Ch. 11
What the beginning of philosophy is.
THE beginning of philosophy to him at least who enters
on it in the right way and by the door, is a consciousness
of his own weakness and inability about necessary things.
For we come into the world with no natural notion of a
right angled triangle, or of a diesis (a quarter tone), or of
a half tone; but we learn each of these things by a cer-
tain transmission according to art; and for this reason
[p. 131]
those who do not know them, do not think that they know
them. But as to good and evil, and beautiful and ugly,
and becoming and unbecoming, and happiness and misfortune, and proper and improper, and what we ought to
do and what we ought not to do, who ever came into the
world without having an innate idea of them? Wherefore we all use these names, and we endeavour to fit the
preconceptions291 to the several cases (things) thus: he has
done well, he has not done well; he has done as he ought,
not as he ought; he has been unfortunate, he has been
fortunate; he is unjust, he is just: who does not use
these names? who among us defers the use of them till he
has learned them, as he defers the use of the words about
lines (geometrical figures) or sounds? And the cause of
this is that we come into the world already taught as it
were by nature some things on this matter (τόπον), and
proceeding from these we have added to them selfconceit
(οἴησιν).292 For why, a man says, do I not know the beautiful and the ugly? Have I not the notion of it? You
have. Do I not adapt it to particulars? You do. Do I
not then adapt it properly? In that lies the whole question; and conceit is added here. For beginning from
these things which are admitted men proceed to that
which is matter of dispute by means of unsuitable adaptation; for if they possessed this power of adaptation in
addition to those things, what would hinder them from
being perfect? But now since you think that you properly adapt the preconceptions to the particulars, tell me
whence you derive this (assume that you do so). Because
I think so. But it does not seem so to another, and he
thinks that he also makes a proper adaptation; or does he
not think so? He does think so. Is it possible then that
both of you can properly apply the preconceptions to
things about which you have contrary opinions? It is
not possible. Can you then show us anything better
towards adapting the preconceptions beyond your thinking
that you do? Does the madman do any other things than
the things which seem to him right? Is then this
criterion sufficient for him also? It is not sufficient.
[p. 132]
Come then to something which is superior to seeming
(τοῦ δοκεῖν). What is this?
Observe, this is the beginning of philosophy, a perception of the disagreement of men with one another, and
an inquiry into the cause of the disagreement, and a
condemnation and distrust of that which only 'seems,'
and a certain investigation of that which 'seems' whether
it 'seems' rightly, and a discovery of some rule (κανόνος),
as we have discovered a balance in the determination of
weights, and a carpenter's rule (or square) in the case of
straight and crooked things.This is the beginning of
philosophy. Must we say that all things are right which
seem so to all?293 And how is it possible that contradictions
can be right?Not all then, but all which seem to us to be
right.How more to you than those which seem right to the
Syrians? why more than what seem right to the Egyptians?
why more than what seems right to me or to any other man?
Not at all more. What then 'seems' to every man is not
sufficient for determining what 'is;' for neither in the case
of weights or measures are we satisfied with the bare appearance, but in each case we have discovered a certain
rule. In this matter then is there no rule superior to
what 'seems'? And how is it possible that the most
necessary things among men should have no sign (mark),
and be incapable of being discovered? There is then
some rule. And why then do we not seek the rule and
discover it, and afterwards use it without varying from it,
not even stretching out the finger without it?294 For this,
I think, is that which when it is discovered cures of their
madness those who use mere 'seeming' as a measure, and
misuse it; so that for the future proceeding from certain
things (principles) known and made clear we may use in
the case of particular things the preconceptions which are
distinctly fixed.
What is the matter presented to us about which we are
inquiring? Pleasure (for example). Subject it to the
rule, throw it into the balance. Ought the good to be
[p. 133]
such a thing that it is fit that we have confidence in it?
Yes. And in which we ought to confide? It ought to
be. Is it fit to trust to any thing which is insecure?
No. Is then pleasure any thing secure? No. Take it
Then and throw it out of the scale, and drive it far away
from the place of good things. But if you are not sharp-
sighted, and one balance is not enough for you, bring
another. Is it fit to be elated over what is good? Yes.
Is it proper then to be elated over present pleasure? See
that you do not say that it is proper; but if you do, I
shall then not think you worthy even of the balance.295
Thus things are tested and weighed when the rules are
ready. And to philosophize is this, to examine and confirm the rules; and then to use them when they are
known is the act of a wise and good man.296
