Ch. 19
Against those who embrace philosophical opinions only in words.
369
THE argument called the ruling argument (ὁ κυριεύων λόγος)370 appears to have been proposed from such principles as these: there is in fact a common contradiction
between one another in these three propositions, each two
being in contradiction to the third. The propositions are,
that every thing past must of necessity be true; that an
impossibility does not follow a possibility; and that a thing
is possible which neither is nor will be true. Diodorus371
observing this contradiction employed the probative force
of the first two for the demonstration of this proposition,
That nothing is possible which is not tine and never will
[p. 163]
be. Now another will hold these two: That something is
possible. which is neither true nor ever will be: and That
an impossibility does not follow a possibility. But he
will not allow that every thing which is past is necessarily
true, as the followers of Cleanthes seem to think, and
Antipater copiously defended them. But others maintain
the other two propositions, That a thing is possible which
is neither true nor will be true: and That everything
which is past is necessarily true; but then they will
maintain that an impossibility can follow a possibility.
But it is impossible to maintain these three propositions,
because of their common contradiction.372
If then any man should ask me, which of these propositions do you maintain? I will answer him, that I do
not know; but I have received this story, that Diodorus
maintained one opinion, the followers of Panthoides, I
think, and Cleanthes maintained another opinion, and
those of Chrysippus a third. What then is your opinion?
I was not made for this purpose, to examine the appearances that occur to me, and to compare what others say
and to form an opinion of my own on the thing. Therefore
I differ not at all from the grammarian. Who was Hector's
father? Priam. Who were his brothers? Alexander and
Deiphobus. Who was their mother? Hecuba.I have
heard this story. From whom? From Homer. And Hellanicus also, I think, writes about the same things, and
perhaps others like him. And what further have I about
the ruling argument? Nothing. But, if I am a vain
man, especially at a banquet I surprise the guests by
enumerating those who have written on these matters.
Both Chrysippus has written wonderfully in his first book
about Possibilities, and Cleanthes has written specially on
the subject, and Archedemus. Antipater also has written
not only in his work about Possibilities, but also separately
in his work on the ruling argument. Have you not read
the work? I have not read it. Read. And what profit
will 'a man have from it? he will be more trifling and
impertinent than he is now; for what else have you
gained by reading it? What opinion have you formed on
[p. 164]
this subject? none; but you will tell us of Helen and
Priam, and the island of Calypso which never was and
never will be. And in this matter indeed it is of no great
importance if you retain the story, but have formed no
opinion of your own. But in matters of morality (Ethic)
this happens to us much more than in these things of
which we are speaking.
Speak to me about good and evil. Listen:
The wind from Ilium to Ciconian shores
Brought me.373 Odyssey, ix. 39.
Of things some are good, some are bad, and others are
indifferent. The good then are the virtues and the things
which partake of the virtues: the bad are the vices, and
the things which partake of them; and the indifferent are
the things which lie between the virtues and the vices,
wealth, health, life, death, pleasure, pain. Whence do you
know this? Hellanicus says it in his Egyptian history;
for what difference does it make to say this, or to say that
Diogenes has it in his Ethic, or Chrysippus or Cleanthes?
Have you then examined any of these things and formed
an opinion of your own? Show how you are used to
behave in a storm on shipboard? Do you remember this
division (distinction of things), when the sail rattles and
a man, who knows nothing of times and seasons, stands by
you when you are screaming and says, Tell me, I ask you
by the Gods, what you were saying just now, Is it a vice
to suffer shipwreck: does it participate in vice? Will you
not take up a stick and lay it on his head? What have
we to do with you, man? we are perishing and you come
[p. 165]
to mock us? But if Caesar send for you to answer a
charge, do you remember the distinction? If when you
are going in pale and trembling, a person should come up
to you and say, Why do you tremble, man? what is the
matter about which you are engaged? Does Caesar who
sits within give virtue and vice to those who go in to
him? You reply, Why do you also mock me and add
to my present sorrows?Still tell me, philosopher, tell
me why you tremble? Is it not death of which you run
the risk, or a prison, or pain of the body, or banishment,
or disgrace? What else is there? Is there any vice or
anything which partakes of vice? What then did you
use to say of these things?'What have you to do with
me, man? my own evils are enough for me.' And you
say right. Your own evils are enough for you, your
baseness, your cowardice, your boasting which you showed
when you sat in the school. Why did you decorate yourself
with what belonged to others? Why did you call yourself
a Stoic?
Observe yourselves thus in your actions, and you will
find to what sect you belong. You will find that most of
you are Epicureans, a few Peripatetics,374 and those feeble.
For wherein will you show that you really consider virtue
equal to everything else or even superior? But show me
a Stoic, if you can. Where or how? But you can show
me an endless number who utter small arguments of the
Stoics. For do the same persons repeat the Epicurean
opinions any worse? And the Peripatetic, do they not
handle them also with equal accuracy? who then is a
Stoic? As we call a statue Phidiac, which is fashioned
according to the art of Phidias; so show me a man who
is fashioned according to the doctrines which he utters.
Show me a man who is sick and happy, in danger and
happy, dying and happy, in exile and happy, in disgrace
and happy. Show him: I desire, by the gods, to see a
Stoic. You cannot show me one fashioned so; but show
me at least one who is forming, who has shown a tendency to be a Stoic. Do me this favour: do not grudge
[p. 166]
an old man seeing a sight which I have not seen yet. Do
you think that you must show me the Zeus of Phidias or
the Athena, a work of ivory and gold?375 Let any of you
show me a human soul ready to think as God does, and
not to blame376 either God or man, ready not to be disappointed about any thing, not to consider himself damaged
by any thing, not to be angry, not to be envious, not to
be jealous; and why should I not say it direct? desirous
from a man to become a god, and in this poor mortal body
thinking of his fellowship with Zeus.377 Show me the man.
But you cannot. Why then do you delude yourselves and
cheat others? and why do you put on a guise which
does not belong to you, and walk about being thieves and
pilferers of these names and things which do not belong
to you?
And now I am your teacher, and you are instructed in
my school. And I have this purpose, to make you free
from restraint, compulsion, hindrance, to make you free,
prosperous, happy, looking to God in everything small
and great. And you are here to learn and practise these
things. Why then do you not finish the work, if you also
have such a purpose as you ought to have, and if I in addition to the purpose also have such qualification as I ought
to have? What is that which is wanting? When I see
an artificer and material lying by him, I expect the work.
Here then is the artificer, here the material; what is it
that we want? Is not the thing one that can be taught?
It is. Is it not then in our power? The only thing of all
[p. 167]
that is in our power. Neither wealth is in our power, nor
health, nor reputation, nor in a word any thing else except
the right use of appearances. This (right use) is by nature
free from restraint, this alone is free from impediment.
Why then do you not finish the work? Tell me the reason.
For it is either through my fault that you do not finish it,
or through your own fault, or through the nature of the
thing. The thing itself is possible, and the only thing
in our power. It remains then that the fault is either in
me or in you, or, what is nearer the truth, in both. Well
then, are you willing that we begin at last to bring such
a purpose into this school, and to take no notice of the
past? Let us only make a beginning. Trust to me, and
you will see.
