Ch. 5
Against the academics.
37
IF a man, said Epictetus, opposes evident truths, it is
not easy to find arguments by which we shall make him
change his opinion. But this does not arise either from the
[p. 18]
man's strength or the teacher's weakness; for when the
man, though he has been confuted,38 is hardened like a
stone, how shall we then be able to deal with him by
argument?
Now there are two kinds of hardening, one of the understanding, the other of the sense of shame, when a man
is resolved not to assent to what is manifest nor to desist
from contradictions. Most of us are afraid of mortification
of the body, and would contrive all means to avoid such a
thing, but we care not about the soul's mortification. And
indeed with regard to the soul, if a man be in such a state
as not to apprehend anything, or understand at all, we
think that he is in a bad condition: but if the sense of
shame and modesty are deadened, this we call even power
(or strength).
Do you comprehend that you are awake? I do not, the
man replies, for I do not even comprehend when in my
sleep I imagine that I am awake. Does this appearance
then not differ from the other? Not at all, he replies.
Shall I still argue with this man?39 And what fire or
what iron shall I apply to him to make him feel that he is
deadened? He does perceive, but he pretends that he
does not. He is even worse than a dead man. He does
not see the contradiction: he is in a bad condition.
Another does see it, but he is not moved, and makes no
improvement: he is even in a worse condition. His
modesty is extirpated, and his sense of shame; and the
rational faculty has not been cut off from him, but it is
brutalised. Shall I name this strength of mind? Cer-
tainly not, unless we also name it such in catamites,
through which they do and say in public whatever comes
into their head.
[p. 19]