment? This is a fine traffic that you have gone abroad for in syllogisms and sophistical arguments585 and hypothetical: if you like, take your place in the agora (market or public place) and proclaim them for sale like dealers in physic.586 Will you not deny even all that you have learned that you may not bring a bad name on your theorems as useless? What harm has philosophy done you? Wherein has Chrysippus injured you that you should prove by your acts that his labours are useless? Were the evils that you had there (at home) not enough, those which were the cause of your pain and lamentation, even if you had not gone abroad? Have you added more to the list? And if you again have other acquaintances and friends, you will have more causes for lamentation; and the same also if you take an affection for another country. Why then do you live to surround yourself with other sorrows upon sorrows through which you are unhappy? Then, I ask you, do you call this affection? What affection, man! If it is a good thing, it is the cause of no evil: if it is bad, I have nothing to do with it. I am formed by nature for my own good: I am. not formed for my own evil.

What then is the discipline for this purpose? First of all the highest and the principal, and that which stands as it were at the entrance, is this; when you are delighted with anything, be delighted as with a thing which is not [p. 281] one of those which cannot be taken away, but as with something of such a kind, as an earthen pot is, or a glass cup, that when it has been broken, you may remember what it was, and may not be troubled. So in this matter also: if you kiss your own child, or your brother or friend, never give full license to the appearance (φαντασίαν), and allow not your pleasure to go as far as it chooses; but check it, and curb it as those who stand behind men in their triumphs and remind them that they are mortal.587 Do you also remind yourself in like manner, that he whom you love is mortal, and that what you love is nothing of your own: it has been given to you for the present, not that it should not be taken from you, nor has it been given to you for all time, but as a fig is given to you or a bunch of grapes at the appointed season of the year. But if you wish for these things in winter, you are a fool. So if you wish for your son or friend when it is not allowed to you, you must know that you are wishing for a fig in winter.588 For such as winter is to a fig, such is every event which happens from the universe to the things which are taken away according to its nature. And further, at the times when you are delighted with a thing, place before yourself the contrary appearances. What harm is it while you are kissing your child to say with a lisping voice, To-morrow you will die; and to a friend also, To-morrow you will go away or I shall, and never shall we see one another again?But these are words of bad omenAnd some incantations also are of bad omen; but because they are useful, I don't care for this; only let them be useful. But do you call things to be of bad omen except those which are significant of some evil? Cowardice is a word of bad omen, and meanness of spirit, and sorrow, and grief and shamelessness. These words are of bad omen: and yet we ought not to hesitate to utter them in order to protect ourselves against the things. Do you tell me that a name which is significant of any natural thing is of evil omen? say that even for the ears of corn to be [p. 282] reaped is of bad omen, for it signifies the destruction of the ears, but not of the world. Say that the falling of the leaves also is of bad omen, and for the dried fig to take the place of the green fig, and for raisins to be made from the grapes. For all these things are changes from a former state into other states; not a destruction, but a certain fixed economy and administration. Such is going away from home and a small change: such is death, a greater change, not from the state which now is to that which is not, but to that which is not now.589 Shall I then no longer exist?You will not exist, but you will be something else, of which the world now has need:590 for you also came into existence not when you chose, but when the world had need of you.591 [p. 283]

Wherefore the wise and good man, remembering who he is and whence he came, and by whom he was produced, is [p. 284] attentive only to this, how he may fill his place with due regularity, and obediently to God. Dost thou still wish me to exist (live)? I will continue to exist as free, as noble in nature, as thou hast wished me to exist: for thou hast made me free from hindrance in that which is my own. But hast thou no further need of me? I thank thee; and so far I have remained for thy sake, and for the sake of no other person, and now in obedience to thee I depart. How dost thou depart? Again, I say, as thou hast pleased, as free, as thy servant, as one who has known thy commands and thy prohibitions. And so long as I shall stay in thy service, whom dost thou will me to be? A prince or a private man, a senator or a common person, a soldier or a general, a teacher or a master of a family? whatever place and position thou mayest assign to me, as Socrates says, I will die ten thousand times rather than desert them. And where dost thou will me to be? in Rome or Athens, or Thebes or Gyara. Only remember me there where I am. If thou sendest me to a place where there are no means for men living according to nature, I shall not depart (from life) in disobedience to thee, but as if thou wast giving me the signal to retreat: I do not leave thee, let this be far from my intention, but I perceive that thou hast no need of me. If means of living according to nature be allowed to me, I will seek no other place than that in which I am, or other men than those among whom I am.

Let these thoughts be ready to hand by night and by day: these you should write, these you should read: about these you should talk to yourself, and to others. Ask a man, Can you help me at all for this purpose? and further, go to another and to another. Then if any thing that is [p. 285] said be contrary to your wish, this reflection first will im- mediately relieve you, that it is not unexpected. For it is a great thing in all cases to say, I knew that I begot a son who is mortal.592 For so you also will say, I knew that I am mortal, I knew that I may leave my home, I knew that I may be ejected from it, I knew that I may be led to prison. Then if you turn round and look to yourself, and seek the place from which comes that which has happened, you will forthwith recollect that it comes from the place of things which are out of the power of the will, and of things which are not my own. What then is it to me? Then, you will ask, and this is the chief thing: And who is it that sent it? The leader, or the general, the state, the law of the state. Give it me then, for I must always obey the law in every thing. Then, when the appearance (of things) pains you, for it is not in your power to prevent this, contend against it by the aid of reason, conquer it: do not allow it to gain strength nor to lead you to the consequences by raising images such as it pleases and as it pleases. If you be in Gyara, do not imagine the mode of living at Rome, and how many pleasures there were for him who lived there and how many there would be for him who returned to Rome: but fix your mind on this matter, how a man who lives in Gyara ought to live in Gyara like a man of courage. And if you be in Rome, do not imagine what the life in Athens is, but think only of the life in Rome.

Then in the place of all other delights substitute this, that of being conscious that you are obeying God, that not in word, but in deed you are performing the acts of a wise and good man. For what a thing it is for a man to be able to say to himself, Now whatever the rest may say in solemn manner in the schools and may be judged to be saying in a way contrary to common opinion (or in a strange way), this I am doing; and they are sitting and are discoursing of my virtues and inquiring about me and praising me; and of this Zeus has willed that I shall receive from myself a demonstration, and shall myself know if he has a soldier such as he ought to have, a citizen such as [p. 286] he ought to have, and if he has chosen to produce me to the rest of mankind as a witness of the things which are independent of the will: See that you fear without reason, that you foolishly desire what you do desire: seek not the good in things external; seek it in yourselves: if you do not, you will not find it. For this purpose he leads me at one time hither, at another time sends me thither, shows me to men as poor, without authority, and sick; sends me to Gyara, leads me into prison, not because he hates me, far from him be such a meaning, for who hates the best of his servants? nor yet because he cares not for me, for he does not neglect any even of the smallest things;593 but he does this for the purpose of exercising me and making use of me as a witness to others. Being appointed to such a service, do I still care about the place in which I am, or with whom I am, or what men say about me? and do 1 not entirely direct my thoughts to God and to his instructions and commands?

Having these things (or thoughts) always in hand, and exercising them by yourself, and keeping them in readiness, you will never be in want of one to comfort you and strengthen you. For it is not shameful to be without something to eat, but not to have reason sufficient for keeping away fear and sorrow. But if once you have gained exemption from sorrow and fear, will there any longer be a tyrant for you, or a tyrant's guard, or atten- dants on Caesar?594 Or shall any appointment to offices at court cause you pain, or shall those who sacrifice in the Capitol on the occasion of being named to certain functions, cause pain to you who have received so great authority from Zeus?595 Only do not make a proud display of it, nor boast of it; but shew it by your acts; and if no man perceives it, be satisfied that you are yourself in a healthy state and happy. [p. 287]