Works


Works
By Epictetus
Edited by: George Long

London George Bell and Sons 1890



Perseus Documents Collection Table of Contents



Arrian's Discourses of Epictetus
   Arrian to Lucius Gellius, with wishes for his happiness.
   Of the things which are in our power, and not in our power.
   How a man on every occasion can maintain his proper character.
   How a man should proceed from the principle of god being the father of all men to the rest.
   Of progress or improvement.
   Against the academics.
   Of Providence.
   Of the use of sophistical arguments and hypothetical and the like.
   That the faculties57 are not safe to the uninstructed
   How from the fact that we are akin to God a man may proceed to the consequences.
   Against those who eagerly seek preferment at Rome.
   Of natural affection.
   Of contentment.
   How everything may be done acceptably to the gods.
   That the deity oversees all things.
   What philosophy promises.
   Of Providence.
   That the logical art is necessary.
   That we ought not to be angry with the errors (faults) of others.
   How we should behave to tyrants.
   About reason, how it contemplates itself.
   Against those who wish to be admired.
   On praecognitions.
   Against Epicurus.
   How we should struggle with circumstances.
   On the same.
   What is the law of life.
   In how many ways appearances exist, and what aids we should provide against them.
   That we ought not to be angry with men; and what are the small and the great things among men.
   On constancy (or firmness).
   What we ought to have ready in difficult circumstances.
   That confidence (courage) is not inconsistent with caution.
   Of tranquillity (freedom from perturbation).
   To those who recommend persons to philosophers.
   Against a person who had once been detected in adultery.
   How magnanimity is consistent with care.
   Of indifference.
   How we ought to use divination.
   What is the nature (ἡ οὐσία) of the Good
   That when we cannot fulfil that which the character of a man promises, we assume the character of a philosopher.
   How we may discover the duties of life from names.
   What the beginning of philosophy is.
   Of disputation or discussion.
   On anxiety (solicitude).
   To Naso.
   To or against those who obstinately persist in what they have determined.
   That we do not strive to use our opinions about good and evil.
   How we must adapt preconceptions to particular cases.
   How we should struggle against appearances.
   Against those who embrace philosophical opinions only in words.
   Against the Epicureans and Academics.
   Of inconsistency.
   On friendship.
   On the power of speaking.
   To (or against) a person who was one of those who were not valued (esteemed) by him.
   That logic is necessary.
   What is the property of error.
   Of finery in dress.
   In what a man ought to be exercised who has made proficiency;441 and that we neglect the chief things.
   What is the matter on which a good man should be employed, and in what we ought chiefly to practise ourselves.
   Against a person who showed his partizanship in an unseemly way in a theatre.
   Against those who on account of sickness go away home.
   Miscellaneous.
   To the administrator of the free cities who was an Epicurean.
   How we must exercise ourselves against appearances (φαντασίας).
   To a certain rhetorician who was going up to Rome on a suit.
   In what manner we ought to bear sickness.
   Certain miscellaneous matters
   About exercise.
   What solitude is, and what kind of person a solitary man is.
   Certain miscellaneous matters.
   That we ought to proceed with circumspection to every thing.
   That we ought with caution to enter into familiar intercourse with men.
   On Providence.
   That we ought not to be disturbed by any news.
   What is the condition of a common kind of man and of a philosopher.
   That we can derive advantage from all external things.
   Against those who readily come to the profession of sophists.
   About Cynism.
   To those who read and discuss for the sake of ostentation.
   That we ought not to be moved by a desire of those things which are not in our power.
   To those who fall off (desist) from their purpose.
   To those who fear want.
   About freedom.
   On familiar intimacy.
   What things we should exchange for other things.
   To those who are desirous of passing life in tranquillity.
   Against the quarrelsome and ferocious.
   Against those who lament over being pitied.
   On freedom from fear.
   Against those who hastily rush into the use of the philosophic dress.
   To a person who had been changed to a character of shamelessness.
   What things we ought to despise, and what things we ought to value.
   About purity (cleanliness).
   On attention
   Against or to those who readily tell their own affairs.

The Encheiridion, or Manual.

Fragments of Epictetus

Some fragments of Epictetus omitted by Upton and by Meibomius.

Index.

Advertisements
   WORKS BY GEORGE LONG, M. A.
   THE THOUGHTS OF THE EMPEROR M. AURELIUS ANTONINUS. Translated. Revised Edition, Post 8vo., 3s. 6d.
   CATALOGUE OF BOHN'S LIBRARIES.
   BOHN'S LIBRARIES.
   STANDARD LIBRARY.
   HISTORICAL LIBRARY.
   PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY.
   THEOLOGICAL LIBRARY.
   ANTIQUARIAN LIBRARY.
   ILLUSTRATED LIBRARY.
   CLASSICAL LIBRARY.
   TRANSLATIONS FROM THE GREEK AND LATIN.
   COLLEGIATE SERIES.
   SCIENTIFIC LIBRARY.
   ECONOMICS AND FINANCE.
   REFERENCE LIBRARY.
   NOVELISTS' LIBRARY.
   ARTISTS' LIBRARY.
   LIBRARY OF SPORTS AND GAMES.
   BOHN'S CHEAP SERIES.
   Bohn's Select Library of Standard Works.

Arrian's Discourses of Epictetus
   Arrian to Lucius Gellius, with wishes for his happiness.
   Of the things which are in our power, and not in our power.
   How a man on every occasion can maintain his proper character.
   How a man should proceed from the principle of god being the father of all men to the rest.
   Of progress or improvement.
   Against the academics.
   Of Providence.
   Of the use of sophistical arguments and hypothetical and the like.
   That the faculties57 are not safe to the uninstructed
   How from the fact that we are akin to God a man may proceed to the consequences.
   Against those who eagerly seek preferment at Rome.
   Of natural affection.
   Of contentment.
   How everything may be done acceptably to the gods.
   That the deity oversees all things.
   What philosophy promises.
   Of Providence.
   That the logical art is necessary.
   That we ought not to be angry with the errors (faults) of others.
   How we should behave to tyrants.
   About reason, how it contemplates itself.
   Against those who wish to be admired.
   On praecognitions.
   Against Epicurus.
   How we should struggle with circumstances.
   On the same.
   What is the law of life.
   In how many ways appearances exist, and what aids we should provide against them.
   That we ought not to be angry with men; and what are the small and the great things among men.
   On constancy (or firmness).
   What we ought to have ready in difficult circumstances.
   That confidence (courage) is not inconsistent with caution.
   Of tranquillity (freedom from perturbation).
   To those who recommend persons to philosophers.
   Against a person who had once been detected in adultery.
   How magnanimity is consistent with care.
   Of indifference.
   How we ought to use divination.
   What is the nature (ἡ οὐσία) of the Good
   That when we cannot fulfil that which the character of a man promises, we assume the character of a philosopher.
   How we may discover the duties of life from names.
   What the beginning of philosophy is.
   Of disputation or discussion.
   On anxiety (solicitude).
   To Naso.
   To or against those who obstinately persist in what they have determined.
   That we do not strive to use our opinions about good and evil.
   How we must adapt preconceptions to particular cases.
   How we should struggle against appearances.
   Against those who embrace philosophical opinions only in words.
   Against the Epicureans and Academics.
   Of inconsistency.
   On friendship.
   On the power of speaking.
   To (or against) a person who was one of those who were not valued (esteemed) by him.
   That logic is necessary.
   What is the property of error.
   Of finery in dress.
   In what a man ought to be exercised who has made proficiency;441 and that we neglect the chief things.
   What is the matter on which a good man should be employed, and in what we ought chiefly to practise ourselves.
   Against a person who showed his partizanship in an unseemly way in a theatre.
   Against those who on account of sickness go away home.
   Miscellaneous.
   To the administrator of the free cities who was an Epicurean.
   How we must exercise ourselves against appearances (φαντασίας).
   To a certain rhetorician who was going up to Rome on a suit.
   In what manner we ought to bear sickness.
   Certain miscellaneous matters
   About exercise.
   What solitude is, and what kind of person a solitary man is.
   Certain miscellaneous matters.
   That we ought to proceed with circumspection to every thing.
   That we ought with caution to enter into familiar intercourse with men.
   On Providence.
   That we ought not to be disturbed by any news.
   What is the condition of a common kind of man and of a philosopher.
   That we can derive advantage from all external things.
   Against those who readily come to the profession of sophists.
   About Cynism.
   To those who read and discuss for the sake of ostentation.
   That we ought not to be moved by a desire of those things which are not in our power.
   To those who fall off (desist) from their purpose.
   To those who fear want.
   About freedom.
   On familiar intimacy.
   What things we should exchange for other things.
   To those who are desirous of passing life in tranquillity.
   Against the quarrelsome and ferocious.
   Against those who lament over being pitied.
   On freedom from fear.
   Against those who hastily rush into the use of the philosophic dress.
   To a person who had been changed to a character of shamelessness.
   What things we ought to despise, and what things we ought to value.
   About purity (cleanliness).
   On attention
   Against or to those who readily tell their own affairs.

The Encheiridion, or Manual.

Fragments of Epictetus

Some fragments of Epictetus omitted by Upton and by Meibomius.

Index.

Advertisements
   WORKS BY GEORGE LONG, M. A.
   THE THOUGHTS OF THE EMPEROR M. AURELIUS ANTONINUS. Translated. Revised Edition, Post 8vo., 3s. 6d.
   CATALOGUE OF BOHN'S LIBRARIES.
   BOHN'S LIBRARIES.
   STANDARD LIBRARY.
   HISTORICAL LIBRARY.
   PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY.
   THEOLOGICAL LIBRARY.
   ANTIQUARIAN LIBRARY.
   ILLUSTRATED LIBRARY.
   CLASSICAL LIBRARY.
   TRANSLATIONS FROM THE GREEK AND LATIN.
   COLLEGIATE SERIES.
   SCIENTIFIC LIBRARY.
   ECONOMICS AND FINANCE.
   REFERENCE LIBRARY.
   NOVELISTS' LIBRARY.
   ARTISTS' LIBRARY.
   LIBRARY OF SPORTS AND GAMES.
   BOHN'S CHEAP SERIES.
   Bohn's Select Library of Standard Works.


Funded by The Annenberg CPB/Project

Arrian's Discourses of Epictetus

 

Ch. 2

How a man on every occasion can maintain his proper character.

To the rational animal only is the irrational intolerable; but that which is rational is tolerable. Blows are not naturally intolerable. How is that? See how the Lacedaemonians17 endure whipping when they have learned that whipping is consistent with reason. To hang yourself is not intolerable. When then you have the opinion that it is rational, you go and hang yourself. In short, if we observe, we shall find that the animal man is pained by nothing so much as by that which is irrational; and, on the contrary, attracted to nothing so much as to that which is rational.

But the rational and the irrational appear such in a different way to different persons, just as the good and the bad, the profitable and the unprofitable. For this reason, particularly, we need discipline, in order to learn how to adapt the preconception18 of the rational and the irrational to the several things conformably to nature. But in order to determine the rational and the irrational, we use not only the estimates of external things, but we consider also [p. 9] what is appropriate to each person. For to one man it is consistent with reason to hold a chamber pot for another, and to look to this only, that if he does not hold it, he will receive stripes, and he will not receive his food: but if he shall hold the pot, he will not suffer anything hard or disagreeable. But to another man not only does the holding of a chamber pot appear intolerable for himself, but intolerable also for him to allow another to do this office for him. If then you ask me whether you should hold the chamber pot or not, I shall say to you that the receiving of food is worth more than the not receiving of it, and the being scourged is a greater indignity than not being scourged; so that if you measure your interests by these things, go and hold the chamber pot. But this, you say, would not be worthy of me. Well then, it is you who must introduce this consideration into the inquiry, not I; for it is you who know yourself, how much you are worth to yourself, and at what price you sell yourself; for men sell themselves at various prices.

For this reason, when Florus was deliberating whether he should go down to Nero's19 spectacles, and also perform in them himself, Agrippinus said to him, Go down: and when Florus asked Agrippinus, Why do not you go down? Agrippinus replied, Because I do not even deliberate about the matter. For he who has once brought himself to deliberate about such matters, and to calculate the value of external things, comes very near to those who have forgotten their own character. For why do you ask me the question, whether death is preferable or life? I say life. Pain or pleasure? I say pleasure. But if I do not take a part in the tragic acting, I shall have my head struck off. Go then and take a part, but I will not. Why? Because you consider yourself to be only one thread of those which are in the tunic. Well then it was fitting for you to take care how you should be like the rest of men, just as the thread has no design to be anything [p. 10] superior to the other threads. But I wish to be purple,20 that small part which is bright, and makes all the rest appear graceful and beautiful. Why then do you tell me to make myself like the many? and if I do, how shall I still be purple?

Priscus Helvidius21 also saw this, and acted conformably. For when Vespasian sent and commanded him not to go into the senate, he replied, It is in your power not to allow me to be a member of the senate, but so long as I am, I must go in. Well, go in then, says the emperor, but say nothing. Do not ask my opinion, and I will be silent. But I must ask your opinion. And I must say what I think right. But if you do, I shall put you to death. When then did I tell you that I am immortal? You will do your part, and I will do mine: it is your part to kill; it is mine to die, but not in fear: yours to banish me; mine to depart without sorrow.

What good then did Priscus do, who was only a single person? And what good does the purple do for the toga? Why, what else than this, that it is conspicuous in the toga as purple, and is displayed also as a fine example to all other things? But in such circumstances another would have replied to Caesar who forbade him to enter the senate, I thank you for sparing me. But such a man Vespasian would not even have forbidden to enter the senate, for he knew that he would either sit there like an earthen vessel, or, if he spoke, he would say what Caesar wished, and add even more. [p. 11]

In this way an athlete also acted who was in danger of dying unless his private parts were amputated. His brother came to the athlete, who was a philosopher, and said, Come, brother, what are you going to do? Shall we amputate this member and return to the gymnasium? But the athlete persisted in his resolution and died. When some one asked Epictetus, How he did this, as an athlete or a philosopher? As a man, Epictetus replied, and a man who had been proclaimed among the athletes at the Olympic games and had contended in them, a man who had been familiar with such a place, and not merely anointed in Baton's school.22 Another would have allowed even his head to be cut off, if he could have lived without it. Such is that regard to character which is so strong in those who have been accustomed to introduce it of themselves and conjoined with other things into their deliberations.

Come then, Epictetus, shave23 yourself. If I am a philosopher, I answer, I will not shave myself. But I will take off your head? If that will do you any good, take it off.

Some person asked, how then shall every man among us perceive what is suitable to his character? How, he replied, does the bull alone, when the lion has attacked, discover his own powers and put himself forward in defence of the whole herd? It is plain that with the powers the perception of having them is immediately conjoined: and, therefore, whoever of us has such powers will not be ignorant of them. Now a bull is not made suddenly, nor a brave man; but we must discipline ourselves in the winter for the summer campaign, and not rashly run upon that which does not concern us.

Only consider at what price you sell your own will: if for no other reason, at least for this, that you sell it not for a small sum. But that which is great and superior perhaps [p. 12] belongs to Socrates and such as are like him. Why then, if we are naturally such, are not a very great number of us like him? Is it true then that all horses become swift, that all dogs are skilled in tracking footprints? What then, since I am naturally dull, shall I, for this reason, take no pains? I hope not. Epictetus is not superior to Socrates; but if he is not inferior,24 this is enough for me; for I shall never be a Milo,25 and yet I do not neglect my body; nor shall I be a Croesus, and yet I do not neglect my property; nor, in a word, do we neglect looking after anything because we despair of reaching the highest degree.