Ch. 9
To a certain rhetorician who was going up to Rome on
a suit.
WHEN a certain person came to him, who was going up to
Rome on account of a suit which had regard to his rank,
Epictetus enquired the reason of his going to Rome, and
the man then asked what he thought about the matter.
Epictetus replied, If you ask me what you will do in
Rome, whether you will succeed or fail, I have no rule
(θεώρημα) about this. But if you ask me how you will
fare, I can tell you: if you have right opinions (δόγματα),
you will fare well; if they are false, you will fare ill.
For to every man the cause of his acting is opinion. For
what is the reason why you desired to be elected governor
of the Cnossians? Your opinion. What is the reason
that you are now going up to Rome? Your opinion. And
going in winter, and with danger and expense.I must
go.What tells you this? Your opinion. Then if opi-
nions are the causes of all actions, and a man has bad
opinions, such as the cause may be, such also is the effect.
Have we then all sound opinions, both you and your
adversary? And how do you differ? But have you
sounder opinions than your adversary? Why? You
think so. And so does he think that his opinions are
better; and so do madmen. This is a bad criterion.
But show to me that you have made some inquiry
into your opinions and have taken some pains about
them. And as now you are sailing to Rome in order
to become governor of the Cnossians, and you are not
content to stay at home with the honours which you had,
but you desire something greater and more conspicuous,
so when did you ever make a voyage for the purpose
of examining your own opinions, and casting them out, if
you have any that are bad? Whom have you approached
for this purpose? What time have you fixed for it? What
age? Go over the times of your life by yourself, if you
are ashamed of me (knowing the fact) when you were a
boy, did you examine your own opinions? and did you not
[p. 220]
then, as you do all things now, do as you did do? and
when you were become a youth and attended the rheto-
ricians, and yourself practised rhetoric, what did you imagine
that you were deficient in? And when you were a young
man and engaged in public matters, and pleaded causes
yourself, and were gaining reputation, who then seemed
your equal? And when would you have submitted to any
man examining and showing that your opinions are bad?
What then do you wish me to say to you?Help me in
this matter.I have no theorem (rule) for this. Nor have
you, if you came to me for this purpose, come to me as a
philosopher, but as to a seller of vegetables or a shoemaker.
For what purpose then have philosopher' theorems? For
this purpose, that whatever may happen, our ruling faculty
may be and continue to be conformable to nature. Does
this seem to you a small thing?No; but the greatest.
What then? does it need only a short time? and is it
possible to seize it as you pass by? If you can, seize it.
Then you will say, I met with Epictetus as I should
meet with a stone or a statue: for you saw me, and nothing
snore. But he meets with a man as a man, who learns his
opinions, and in his turn shows his own. Learn my
opinions: show me yours; and then say that you have
visited me. Let us examine one another: if I have any
bad opinion, take it away: if you have any, show it. This
is the meaning of meeting with a philosopher.Not so,
(you say): but this is only a passing visit, and while we
are hiring the vessel, we can also see Epictetus. Let us
see what he says. Then you go away and say: Epictetus
was nothing; he used solecisms and spoke in a barbarous
way. For of what else do you come as judges?Well,
but a man may say to me, if I attend to such matters474 (as
you do), I shall have no land, as you have none; I shall
have no silver cups as you have none, nor fine beasts as
you have none.In answer to this it is perhaps sufficient
to say: I have no need of such things: but if you possess
many things, you have need of others: whether you
choose or not, you are poorer than I am. What then have
I need of? Of that which you have not: of firmness, of a
[p. 221]
mind which is conformable to nature, of being free from
perturbation. Whether I have a patron475 or not, what is
that to me? but it is something to you. I am richer than
you: I am not anxious what Caesar will think of me: for
this reason, I flatter no man. This is what I possess
instead of vessels of silver and gold. You have utensils
of gold; but your discourse, your opinions, your assents,
your movements (pursuits), your desires are of earthen
ware. But when I have these things conformable to
nature, why should I not employ my studies also upon
reason? for I have leisure: my mind is not distracted.
What shall I do, since I have no distraction? What more
suitable to a man have I than this? When you have
nothing to do, you are disturbed, you go to the theatre or
you wander about without a purpose. Why should not
the philosopher labour to improve his reason? You
employ yourself about crystal vessels: I employ myself
about the syllogism named the lying:476 you about
myrrhine477 vessels; I employ myself about the syllogism
named the denying (τοῦ ἀποφάσκοντος). To you every
thing appears small that you possess: to me all that I
have appears great. Your desire is insatiable: mine is
satisfied. To (children) who put their hand into a narrow-
necked earthen vessel and bring out figs and nuts, this
happens; if they fill the hand, they cannot take it out,
and then they cry. Drop a few of them and you will
draw things out. And do you part with your desires:
do not desire many things and you will have what you
want.
[p. 222]