Works


Works
By Epictetus
Edited by: George Long

London George Bell and Sons 1890


Perseus Documents Collection Table of Contents


Arrian's Discourses of Epictetus
   Arrian to Lucius Gellius, with wishes for his happiness.
   Of the things which are in our power, and not in our power.
   How a man on every occasion can maintain his proper character.
   How a man should proceed from the principle of god being the father of all men to the rest.
   Of progress or improvement.
   Against the academics.
   Of Providence.
   Of the use of sophistical arguments and hypothetical and the like.
   That the faculties57 are not safe to the uninstructed
   How from the fact that we are akin to God a man may proceed to the consequences.
   Against those who eagerly seek preferment at Rome.
   Of natural affection.
   Of contentment.
   How everything may be done acceptably to the gods.
   That the deity oversees all things.
   What philosophy promises.
   Of Providence.
   That the logical art is necessary.
   That we ought not to be angry with the errors (faults) of others.
   How we should behave to tyrants.
   About reason, how it contemplates itself.
   Against those who wish to be admired.
   On praecognitions.
   Against Epicurus.
   How we should struggle with circumstances.
   On the same.
   What is the law of life.
   In how many ways appearances exist, and what aids we should provide against them.
   That we ought not to be angry with men; and what are the small and the great things among men.
   On constancy (or firmness).
   What we ought to have ready in difficult circumstances.
   That confidence (courage) is not inconsistent with caution.
   Of tranquillity (freedom from perturbation).
   To those who recommend persons to philosophers.
   Against a person who had once been detected in adultery.
   How magnanimity is consistent with care.
   Of indifference.
   How we ought to use divination.
   What is the nature (ἡ οὐσία) of the Good
   That when we cannot fulfil that which the character of a man promises, we assume the character of a philosopher.
   How we may discover the duties of life from names.
   What the beginning of philosophy is.
   Of disputation or discussion.
   On anxiety (solicitude).
   To Naso.
   To or against those who obstinately persist in what they have determined.
   That we do not strive to use our opinions about good and evil.
   How we must adapt preconceptions to particular cases.
   How we should struggle against appearances.
   Against those who embrace philosophical opinions only in words.
   Against the Epicureans and Academics.
   Of inconsistency.
   On friendship.
   On the power of speaking.
   To (or against) a person who was one of those who were not valued (esteemed) by him.
   That logic is necessary.
   What is the property of error.
   Of finery in dress.
   In what a man ought to be exercised who has made proficiency;441 and that we neglect the chief things.
   What is the matter on which a good man should be employed, and in what we ought chiefly to practise ourselves.
   Against a person who showed his partizanship in an unseemly way in a theatre.
   Against those who on account of sickness go away home.
   Miscellaneous.
   To the administrator of the free cities who was an Epicurean.
   How we must exercise ourselves against appearances (φαντασίας).
   To a certain rhetorician who was going up to Rome on a suit.
   In what manner we ought to bear sickness.
   Certain miscellaneous matters
   About exercise.
   What solitude is, and what kind of person a solitary man is.
   Certain miscellaneous matters.
   That we ought to proceed with circumspection to every thing.
   That we ought with caution to enter into familiar intercourse with men.
   On Providence.
   That we ought not to be disturbed by any news.
   What is the condition of a common kind of man and of a philosopher.
   That we can derive advantage from all external things.
   Against those who readily come to the profession of sophists.
   About Cynism.
   To those who read and discuss for the sake of ostentation.
   That we ought not to be moved by a desire of those things which are not in our power.
   To those who fall off (desist) from their purpose.
   To those who fear want.
   About freedom.
   On familiar intimacy.
   What things we should exchange for other things.
   To those who are desirous of passing life in tranquillity.
   Against the quarrelsome and ferocious.
   Against those who lament over being pitied.
   On freedom from fear.
   Against those who hastily rush into the use of the philosophic dress.
   To a person who had been changed to a character of shamelessness.
   What things we ought to despise, and what things we ought to value.
   About purity (cleanliness).
   On attention
   Against or to those who readily tell their own affairs.

The Encheiridion, or Manual.

Fragments of Epictetus

Some fragments of Epictetus omitted by Upton and by Meibomius.

Index.

Advertisements
   WORKS BY GEORGE LONG, M. A.
   THE THOUGHTS OF THE EMPEROR M. AURELIUS ANTONINUS. Translated. Revised Edition, Post 8vo., 3s. 6d.
   CATALOGUE OF BOHN'S LIBRARIES.
   BOHN'S LIBRARIES.
   STANDARD LIBRARY.
   HISTORICAL LIBRARY.
   PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY.
   THEOLOGICAL LIBRARY.
   ANTIQUARIAN LIBRARY.
   ILLUSTRATED LIBRARY.
   CLASSICAL LIBRARY.
   TRANSLATIONS FROM THE GREEK AND LATIN.
   COLLEGIATE SERIES.
   SCIENTIFIC LIBRARY.
   ECONOMICS AND FINANCE.
   REFERENCE LIBRARY.
   NOVELISTS' LIBRARY.
   ARTISTS' LIBRARY.
   LIBRARY OF SPORTS AND GAMES.
   BOHN'S CHEAP SERIES.
   Bohn's Select Library of Standard Works.

Arrian's Discourses of Epictetus
   Arrian to Lucius Gellius, with wishes for his happiness.
   Of the things which are in our power, and not in our power.
   How a man on every occasion can maintain his proper character.
   How a man should proceed from the principle of god being the father of all men to the rest.
   Of progress or improvement.
   Against the academics.
   Of Providence.
   Of the use of sophistical arguments and hypothetical and the like.
   That the faculties57 are not safe to the uninstructed
   How from the fact that we are akin to God a man may proceed to the consequences.
   Against those who eagerly seek preferment at Rome.
   Of natural affection.
   Of contentment.
   How everything may be done acceptably to the gods.
   That the deity oversees all things.
   What philosophy promises.
   Of Providence.
   That the logical art is necessary.
   That we ought not to be angry with the errors (faults) of others.
   How we should behave to tyrants.
   About reason, how it contemplates itself.
   Against those who wish to be admired.
   On praecognitions.
   Against Epicurus.
   How we should struggle with circumstances.
   On the same.
   What is the law of life.
   In how many ways appearances exist, and what aids we should provide against them.
   That we ought not to be angry with men; and what are the small and the great things among men.
   On constancy (or firmness).
   What we ought to have ready in difficult circumstances.
   That confidence (courage) is not inconsistent with caution.
   Of tranquillity (freedom from perturbation).
   To those who recommend persons to philosophers.
   Against a person who had once been detected in adultery.
   How magnanimity is consistent with care.
   Of indifference.
   How we ought to use divination.
   What is the nature (ἡ οὐσία) of the Good
   That when we cannot fulfil that which the character of a man promises, we assume the character of a philosopher.
   How we may discover the duties of life from names.
   What the beginning of philosophy is.
   Of disputation or discussion.
   On anxiety (solicitude).
   To Naso.
   To or against those who obstinately persist in what they have determined.
   That we do not strive to use our opinions about good and evil.
   How we must adapt preconceptions to particular cases.
   How we should struggle against appearances.
   Against those who embrace philosophical opinions only in words.
   Against the Epicureans and Academics.
   Of inconsistency.
   On friendship.
   On the power of speaking.
   To (or against) a person who was one of those who were not valued (esteemed) by him.
   That logic is necessary.
   What is the property of error.
   Of finery in dress.
   In what a man ought to be exercised who has made proficiency;441 and that we neglect the chief things.
   What is the matter on which a good man should be employed, and in what we ought chiefly to practise ourselves.
   Against a person who showed his partizanship in an unseemly way in a theatre.
   Against those who on account of sickness go away home.
   Miscellaneous.
   To the administrator of the free cities who was an Epicurean.
   How we must exercise ourselves against appearances (φαντασίας).
   To a certain rhetorician who was going up to Rome on a suit.
   In what manner we ought to bear sickness.
   Certain miscellaneous matters
   About exercise.
   What solitude is, and what kind of person a solitary man is.
   Certain miscellaneous matters.
   That we ought to proceed with circumspection to every thing.
   That we ought with caution to enter into familiar intercourse with men.
   On Providence.
   That we ought not to be disturbed by any news.
   What is the condition of a common kind of man and of a philosopher.
   That we can derive advantage from all external things.
   Against those who readily come to the profession of sophists.
   About Cynism.
   To those who read and discuss for the sake of ostentation.
   That we ought not to be moved by a desire of those things which are not in our power.
   To those who fall off (desist) from their purpose.
   To those who fear want.
   About freedom.
   On familiar intimacy.
   What things we should exchange for other things.
   To those who are desirous of passing life in tranquillity.
   Against the quarrelsome and ferocious.
   Against those who lament over being pitied.
   On freedom from fear.
   Against those who hastily rush into the use of the philosophic dress.
   To a person who had been changed to a character of shamelessness.
   What things we ought to despise, and what things we ought to value.
   About purity (cleanliness).
   On attention
   Against or to those who readily tell their own affairs.

The Encheiridion, or Manual.

Fragments of Epictetus

Some fragments of Epictetus omitted by Upton and by Meibomius.

Index.

Advertisements
   WORKS BY GEORGE LONG, M. A.
   THE THOUGHTS OF THE EMPEROR M. AURELIUS ANTONINUS. Translated. Revised Edition, Post 8vo., 3s. 6d.
   CATALOGUE OF BOHN'S LIBRARIES.
   BOHN'S LIBRARIES.
   STANDARD LIBRARY.
   HISTORICAL LIBRARY.
   PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY.
   THEOLOGICAL LIBRARY.
   ANTIQUARIAN LIBRARY.
   ILLUSTRATED LIBRARY.
   CLASSICAL LIBRARY.
   TRANSLATIONS FROM THE GREEK AND LATIN.
   COLLEGIATE SERIES.
   SCIENTIFIC LIBRARY.
   ECONOMICS AND FINANCE.
   REFERENCE LIBRARY.
   NOVELISTS' LIBRARY.
   ARTISTS' LIBRARY.
   LIBRARY OF SPORTS AND GAMES.
   BOHN'S CHEAP SERIES.
   Bohn's Select Library of Standard Works.

Funded by The Annenberg CPB/Project

Arrian's Discourses of Epictetus
 

Ch. 13

On anxiety (solicitude).

WHEN I see a man anxious, I say, What does this man want? If he did not want some thing which is not in his power, how could he be anxious? For this reason a lute [p. 137] player when he is singing by himself has no anxiety, but when he enters the theatre, he is anxious even if he has a good voice and plays well on the lute; for he not only wishes to sing well, but also to obtain applause: but this is not in his power. Accordingly, where he has skill, there he has confidence. Bring any single person who knows nothing of music, and the musician does not care for him. But in the matter where a man knows nothing and has not been practised, there he is anxious. What matter is this? He knows not what a crowd is or what the praise of a crowd is. However he has learned to strike the lowest chord and the highest;305 but what the praise of the many is, and what power it has in life he neither knows nor has he thought about it. Hence he must of necessity tremble and grow pale. I cannot then say that a man is not a lute player when I see him afraid, but I can say something else, and not one thing, but many. And first of all I call him a stranger and say, This man does not know in what part of the world he is, but though he has been here so long, he is ignorant of the laws of the State and the customs, and what is permitted and what is not; and he has never employed any lawyer to tell him and to explain the laws. But a man does not write a will, if he does not know how it ought to be written, or he employs a person who does know; nor does he rashly seal a bond or write a security. But he uses his desire without a lawyer's advice, and aversion, and pursuit (movement), and attempt and purpose. How do you mean without a lawyer? He does not know that he wills what is not allowed, and does not will that which is of necessity; and he does not know either what is his own or what is another man's; but if he did know, he would never be impeded, he would never be hindered, he would not be anxious. How so?Is any man then afraid about things which are not evils?No.Is he afraid about things which are evils, but still so far within his power that they may not happen?Certainly he is not. If then the things which are independent of the will are neither good nor bad, and all things which do depend on [p. 138] the will are within our power, and no man can either take them from us or give them to us, if we do not choose, where is room left for anxiety? But we are anxious about our poor body, our little property, about the will of Caesar; but not anxious about things internal. Are we anxious about not forming a false opinion?No, for this is in my power.About not exerting our movements contrary to nature?No, not even about this.When then you see a man pale, as the physician says, judging from the complexion, this man's spleen is disordered, that man's liver; so also say, this man's desire and aversion are disordered, he is not in the right way, he is in a fever. For nothing else changes the colour, or causes trembling or chattering of the teeth, or causes a man to Sink in his knees and shift from foot to foot.Iliad, xiii. 281. For this reason when Zeno was going to meet Antigonus,306 he was not anxious, for Antigonus had no power over any of the things which Zeno admired; and Zeno did not care for those things over which Antigonus had power. But Antigonus was anxious when he was going to meet Zeno, for he wished to please Zeno; but this was a thing external (out of his power). But Zeno did not want to please Antigonus; for no man who is skilled in any art wishes to please one who has no such skill.

Should I try to please you? Why? I suppose, you know the measure by which one man is estimated by another. Have you taken pains to learn what is a good man and what is a bad man, and how a man becomes one or the other? Why then are you not good yourself? How, he replies, am I not good?Because no good man laments or groans or weeps, no good man is pale and trembles, or says, How will he receive me, how will he listen to me?Slave, just as it pleases him. Why do you care about what belongs to others? Is it now his fault if he receives badly what proceeds from you?Certainly. [p. 139] And is it possible that a fault should be one man's, and the evil in another?No.Why then are you anxious about that which belongs to others?Your question is reasonable; but I am anxious how I shall speak to him. Cannot you then speak to him as you choose?But I fear that I may be disconcerted?If you are going to write the name of Dion, are you afraid that you would be disconcerted?By no means.Why? is it not because you have practised writing the name?Certainly.Well, if you were going to read the name, would you not feel the same? and why? Because every art has a certain strength and confidence in the things which belong to it. Have you then not practised speaking? and what else did you learn in the school? Syllogisms and sophistical propositions?307 For what purpose? was it not for the purpose of discoursing skilfully? and is not discoursing skilfully the same as discoursing seasonably and cautiously and with intelligence, and also without making mistakes and without hindrance, and besides all this with confidence? Yes.When then you are mounted on a horse and go into a plain, are you anxious at being matched against a man who is on foot, and anxious in a matter in which you are practised, and he is not?Yes, but that person (to whom I am going to speak) has power to kill me.308 Speak the truth then, unhappy man, and do not brag, nor claim to be a philosopher, nor refuse to acknowledge your masters, but so long as you present this handle in your body, follow every man who is stronger than yourself. So, crates used to practise speaking, he who talked as he did to the tyrants,310 to the dicasts (judges), he who talked in his prison. Diogenes had practised speaking, he who spoke as he did to Alexander, to the pirates, to the person [p. 140] who bought him. These men were confident in the things which they practised.311 But do you walk off to your own affairs and never leave them: go and sit in a corner, and weave syllogisms, and propose them to another. There is not in you the man who can rule a state.