Ch. 8
What is the nature (ἡ οὐσία) of the Good
264
GOD is beneficial. But the Good also is beneficial.265 It is
consistent then that where the nature of God is, there also
the nature of the good should be. What then is the
nature of God?266 Flesh? Certainly not. An estate in
land? By no means. Fame? No. Is it intelligence,
knowledge, right reason? Yes. Herein then simply seek
the nature of the good; for I suppose that you do not seek
it in a plant. No. Do you seek it in an irrational
animal? No. If then you seek it in a rational animal,
why do you still seek it any where except in the supe-
riority of rational over irrational animals?267 Now plants
have not even the power of using appearances, and for this
reason you do not apply the term good to them. The
good then requires the use of appearances. Does it re-
quire this use only? For if you say that it requires this
use only, say that the good, and that happiness and unhap-
piness are in irrational animals also. But you do not say
this, and you do right; for if they possess even in the
highest degree the use of appearances, yet they have not
the faculty of understanding the use of appearances; and
there is good reason for this, for they exist for the purpose
of serving others, and they exercise no superiority. For
the ass, I suppose, does not exist for any superiority over
others. No; but because we had need of a back which is
able to bear something; and in truth we had need also of
his being able to walk, and for this reason he received
also the faculty of making use of appearances, for other
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wise he would not have been able to walk. And here then
the matter stopped. For if he had also received the faculty
of comprehending the use of appearances, it is plain that
consistently with reason he would not then have beer
subjected to us, nor would he have done us these services,
but he would have been equal to us and like to us.
Will you not then seek the nature of good in the
rational animal? for if it is not there, you will not choose
to say that it exists in any other thing (plant or animal).
What then? are not plants and animals also the works of
God? They are; but they are not superior things, nor
yet parts of the Gods. But you are a superior thing; you
are a portion separated from the deity; you have in yourself a certain portion of him. Why then are you ignorant
of your own noble descent?268 Why do you not know
whence you came? will you not remember when you are
eating, who you are who eat and whom you feed? When
you are in conjunction with a woman, will you not remember who you are who do this thing? When you are
in social intercourse, when you are exercising yourself,
when you are engaged in discussion, know you not that
you are nourishing a god, that you are exercising a god?
Wretch, you are carrying about a god with you, and you
know it not.269 Do you think that I mean some God of
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silver or of gold, and external? You carry him within
yourself, and you perceive not that you are polluting him
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by impure thoughts and dirty deeds. And if an image of
God were present, you would not dare to do any of the
things which you are doing: but when God himself is
present within and sees all and hears all, you are not
ashamed of thinking such things and doing such things,
ignorant as you are of your own nature and subject to the
anger of God. Then why do we fear when we are sending a young man from the school into active life, lest he
should do anything improperly, eat improperly, have
improper intercourse with women; and lest the rags in
which he is wrapped should debase him, lest fine garments
should make him proud? This youth (if he acts thus)
does not know his own God: he knows not with whom he
sets out (into the world). But can we endure when he
says' I wish I had you (God) with me.' Have you not
God with you? and do you seek for any other, when you
have him? or will God tell you any thing else than this?
If you were a statue of Phidias, either Athena or Zeus, you
would think both of yourself and of the artist, an if you
had any understanding (power of perception) you would
try to do nothing unworthy of him who made you or of
yourself, and try not to appear in an unbecoming dress
(attitude) to those who look on you. But now because
Zeus has made you, for this reason do you care not how you
shall appear? And yet is the artist (in the one case) like
the artist in the other? or the work in the one case like
the other? And what work of an artist, for instance, has
in itself the faculties, which the artist shows in making
it? Is it not marble or bronze, or gold or ivory? and the
Athena of Phidias when she has once extended the hand
and received in it the figure of Victory270 stands in that
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attitude for ever. But the works of God have power of
motion, they breathe, they have the faculty of using the
appearances of things, and the power of examining them.
Being the work of such an artist do you dishonour him?
And what shall I say, not only that he made you, but also
entrusted you to yourself and made you a deposit to your-
self? Will you not think of this too, but do you also dis-
honour your guardianship? But if God had entrusted
an orphan to you, would you thus neglect him? He has
delivered yourself to your own care, and says, I had no
one fitter to intrust him to than yourself: keep him for
me such as he is by nature, modest, faithful, erect, unterri-
fled, free from passion and perturbation. And then you
do not keep him such.
But some will say, whence has this fellow got the
arrogance which he displays and these supercilious
looks?I have not yet so much gravity as befits a
philosopher; for I do not yet feel confidence in what I
have learned and in what I have assented to: I still
fear my own weakness. Let me get confidence and
then you shall see a countenance such as I ought to have
and an attitude such as I ought to have: then I will
show to you the statue, when it is perfected, when it
is polished. What do you expect? a supercilious coun-
tenance? Does the Zeus at Olympia271 lift up his brow?
No, his look is fixed as becomes him who is ready to
say
Irrevocable is my word and shall not fail.Iliad, i. 526.
Such will I show myself to you, faithful, modest, noble,
free from perturbationWhat, and immortal too, exempt
from old age, and from sickness? No, but dying as becomes
a god, sickening as becomes a god. This power I possess;
this I can do. But the rest I do not possess, nor can I do.
I will show the nerves (strength) of a philosopher. What
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Lerves272 are these? A desire never disappointed, an
aversion273 which never falls on that which it would
avoid, a proper pursuit (ὁρμήν), a diligent purpose, an
assent which is not rash. These you shall see.