Ch. 22
On praecognitions.
142
PRAECOGNITIONS are common to all men, and praecognition
is not contradictory to praecognition. For who of us does
not assume that Good is useful and eligible, and in all circumstances that we ought to follow and pursue it? And
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who of us does not assume that Justice is beautiful and
becoming? When then does the contradiction arise?
It arises in the adaptation of the praecognitions to the
particular cases. When one man says, He has done well:
he is a brave man, and another says, Not so; but he
has acted foolishly; then the disputes arise among men.
This is the dispute among the Jews and the Syrians and
the Egyptians and the Romans; not whether holiness143
should be preferred to all things and in all cases should
be pursued, but whether it is holy to eat pig's flesh or
not holy. You will find this dispute also between Agamemnon and Achilles;144 for call them forth. What do
you say, Agamemnon? ought not that to be done which
is proper and right? Certainly. Well, what do you say,
Achilles? do you not admit that what is good ought to
be done? I do most certainly. Adapt your praecognitions then to the present matter. Here the dispute
begins. Agamemnon says, I ought not to give up
Chryseis to her father. Achilles says, You ought. It
is certain that one of the two makes a wrong adaptation
of the praecognition of ought or duty. Further,
Agamemnon says, Then if I ought to restore Chryseis,
it is fit that I take his prize from some of you. Achilles
replies, Would you then take her whom I love?
Yes, her whom you love. Must I then be the only man
who goes without a prize? and must I be the only man
who has no prize? Thus the dispute begins.145
What then is education? Education is the learning
how to adapt the natural praecognitions to the particular
things conformably to nature; and then to distinguish
that of things some are in our power, but others are not:
in our power are will and all acts which depend on the
will; things not in our power are the body, the parts of
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the body, possessions, parents, brothers, children, country
and generally, all with whom we live in society. In what
then should we place the good? To what kind of things
(οὐσίᾳ) shall we adapt it? To the things which are in
our power? Is not health then a good thing, and
soundness of limb, and life? and are not children and
parents and country? Who will tolerate you if you deny
this?
Let us then transfer the notion of good to these things.
Is it possible then, when a man sustains damage and
does not obtain good things, that he can be happy? It is
not possible. And can he maintain towards society a
proper behaviour? He can not. For I am naturally
formed to look after my own interest. If it is my interest to have an estate in land, it is my interest also to
take it from my neighbour. If it is my interest to have a
garment, it is my interest also to steal it from the bath.146
This is the origin of wars, civil commotions, tyrannies,
conspiracies. And how shall I be still able to maintain
my duty towards Zeus? for if I sustain damage and am
unlucky, he takes no care of me; and what is he to me
if he cannot help me; and further, what is he to me if he
allows me to be in the condition in which I am? I now
begin to hate him. Why then do we build temples, why
set up statues to Zeus, as well as to evil daemons, such
as to Fever;147 and how is Zeus the Saviour, and how the
giver of rain, and the giver of fruits? And in truth if we
place the nature of Good in any such things, all this
follows.
What should we do then? This is the inquiry of the
true philosopher who is in labour.148 Now I do not see
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what the Good is nor the Bad. Am I not mad? Yes.
But suppose that I place the good somewhere among the
things which depend on the will: all will laugh at me.
There will come some greyhead wearing many gold rings
on his fingers, and he will shake his head and say, Hear,
my child. It is right that you should philosophize; but
you ought to have some brains also: all this that you
are doing is silly. You learn the syllogism from philosophers; but you know how to act better than philosophers
do.Man, why then do you blame me, if I know? What
shall I say to this slave? If I am silent, he will burst.
I must speak in this way: Excuse me, as you would
excuse lovers: I am not my own master: I am mad.