Ch. 22
On friendship.
399
WHAT a man applies himself to earnestly, that he natu-
rally loves. Do men then apply themselves earnestly to
the things which are bad? By no means. Well, do they
apply themselves to things which in no way concern
themselves? not to these either. It remains then that
they employ themselves earnestly only about things which
are good; and if they are earnestly employed about things,
they love such things also. Whoever then understands
what is good, can also know how to love: but he who
cannot distinguish good from bad, and things which are
neither good nor bad from both, how can he possess the
power of loving? To love then is only in the power of
the wise.
How is this? a man may say; I am foolish, and yet I
love my child.I am surprised indeed that you have
begun by making the admission that you are foolish. For
what are you deficient in? Can you not make use of
your senses? do you not distinguish appearances? do you
not use food which is suitable for your body, and clothing
and habitation? Why then do you admit that you are
foolish? It is in truth because you are often disturbed by
appearances and perplexed, and their power of persuasion
often conquers you; and sometimes you think these things
to be good, and then the same things to be bad, and lastly
neither good nor bad; and in short you grieve, fear, envy,
are disturbed, you are changed. This is the reason why
you confess that you are foolish. And are you not changeable in love? But wealth, and pleasure and in a word
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things themselves, do you sometimes think them to be
good, and sometimes bad? and do you not think the same
men at one time to be good, at another time bad? and
have you not at one time a friendly feeling towards them,
and at another time the feeling of an enemy? and do you
not at one time praise them, and at another time blame
them? Yes; I have these feelings also. Well then, do
you think that he who has been deceived about a man is
his friend? Certainly not. And he who has selected a
man as his friend and is of a changeable disposition, has
he good will towards him? He has not. And he who
now abuses a man, and afterwards admires him? This
man also has no good will to the other. Well then, did
you never see little dogs caressing and playing with one
another, so that you might say, there is nothing more
friendly? but that you may know what friendship is,
throw a bit of flesh among them, and you will learn.
Throw between yourself and your son a little estate, and
you will know how soon he will wish to bury you and
how soon you wish your son to die. Then you will change
your tone and say, what a son I have brought up! He
has long been wishing to bury me. Throw a smart girl
between you; and do you the old man love her, and the
young one will love her too. If a little fame intervene
or dangers, it will be just the same. You will utter the
words of the father of Admetus!
Life gives you pleasure: and why not your father?400
Do you think that Admetus did not love his own child
when he was little? that he was not in agony when the
child had a fever? that he did not often say, I wish I had
the fever instead of the child? then when the test (the
thing) came and was near, see what words they utter.
Were not Eteocles and Polynices from the same mother
and from the same father? Were they not brought up
together, had they not lived together, drunk together,
slept together, and often kissed one another? So that, if
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any man, I think, had seen them, he would have ridiculed
the philosophers for the paradoxes which they utter about
friendship. But when a quarrel rose between them about
the royal power, as between dogs about a bit of meat, see
what they say
Polynices. Where will you take your station
before the towers?
Eteocles. Why do you ask me this?
Pol. I will place myself opposite and try to
kill you.
Et. I also wish to do the same.
401
Such are the wishes that they utter.
For universally, be not deceived, every animal is
attached to nothing so much as to its own interest.402
Whatever then appears to it an impediment to this interest,
whether this be a brother, or a father, or a child, or
beloved, or lover, it hates, spurns, curses: for its nature is
to love nothing so much as its own interest; this is father,
and brother and kinsman, and country, and God. When
then the gods appear to us to be an impediment to this,
we abuse them and throw down their statues and burn
their temples, as Alexander ordered the temples of Aes-
culapius to be burned when his dear friend died.403
For this reason if a man put in the same place his
interest, sanctity, goodness, and country, and parents, and
friends, all these are secured: but if he puts in one place
his interest, in another his friends, and his country and
his kinsmen and justice itself, all these give way being
borne down by the weight of interest. For where the I
and the Mine are placed, to that place of necessity the
animal inclines: if in the flesh, there is the ruling power:
if in the will, it is there: and if it is in externals, it is
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there.404 If then I am there where my will is, then only
shall I be a friend such as I ought to be, and son, and
father; for this will be my interest, to maintain the
character of fidelity, of modesty, of patience, of abstinence,
of active cooperation, of observing my relations (towards
all). But if I put myself in one place, and honesty in
another, then the doctrine of Epicurus becomes strong,
which asserts either that there is no honesty or it is that
which opinion holds to be honest (virtuous).405
It was through this ignorance that the Athenians and
the Lacedaemonians quarrelled, and the Thebans with
both; and the great king quarrelled with Hellas, and the
Macedonians with both; and the Romans with the Getae.406
And still earlier the Trojan war happened for these
reasons. Alexander was the guest of Menelaus; and if
any man had seen their friendly disposition, he would not
have believed any one who said that they were not friends.
But there was cast between them (as between dogs) a bit
of meat, a handsome woman, and about her war arose.
And now when you see brothers to be friends appearing to
have one mind, do not conclude from this any thing about
their friendship, not even if they swear it and say that it is
impossible for them to be separated from one another. For
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the ruling principle of a bad man cannot be trusted, it is
insecure, has no certain rule by which it is directed, and
is overpowered at different times by different appearances.407
But examine, not what other men examine, if they are
born of the same parents and brought up together, and
under the same paedagogue; but examine this only,
wherein they place their interest, whether in externals or
in the will. If in externals, do not name them friends, no
more than name them trustworthy or constant, or brave
or free: do not name them even men, if you have any
judgment. For that is not a principle of human nature
which makes them bite one another, and abuse one another,
and occupy deserted places or public places, as if they
were mountains,408 and in the courts of justice display the
acts of robbers; nor yet that which makes them intemperate and adulterers and corrupters, nor that which
makes them do whatever else men do against one another
through this one opinion only, that of placing themselves
and their interests in the things which are not within the
power of their will. But if you hear that in truth these
men think the good to be only there, where will is, and
where there is a right use of appearances, no longer
trouble yourself whether they are father or son, or
brothers, or have associated a long time and are companions, but when you have ascertained this only, confidently declare that they are friends, as you declare that
they are faithful, that they are just. For where else is
friendship than where there is fidelity, and modesty,
where there is a communion409 of honest things and of
nothing else?
But you may say, such a one treated me with regard so
lung; and did he not love me? How do you know, slave,
if he did not regard you in the same way as he wipes his
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shoes with a sponge, or as he takes care of his beast? How
do you know, when you have ceased to be useful as a
vessel, he will not throw you away like a broken platter?
But this woman is my wife, and we have lived together so
long. And how long did Eriphyle live with Amphiaraus,
and was the mother of children and of many? But a
necklace410 came between them: and what is a necklace?
It is the opinion about such things. That was the bestial
principle, that was the thing which broke asunder the
friendship between husband and wife, that which did not
allow the woman to be a wife nor the mother to be a
mother. And let every man among you who has seriously
resolved either to be a friend himself or to have another for
his friend, cut out these opinions, hate them, drive them from
his soul. And thus first of all he will not reproach himself,
he will not be at variance with himself, he will not change
his mind, he will not torture himself. In the next place, to
another also, who is like himself, he will be altogether and
completely a friend.411 But he will bear with the man
who is unlike himself, he will be kind to him, gentle, ready
to pardon on account of his ignorance, on account of his
being mistaken in things of the greatest importance; but
he will be harsh to no man, being well convinced of
Plato's doctrine that every mind is deprived of truth
unwillingly. If you cannot do this, yet you can do in all
other respects as friends do, drink together, and lodge
together, and sail together, and you may be born of the
same parents; for snakes also are: but neither will they
be friends nor you, so long as you retain these bestial and
cursed opinions.
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