Book 4
Ch. 1
About freedom.
HE is free who lives as he wishes to live;616 who is neither
subject to compulsion nor to hindrance, nor to force;
whose movements to action (ὁρμαί) are not impeded,
whose desires attain their purpose, and who does not fall
into that which he would avoid (ἐκκλίσεις ἀπερίπτωτοι). Who then chooses to live in error? No man. Who chooses
to live deceived, liable to mistake,617 unjust, unrestrained,
discontented, mean? No man. Not one then of the bad
lives as he wishes; nor is he then free. And who chooses
to live in sorrow, fear, envy, pity, desiring and failing in
his desires, attempting to avoid something and falling
into it? Not one. Do we then find any of the bad free
from sorrow, free from fear, who does not fall into that
which he would avoid, and does not obtain that which
he wishes? Not one; nor then do we find any bad man
free.618
If then a man who has been twice consul should hear
this, if you add, But you are a wise man; this is nothing
to you: he will pardon you. But if you tell him the
truth, and say, You differ not at all from those who have
been thrice sold as to being yourself not a slave, what else
ought you to expect than blows? For he says, What, I a
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slave, I whose father was free, whose mother was free
I whom no man can purchase: I am also of senatorial
rank, and a friend of Caesar, and I have been a consul,
and I own many slaves.In the first place, most excellent senatorial man, perhaps your father also was a slave
in the same kind of servitude, and your mother, and your
grandfather and all your ancestors in an ascending series.
But even if they were as free as it is possible, what is this
to you? What if they were of a noble nature, and you of
a mean nature; if they were fearless, and you a coward;
if they had the power of self-restraint, and you are not
able to exercise it.
And what, you may say, has this to do with being a
slave? Does it seem to you to be nothing to do a thing unwillingly, with compulsion, with groans, has this nothing
to do with being a slave? It is something, you say: but
who is able to compel me, except the lord of all, Caesar?
Then even you yourself have admitted that you have one
master. But that he is the common master of all, as you
say, let not this console you at all: but know that you
are a slave in a great family. So also the people of
Nicopolis are used to exclaim, By the fortune of Caesar,619
we are free.
However, if you please, let us not speak of Caesar at
present. But tell me this: did you never love any person,
a young girl, or slave, or free? What then is this with
respect to being a slave or free? Were you never commanded by the person beloved to do something which you
did not wish to do? have you never flattered your little
slave? have you never kissed her feet? And yet if any
man compelled you to kiss Caesar's feet, you would think
it an insult and excessive tyranny. What else then is
slavery? Did you never go oat by night to some place
whither you did not wish to go, did you not expend that
you did not wish to expend, did you not utter words with
sighs and groans, did you not submit to abuse and to be
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excluded?620 But if you are ashamed to confess your own
acts, see what Thrasonides621 says and does, who having
seen so much military service as perhaps not even you
have, first of all went out by night, when Geta (a slave)
does not venture out, but if he were compelled by his
master, would have cried out much and would have gone
out lamenting his bitter slavery. Next, what does Thrasonides say? A worthless girl has enslaved me, me whom
no enemy ever did. Unhappy man, who are the slave even
of a girl, and a worthless girl. Why then do you still call
yourself free? and why do you talk of your service in the
army? Then he calls for a sword and is angry with him
who out of kindness refuses it; and he sends presents to
her who hates him, and intreats and weeps, and on the
other hand having had a little success he is elated. But
even then how? was he free enough neither to desire
nor to fear?
Now consider in the case of animals, how we employ
the notion of liberty. Men keep tame lions shut up, and
feed them, and some take them about; and who will say
that this lion is free?622 Is it not the fact that the more
he lives at his ease, so much the more he is in a slavish
condition? and who if he had perception and reason would
wish to be one of these lions? Well, these birds when
they are caught and are kept shut up, how much do they
suffer in their attempts to escape?623 and some of them die
of hunger rather than submit to such a kind of life. And
as many of them as live, hardly live and with suffering pine
away; and if they ever find any opening, they make their
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escape. So much do they desire their natural liberty, and
to be independent and free from hindrance. And what
harm is there to you in this? What do you say? I am
formed by nature to fly where I choose, to live in the
open air, to sing when I choose: you deprive me of all
this, and say, what harm is it to you? For this reason
we shall say that those animals only are free, which
cannot endure capture, but as soon as they are caught.
escape from captivity by death. So Diogenes also somewhere says that there is only one way to freedom, and
that is to die content: and he writes to the Persian king.
You cannot enslave the Athenian state any more than you
can enslave fishes. How is that? cannot I catch them?
If you catch them, says Diogenes, they will immediately
leave you, as fishes do; for if you catch a fish, it dies; and
if these men that are caught shall die, of what use to you
is the preparation for war? These are the words of a
free man who had carefully examined the thing, and, as
was natural, had discovered it. But if you look for it in
a different place from where it is, what wonder if you
never find it?
The slave wishes to be set free immediately. Why?
Do you think that he wishes to pay money to the collectors of twentieths?624 No; but because he imagines that
hitherto through not having obtained this, he is hindered
and unfortunate. If I shall be set free, immediately it is
all happiness, I care for no man, I speak to all as an equal
and like to them, I go where I choose, I come from any
place I choose, and go where I choose. Then he is set
free; and forthwith having no place where he can eat, he
looks for some man to flatter, some one with whom he
shall sup: then he either works with his body and endures the most dreadful things;625 and if he can obtain a
manger, he falls into a slavery much worse than his former
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slavery; or even if he is become rich, being a man with-
out any knowledge of what is good, he loves some little
girl, and in his unhappiness laments and desires to be a
slave again. He says, what evil did I suffer in my state
of slavery? Another clothed me, another supplied me
with shoes, another fed me, another looked after me in
sickness; and I did only a few services for him. But
now a wretched man, what things I suffer, being a slave
to many instead of to one. But however, he says, if I
shall acquire rings626 then I shall live most prosperously
and happily. First, in order to acquire these rings, he
submits to that which he is worthy of; then when he has
acquired them, it is again all the same. Then he says,
If I shall be engaged in military service, I am free from
all evils. He obtains military service. He suffers as much
as a flogged slave, and nevertheless he asks for a second
service and a third. After this, when he has put the finishing stroke (the colophon)627 to his career, and is become a
senator, then he becomes a slave by entering into the
assembly, then he serves the finer and most splendid
slaverynot to be a fool, but to learn what Socrates
taught, what is the nature of each thing that exists, and that
a man should not rashly adapt preconceptions (προλήψεις)
to the several things which are.628 For this is the cause
to men of all their evils, the not being able to adapt the
general preconceptions to the several things. But we
have different opinions (about the cause of our evils).
One man thinks that he is sick: not so however, but the
fact is that he does not adapt his preconceptions right.
Another thinks that he is poor; another that he has a
severe father or mother; and another again that Caesar is
not favourable to him. But all this is one and only one
thing, the not knowing how to adapt the preconceptions.
For who has not a preconception of that which is bad,
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that it is hurtful, that it ought to be avoided, that it ought
in every way to be guarded against? One preconception
is not repugnant to another,629 only where it comes to the
matter of adaptation. What then is this evil, which is
both hurtful, and a thing to be avoided? He answers
not to be Caesar's friend.He is gone far from the mark,
he has missed the adaptation, he is embarrassed, he
seeks the things which are not at all pertinent to the
matter; for when he has succeeded in being Caesar's
friend, never the less he has failed in finding what he
sought. For what is that which every man seeks? To
live secure, to be happy, to do every thing as he wishes,
not to be hindered, nor compelled. When then he is
become the friend of Caesar, is he free from hindrance?
free from compulsion, is he tranquil, is he happy? Of
whom shall we inquire? What more trustworthy witness
have we than this very man who is become Caesar's
friend? Come forward and tell us when did you sleep
more quietly, now or before you became Caesar's friend?
Immediately you hear the answer, Stop, I intreat you, and
do not mock me: you know not what miseries I suffer,
and sleep does not come to me; but one comes and says,
Caesar is already awake, he is now going forth: then
come troubles and caresWell, when did you sup with
more pleasure, now or before? Hear what he says about
this also. He says that if he is not invited, he is pained:
and if he is invited, he sups like a slave with his master,
all the while being anxious that he does not say or do any
thing foolish. And what do you suppose that he is afraid
of; lest he should be lashed like a slave? How can he
expect any thing so good? No, but as befits so great a
man, Caesar's friend, he is afraid that he may lose his
head. And when did you bathe more free from trouble,
and take your gymnastic exercise more quietly? In fine,
which kind of life did you prefer? your present or your
former life? I can swear that no man is so stupid or so
ignorant of truth as not to bewail his own misfortunes the
nearer he is in friendship to Caesar.
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Since then neither those who are called kings live as
they choose, nor the friends of kings, who finally are
those who are free? Seek, and you will find; for you
have aids from nature for the discovery of truth. But if
you are not able yourself by going along these ways only
to discover that which follows, listen to those who have
made the inquiry. What do they say? Does freedom
seem to you a good thing? The greatest good. Is it
possible then that he who obtains the greatest good can be
unhappy or fare badly? No. Whomsoever then you
shall see unhappy, unfortunate, lamenting, confidently
declare that they are not free. I do declare it. We have
now then got away from buying and selling and from such
arrangements about matters of property: for if you have
rightly assented to these matters, if the great king (the
Persian king) is unhappy, he cannot be free, nor can a
little king, nor a man of consular rank, nor one who has
been twice consul.Be it so.
Further then answer me this question also, does freedom
seem to you to be something great and noble and valuable?How should it not seem so? Is it possible then
when a man obtains anything so great and valuable and
noble to be mean?It is not possibleWhen then you see
any man subject to another or flattering him contrary to
his own opinion, confidently affirm that this man also is
not free; and not only if he do this for a bit of supper,
but also if he does it for a government (province) or a
consulship: and call these men little slaves who for the
sake of little matters do these things, and those who do so
for the sake of great things call great slaves, as they
deserve to be.This is admitted alsoDo you think that
freedom is a thing independent and self governing?
CertainlyWhomsoever then it is in the power of another
to hinder and compel, declare that he is not free. And do
not look, I intreat you, after his grandfathers and great
grandfathers, or inquire about his being bought or sold;
but if you hear him saying from his heart and with
feeling, 'Master,' even if the twelve fasces precede him (as
consul), call him a slave. And if you hear him say,
'Wretch that I am, how much I suffer,' call him a slave.
If finally you see him lamenting, complaining, unhappy,
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call him a slave though he wears a praetexta.630 If then he
is doing nothing of this kind, do not yet say that he is
free, but learn his opinions, whether they are subject to
compulsion, or may produce hindrance, or to bad fortune;
and if you find him such, call him a slave who has a holiday in the Saturnalia:631 say that his master is from
home: he will return soon, and you will know what he
suffers. Who will return? Whoever has in himself the
power over anything which is desired by the man, either
to give it to him or to take it away? Thus then have we
many masters? We have: for we have circumstances as
masters prior to our present masters; and these circumstances are many. Therefore it must of necessity be that
those who have the power over any of these circumstances
must be our masters. For no man fears Caesar himself,
but he fears death, banishment, deprivation of his property, prison, and disgrace. Nor does any man love
Caesar, unless Caesar is a person of great merit, but he
loves wealth, the office of tribune, praetor or consul. When
we love, and hate and fear these things, it must be that
those who have the power over them must be our masters.
Therefore we adore them even as gods; for we think that
what possesses the power of conferring the greatest
advantage on us is divine. Then we wrongly assume
(ὑποτάσσομεν) that a certain person has the power of conferring the greatest advantages; therefore he is something
divine. For if we wrongly assume632 that a certain person
has the power of conferring the greatest advantages, it is
a necessary consequence that the conclusion from these
premises must be false.
What then is that which makes a man free from
hindrance and makes him his own master? For wealth
does not do it, nor consulship, nor provincial government,
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nor royal power; but something else must be discovered.
What then is that which when we write makes us free from
hindrance and unimpeded? The knowledge of the art of
writing. What then is it in playing the lute? The
science of playing the lute. Therefore in life also it is the
science of life. You have then heard in a general way:
but examine the thing also in the several parts. Is it
possible that he who desires any of the things which
depend on others can be free from hindrance? NoIs it
possible for him to be unimpeded? NoTherefore he
cannot be free. Consider then: whether we have nothing
which is in our own power only, or whether we have all
things, or whether some things are in our own power, and
others in the power of others.What do you mean?
When you wish the body to be entire (sound), is it in
your power or not?It is not in my powerWhen you
wish it to be healthy?Neither is this in my power.
When you wish it to be handsome?Nor is thisLife or
death?Neither is this in my power.633 Your body then
is another's, subject to every man who is stronger than
yourselfIt isBut your estate, is it in your power to
have it when you please, and as long as you please, and
such as you please?NoAnd your slaves?NoAnd
your clothes?NoAnd your house?NoAnd your
horses?Not one of these thingsAnd if you wish by all
means your children to live, or your wife, or your brother,
or your friends, is it in your power?This also is not in
my power.
Whether then have you nothing which is in your own
power, which depends on yourself only and cannot be
taken from you, or have you any thing of the kind?I
know notLook at the thing then thus, and examine it.
Is any man able to make you assent to that which is
false634 No manIn the matter of assent then you are free
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from hindrance and obstruction.GrantedWell; and
can a man force you to desire to move towards that to
which you do not choose?He can, for when he threatens
me with death or bonds, he compels me to desire to move
towards it. If then, you despise death and bonds, do you
still pay any regard to him?NoIs then the despising
of death an act of your own or is it not yours?It is my
actIt is your own act then also to desire to move towards
a thing: or is it not so?It is my own actBut to desire
to move away from a thing, whose act is that? This also
is your actWhat then if I have attempted to walk, sup-
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pose another should hinder meWhat part of you does he
hinder? does he hinder the faculty of assent?No: but
my poor bodyYes, as he would do with a stone
Granted; but I no longer walkAnd who told you that
walking is your own act free from hindrance? for I said
that this only was free from hindrance, to desire to move:
but where there is need of body and its co-operation, you
have heard long ago that nothing is your own.Granted
this alsoAnd who can compel you to desire what you
do not wish?No manAnd to propose or intend, or in
short to make use of the appearances which present themselves, can any man compel you?He cannot do this: but
he will hinder me when I desire from obtaining what I
desire.If you desire any thing which is your own, and
one of the things which cannot be hindered, how will he
hinder you?He cannot in any wayWho then tells
you that he who desires the things that belong to another
is free from hindrance?
Must I then not desire health? By no means, nor
any thing else that belongs to another: for what is not
in your power to acquire or to keep when you please, this
belongs to another. Keep then far from it not only your
hands, but more than that, even your desires. If you do
not, you have surrendered yourself as a slave; you have
subjected your neck, if you admire635 any thing not your
own, to every thing that is dependent on the power of
others and perishable, to which you have conceived a
liking.Is not my hand my own?It is a part of your
own body;636 but it is by nature earth, subject to hindrance,
compulsion, and the slave of every thing which is stronger.
And why do I say your hand? You ought to possess your
whole body as a poor ass loaded, as long as it is possible,
as long as you are allowed. But if there be a press,637 and
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a soldier should lay hold of it, let it go, do not resist, nor
murmur; if you do, you will receive blows, and never the
less you will also lose the ass. But when you ought to
feel thus with respect to the body, consider what remains
to be done about all the rest, which is provided for the
sake of the body. When the body is an ass, all the other
things are bits belonging to the ass, pack-saddles, shoes,638
barley, fodder. Let these also go: get rid of them quicker
and more readily than of the ass.
When you have made this preparation, and have practised this discipline, to distinguish that which belongs to
another from that which is your own, the things which
are subject to hindrance from those which are not, to consider the things free from hindrance to concern yourself,
and those which are not free not to concern yourself, to
keep your desire steadily fixed to the things which do
concern yourself, and turned from the things which do
not concern yourself; do you still fear any man? No one.
For about what will you be afraid? about the things which
are your own, in which consists the nature of good and
evil? and who has power over these things? who can take
them away? who can impede them? No man can, no more
than he can impede God. But will you be afraid about
your body and your possessions, about things which are
not yours, about things which in no way concern you?
and what else have you been studying from the beginning
than to distinguish between your own and not your own,
the things which are in your power and not in your power,
the things subject to hindrance and not subject? and why
have you come to the philosophers? was it that you may
never the less be unfortunate and unhappy? You will then
in this way, as I have supposed you to have done, be without fear and disturbance. And what is grief to you? for
fear comes from what you expect, but grief from that which
is present.639 But what further will you desire? For of
the things which are within the power of the will, as being
good and present, you have a proper and regulated desire:
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but of the things which are not in the power of the will
you do not desire any one, and so you do not allow any
place to that which is irrational, and impatient, and above
measure hasty.640
When then you are thus affected towards things, what
man can any longer be formidable to you? For what has
a man which is formidable to another, either when you see
him or speak to him or finally are conversant with him?
Not more than one horse has with respect to another, or
one dog to another, or one bee to another bee. Things
indeed are formidable to every man; and when any man
is able to confer these things on another or to take them
away, then he too becomes formidable. How then is an
acropolis (a stronghold or fortress, the seat of tyranny)
demolished? Not by the sword, not by fire, but by opinion.
For if we abolish the acropolis which is in the city, can we
abolish also that of fever, and that of beautiful women?
Can we in a word abolish the acropolis which is in us and
cast out the tyrants within us,641 whom we have daily over
us, sometimes the same tyrants, at other times different
tyrants? But with this we must begin, and with this we
must demolish the acropolis and eject the tyrants, by giving
up the body, the parts of it, the faculties of it, the possessions, the reputation, magisterial offices, honours, children,
brothers, friends, by considering all these things as belonging to others. And if tyrants have been ejected from us,
why do I still shut in the acropolis by a wall of circumvallation,642 at least on my account; for if it still stands, what
does it do to me? why do I still eject (the tyrant's) guards?
For where do I perceive them? against others they have
their fasces, and their spears and their swords. But I
have never been hindered in my will, nor compelled when
I did not will. And how is this possible? I have placed
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my movements towards action (ὁρμήν) in obedience to
God.643 Is it his will that I shall have fever? It is my
will also. Is it his will that I should move towards any
thing? It is my will also. Is it his will that I should
obtain any thing? It is my wish also.644 Does he not
will? I do not wish. Is it his will that I die, is it his
will that I be put to the rack? It is my will then to die:
it is my will then to be put to the rack. Who then is
still able to hinder me contrary to my own judgment, or to
compel me? No more than he can hinder or compel Zeus.
Thus the more cautious of travellers also act. A traveller
has heard that the road is infested by robbers; he does not
venture to enter on it alone, but he waits for the companionship on the road either of an ambassador, or of a quaestor,
or of a proconsul, and when he has attached himself to such
persons he goes along the road safely. So in the world645
the wise man acts. There are many companies of robbers,
tyrants, storms, difficulties, losses of that which is dearest.
Where is there any place of refuge? how shall he pass
along without being attacked by robbers? what company
shall he wait for that he may pass along in safety? to whom
shall he attach himself? To what person generally? to
the rich man, to the man of consular rank? and what is
the use of that to me? Such a man is stripped himself,
groans and laments. But what if the fellow companion
himself turns against me and becomes my robber, what
shall I do? I will be a friend of Caesar: when I am Caesar's
companion no man will wrong me. In the first place, that
I may become illustrious, what things must I endure and
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suffer? how often and by how many must I be robbed?
Then, if I become Caesar's friend, he also is mortal. And
if Caesar from any circumstance becomes my enemy, where
is it best for me to retire? Into a desert? Well, does fever
not come there? What shall be done then? Is it not
possible to find a safe fellow traveller, a faithful one, strong,
secure against all surprises? Thus he considers and perceives that if he attaches himself to God, he will make his
journey in safety.
How do you understand 'attaching yourself to God?
In this sense, that whatever God wills, a man also shall
will; and what God does not will, a man also shall not
will. How then shall this be done? In what other way
than by examining the movements (ὁρμάς, the acts) of
God646 and his administration? What has he given to me
as my own and in my own power? what has he reserved
to himself? He has given to me the things which are in
the power of the will (τὰ προαιρετικὰ): he has put them
in my power free from impediment and hindrance. How
was he able to make the earthy body free from hindrance?
[He could not], and accordingly he has subjected to the
revolution of the whole (τῇ τῶν ὅλων περιόδῳ)647 possessions,
household things, house, children, wife. Why then do I
fight against God? why do I will what does not depend on
the will? why do I will to have absolutely what is not
granted to me? But how ought I to will to have things?
In the way in which they are given and as long as they are
given. But he who has given takes away.648 Why then
do I resist? I do not say that I shall be a fool if I use
force to one who is stronger, but I shall first be unjust.
For whence had I things when I came into the world?
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My father gave them to meAnd who gave them to him?
and who made the sun? and who made the fruits of the
earth? and who the seasons? and who made the connection
of men with one another and their fellowship?
Then after receiving everything from another and even
yourself, are you angry and do you blame the giver if he
takes any thing from you? Who are you, and for what
purpose did you come into the world? Did not he (God)
introduce you here, did he not show you the light, did he
not give you fellow workers, and perceptions and reason?
and as whom did he introduce you here? did he not introduce you as subject to death, and as one to live on the
earth with a little flesh, and to observe his administration,
and to join with him in the spectacle and the festival for
a short time? Will you not then, as long as you have
been permitted, after seeing the spectacle and the solemnity,
when he leads you out, go with adoration of him and thanks
for what you have heard and seen?No; but I would still
enjoy the feast.The initiated too would wish to be longer
in the initiation:649 and perhaps also those at Olympia to
see other athletes; but the solemnity is ended: go away
like a grateful and modest man; make room for others:
others also must be born, as you were, and being born they
must have a place, and houses and necessary things. And
if the first do not retire, what remains? Why are you insatiable? Why are you not content? why do you contract
the world?Yes, but I would have my little children with
me and my wifeWhat, are they yours? do they not belong
to the giver, and to him who made you? then will you not
give up what belongs to others? will you not give way to
him who is superior?Why then did he introduce me into
the world on these conditions?And if the conditions do
not suit you, depart.650 He has no need of a spectator who
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is not satisfied. He wants those who join in the festival,
those who take part in the chorus, that they may rather
applaud, admire, and celebrate with hymns the solemnity.
But those who can bear no trouble, and the cowardly he
will not unwillingly see absent from the great assembly
(πανήγυρις); for they did not when they were present behave as they ought to do at a festival nor fill up their place
properly, but they lamented, found fault with the deity,
fortune, their companions; not seeing both what they had,
and their own powers, which they received for contrary
purposes, the powers of magnanimity, of a generous mind,
manly spirit, and what we are now inquiring about, freedom.For what purpose then have I received these things?
To use themHow long?So long as he who has lent
them chooses.What if they are necessary to me?Do not
attach yourself to them and they will not be necessary: do
not say to yourself that they are necessary, and then they
are not necessary.
This study you ought to practise from morning to evening, beginning with the smallest things and those most
liable to damage, with an earthen pot, with a cup. Then
proceed in this way to a tunic, to a little dog, to a horse,
to a small estate in land: then to yourself, to your body,
to the parts of your body, to your children, to your wife, to
your brothers. Look all round and throw these things
from you (which are not yours). Purge your opinions, so
that nothing cleave to you of the things which are not
your own, that nothing grow to you, that nothing give
you pain when it is torn from you;651 and say, while you
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are daily exercising yourself as you do there (in the school),
not that you are philosophizing, for this is an arrogant
(offensive) expression, but that you are presenting an
asserter of freedom:652 for this is really freedom. To this
freedom Diogenes was called by Antisthenes, and he said
that he could no longer be enslaved by any man. For
this reason when he was taken prisoner,653 how did he
behave to the pirates? Did he call any of them master?
and I do not speak of the name, for I am not afraid of the
word, but of the state of mind, by which the word is produced. How did he reprove them for feeding badly their
captives? How was he sold? Did he seek a master? no;
but a slave. And when he was sold how did he behave to
his master?654 Immediately he disputed with him and
said to his master that he ought not to be dressed as he
was, nor shaved in such a manner; and about the children
he told them how he ought to bring them up. And what
was strange in this? for if his master had bought an
exercise master, would he have employed him in the exercises of the palaestra as a servant or as a master? and sc
if he had bought a physician or an architect. And so in
every matter, it is absolutely necessary that he who has
skill must be the superior of him who has not. Whoever
then generally possesses the science of life, what else must
he be than master? For who is master in a ship? The
man who governs the helm? Why? Because he who
will not obey him suffers for it. But a master can give
me stripes. Can he do it then without suffering for it? So
I also used to think. But because he cannot do it without
suffering for it, for this reason it is not in his power: and
no man can do what is unjust without suffering for it.
And what is the penalty for him who puts his own slave
in chains?655 what do you think that is? The fact of
putting the slave in chains:and you also will admit this,
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if you choose to maintain the truth, that man is not a wild
beast, but a tame animal. For when is a vine doing badly?
When it is in a condition contrary to its nature. When
is a cock? Just the same. Therefore a man also is so.
What then is a man's nature? To bite, to kick, and to
throw into prison and to behead? No; but to do good,
to co-operate with others, to wish them well. At that
time then he is in a bad condition, whether you chose to
admit it or not, when he is acting foolishly.
Socrates then did not fare badly?No; but his judges
and his accusers did.Nor did Helvidius656 at Rome fare
badly?No; but his murderer did. How do you mean?
The same as you do when you say that a cock has not
fared badly when he has gained the victory and been
severely wounded; but that the cock has fared badly when
he has been defeated and is unhurt: nor do you call a dog
fortunate, who neither pursues game nor labours, but
when you see him sweating,657 when you see him in pain
and panting violently after running. What paradox (unusual thing) do we utter if we say that the evil in every
thing is that which is contrary to the nature of the thing?
Is this a paradox? for do you not say this in the case of
all other things? Why then in the case of man only do
you think differently? But because we say that the nature
of man is tame (gentle) and social and faithful, you will
not say that this is a paradox?658 It is notWhat then
is it a paradox to say that a man is not hurt when he is
whipped, or put in chains, or beheaded? does he not, if he
suffers nobly, come off even with increased advantage and
profit? But is he not hurt, who suffers in a most pitiful
and disgraceful way, who in place of a man becomes a
wolf, or viper or wasp?
Well then let us recapitulate the things which have
been agreed on. The man who is not under restraint is
free, to whom things are exactly in that state in which he
wishes them to be; but he who can be restrained or compelled or hindered, or thrown into any circumstances
[p. 314]
against his will, is a slave. But who is free from restraint?
He who desires nothing that belongs to (is in the power
of) others. And what are the things which belong to
others? Those which are not in our power either to have
or not to have, or to have of a certain kind or in a certain
manner.659 Therefore the body belongs to another, the
parts of the body belong to another, possession (property)
belongs to another. If then you are attached to any of
these things as your own, you will pay the penalty which
it is proper for him to pay who desires what belongs to
another. This road leads to freedom, this is the only way
of escaping from slavery, to be able to say at last with all
your soul
Lead me, O Zeus, and thou 0 destiny,
The way that I am bid by you to go.
660
But what do you say, philosopher? The tyrant summons
you to say something which does not become you. Do you
say it or do you not? Answer meLet me considerWill
you consider now? But when you were in the school, what
was it which you used to consider? Did you not study
what are the things that are good and what are bad, and
what things are neither one nor the other?I did.What
then was our opinion?That just and honourable acts
were good; and that unjust and disgraceful (foul) acts
were bad.Is life a good thing?No.Is death a bad
thing?No.Is prison?No.But what did we think
about mean and faithless words and betrayal of a friend
and flattery of a tyrant?That they are bad.Well then,
you are not considering, nor have you considered nor deliberated. For what is the matter for consideration, is it
whether it is becoming for me, when I have it in my
power, to secure for myself the greatest of good things,
and not to secure for myself (that is, not to avoid) the
greatest evils? A fine inquiry indeed, and necessary, and
one that demands much deliberation. Man, why do you
mock us? Such an inquiry is never made. If you really
[p. 315]
imagined that base things were bad and honourable things
were good, and that all other things were neither good nor
bad, you would not even have approached this enquiry,
nor have come near it; but immediately you would have
been able to distinguish them by the understanding as you
would do (in other cases) by the vision. For when do
you inquire if black things are white, if heavy things are
light, and do not comprehend the manifest evidence of the
senses? How then do you now say that you are considering whether things which are neither good nor bad ought
to be avoided more than things which are bad? But you
do not possess these opinions; and neither do these things
seem to you to be neither good nor bad, but you think
that they are the greatest evils; nor do you think those
other things (mean and faithless words, etc.) to be evils, but
matters which do not concern us at all. For thus from the
beginning you have accustomed yourself. Where am I?
In the schools: and are any listening to me? I am discoursing among philosophers. But I have gone out of the
school. Away with this talk of scholars and fools. Thus
a friend is overpowered by the testimony of a philosopher:661
thus a philosopher becomes a parasite; thus he lets himself for hire for money: thus in the senate a man does not
say what he thinks; in private (in the school) he proclaims
his opinions.662 You are a cold and miserable little opinion,
suspended from idle words as from a hair. But keep yourself strong and fit for the uses of life and initiated by being
exercised in action. How do you hear (the report)?I do
not say, that your child is deadfor how could you bear
that?but that your oil is spilled, your wine drunk up.
Do you act in such a way that one standing by you while
you are making a great noise, may say this only, Philo-
[p. 316]
sopher, you say something different in the school. Why
do you deceive us? Why, when you are only a worm, do
you say that you are a man? I should like to be present
when some of the philosophers is lying with a woman, that
I might see how he is exerting himself, and what words he
is uttering, and whether he remembers his title of philosopher, and the words which he hears or says or reads.
And what is this to liberty? Nothing else than this,
whether you who are rich choose or not.And who is
your evidence for this?who else than yourselves? who
have a powerful master (Caesar), and who live in obedience to his nod and motion, and who faint if he only looks
at you with a scowling countenance; you who court old
women663 and old men, and say, I cannot do this: it is not
in my power. Why is it not in your power? Did you
not lately contend with me and say that you are free?
But Aprulla664 has hindered me? Tell the truth then,
slave, and do not run away from your masters, nor deny,
nor venture to produce any one to assert your freedom
(καρπιοτήν), when you have so many evidences of your
slavery. And indeed when a man is compelled by love to
do something contrary to his opinion (judgment), and at
the same time sees the better, but has not the strength to
follow it, one might consider him still more worthy of
excuse as being held by a certain violent and in a manner
a divine power.665 But who could endure you who are in
[p. 317]
love with old women and old men, and wipe the old
women's noses, and wash them and give them presents,
and also wait on them like a slave when they are sick,
and at the same time wish them dead, and question the
physicians whether they are sick unto death? And again,
when in order to obtain these great and much admired
magistracies and honours, you kiss the hands of these
slaves of others, and so you are not the slave even of free
men. Then you walk about before me in stately fashion
a praetor or a consul. Do I not know how you became a
praetor, by what means you got your consulship, who
gave it to you? I would not even choose to live, if I
must live by help of Felicion666 and endure his arrogance
and servile insolence: for I know what a slave is, who is
fortunate, as he thinks, and puffed up by pride.
You then, a man may say, are you free? I wish, by the
Gods, and pray to be free; but I am not yet able to face
my masters, I still value my poor body, I value greatly
the preservation of it entire, though I do not possess it
entire.667 But I can point out to you a free man, that you
may no longer seek an example. Diogenes was free.
How was he free?not because he was born of free
parents,668 but because he was himself free, because he
had cast off all the handles of slavery, and it was not
possible for any man to approach him, nor had any man
the means of laying hold of him to enslave him. He had
everything easily loosed, everything only hanging to him.
If you laid hold of his property, he would have rather
let it go and be yours, than he would have followed you
for it: if you had laid hold of his leg, he would have let
go his leg; if of all his body, all his poor body; his
intimates, friends, country, just the same. For he knew
[p. 318]
from whence he had them, and from whom, and on what
conditions. His true parents indeed, the Gods, and his
real country he would never have deserted, nor would he
have yielded to any man in obedience to them and to their
orders, nor would any man have died for his country more
readily. For he was not used to inquire when he should
be considered to have done anything on behalf of the whole
of things (the universe, or all the world), but he remembered that every thing which is done comes from thence
and is done on behalf of that country and is commanded
by him who administers it.669 Therefore see what Diogenes himself says and writes:For this reason, he
says, Diogenes, it is in your power to speak both with
the King of the Persians and with Archidamus the king
of the Lacedaemonians, as you please. Was it because
he was born of free parents? I suppose all the Athenians
and all the Lacedaemonians because they were born
of slaves, could not talk with them (these kings) as
they wished, but feared and paid court to them. Why
then does he say that it is in his power? Because I do
not consider the poor body to be my own, because I want
nothing, because law670 is every thing to me, and nothing
else is. These were the things which permitted him to be
free.
And that you may not think that I show you the example of a man who is a solitary person,671 who has neither
wife nor children, nor country, nor friends nor kinsmen, by
whom he could be bent and drawn in various directions,
take Socrates and observe that he had a wife and children,
but he did not consider them as his own; that he had a
country, so long as it was fit to have one, and in such a
manner as was fit; friends and kinsmen also, but he held
all in subjection to law and to the obedience due to it.
For this reason he was the first to go out as a soldier, when
it was necessary, and in war he exposed himself to danger
[p. 319]
most unsparingly;672 and when he was sent by the tyrants
to seize Leon, he did not even deliberate about the matter,
because he thought that it was a base action, and he knew
that he must die (for his refusal), if it so happened.673
And what difference did that make to him? for he intended to preserve something else, not his poor flesh, but
his fidelity, his honourable character. These are things
which could not be assailed nor brought into subjection.
Then when he was obliged to speak in defence of his life,
did he behave like a man who had children, who had a
wife? No, but he behaved like a man who has neither.
And what did he do when he was (ordered) to drink the
poison,674 and when he had the power of escaping from
prison, and when Crito said to him, Escape for the sake of
your children, what did Socrates say?675 did he consider
the power of escape as an unexpected gain? By no
means: he considered what was fit and proper; but the
rest he did not even look at or take into the reckoning.
For he did not choose, he said, to save his poor body, but
to save that which is increased and saved by doing what
is just, and is impaired and destroyed by doing what is
unjust. Socrates will not save his life by a base act; he
who would not put the Athenians to the vote when they
clamoured that he should do so,676 he who refused to obey
[p. 320]
the tyrants, he who discoursed in such a manner about
virtue and right behaviour. It is not possible to save
such a man's life by base acts, but he is saved by dying,
not by running away. For the good actor also preserves
his character by stopping when he ought to stop, better
than when he goes on acting beyond the proper time.
What then shall the children of Socrates do? If, said
Socrates, I had gone off to Thessaly, would you have
taken care of them; and if I depart to the world below,
will there be no man to take care of them? See how he
gives to death a gentle name and mocks it. But if you
and I had been in his place, we should have immediately
answered as philosophers that those who act unjustly must
be repaid in the same way, and we should have added, I
shall be useful to many, if my life is saved, and if I die,
I shall be useful to no man. For, if it had been necessary, we should have made our escape by slipping through
a small hole. And how in that case should we have been
useful to any man? for where would they have been then
staying?677 or if we were useful to men while we were
alive, should we not have been much more useful to
them by dying when we ought to die, and as we ought?
And now Socrates being dead, no less useful to men, and
even more useful, is the remembrance of that which he did
or said when he was alive.678
[p. 321]
Think of these things, these opinions, these words: look
to these examples, if you would be free, if you desire the
thing according to its worth. And what is the wonder
if you buy so great a thing at the price of things so many
and so great? For the sake of this which is called liberty,
some hang themselves, others throw themselves down precipices, and sometimes even whole cities have perished:
and will you not for the sake of the true and unassailable
and secure liberty give back to God when he demands
them the things which he has given? Will you not, as
Plato says, study not to die only, but also to endure torture, and exile, and scourging and in a word to give up
all which is not your own? If you will not, you will be
[p. 322]
a slave among slaves, even if you be ten thousand times
a consul; and if you make your way up to the Palace
(Caesar's residence), you will no less be a slave; and you
will feel, that perhaps philosophers utter words which are
contrary to common opinion (paradoxes), as Cleanthes also
said, but not words contrary to reason. For you will know
by experience that the words are true, and that there is no
profit from the things which are valued and eagerly sought
to those who have obtained them; and to those who have
not yet obtained them there is an imagination (φαντασία),
that when these things are come, all that is good will
come with them; then, when they are come, the feverish
feeling is the same, the tossing to and fro is the same,
the satiety, the desire of things which are not present;
for freedom is acquired not by the full possession of the
things which are desired, but by removing the desire.
And that you may know that this is true, as you have
laboured for those things, so transfer your labour to these;
be vigilant for the purpose of acquiring an opinion which
will make you free; pay court to a philosopher instead of
to a rich old man: be seen about a philosopher's doors:
you will not disgrace yourself by being seen; you will
not go away empty nor without profit, if you go to the
philosopher as you ought, and if not (if you do not succeed), try at least: the trial (attempt) is not disgraceful.
