Ch. 29
Of courage.
The essence of good and evil is a certain disposition of the will.
What are things outward, then?
Materials on which the will may act, in attaining
its own good or evil.
How, then, will it attain good?
If it be not dazzled by its own materials; for right
principles concerning these materials keep the will in
a good state; but perverse and distorted principles,
in a bad one. This law hath God ordained, who
says, "If you wish for good, receive it from yourself."
You say, No; but from another. "Nay; but from
yourself."
Accordingly, when a tyrant threatens, and sends for
me, I say, Against what is your threatening pointed?
If he says, "I will chain you," I answer, It is my
hands and feet that you threaten. If he says, "I
will cut off your head," I answer, It is my head
that you threaten. If he says, "I will throw you
into prison," I answer, It is the whole of this paltry
body that you threaten; and if he threatens banishment, just the same.
" Does he not threaten you, then? "
If I am persuaded that these things are nothing to
me, he does not; but if I fear any of them, it is me
that he threatens. Who is it, after all, that I fear?
The master of what? Of things in my own power?
Of these no one is the master. Of things not in my
power? And what are these to me?
" What, then ! do you philosophers teach us a contempt of kings? "
By no means. Which of us teaches any one to
contend with them about things of which they have
the command? Take my body; take my possessions; take my reputation; take away even my
friends. If I persuade any one to claim these things
as his own, you may justly accuse me. "Ay; but I
would command your principles too." And who hath
given you that power? How can you conquer the
principle of another? "By applying terror, I will
conquer it." Do not you see that what conquers
itself .is not conquered by another? And nothing
but itself can conquer the will. Hence, too, the most
excellent and equitable law of God, that the better
should always prevail over the worse. Ten are better
than one.
" For what purpose? "
For chaining, killing, dragging where they please;
for taking away an estate. Thus ten conquer one,
in the cases wherein they are better.
" In what, then, are they worse? "
When the one has right principles, and the others
have not. For can they conquer in this case? How
should they? If we were weighed in a scale, must
not the heavier outweigh?
"How then came Socrates to suffer such things
from the Athenians?"
O foolish man ! what mean you by Socrates? Express the fact as it is. Are you surprised that the
mere body of Socrates should be carried away, and
dragged to prison, by such as were stronger; that it
should be poisoned by hemlock and die? Do these
things appear wonderful to you; these things unjust? Is it for such things as these that you accuse
God? Had Socrates, then, no compensation for
them? In what, then, to him, did the essence of
good consist? Whom shall we regard, you or him?
And what says he? "Anytus and Melitus may indeed kill; but hurt me they cannot." And again,
"If it so pleases God, so let it be."
But show me that he who has the worse principles
can get the advantage over him who has the better.
You never will show it, nor anything like it; for the
Law of Nature and of God is this,--let the better
always prevail over the worse.
"In what?"
In that wherein it is better. One body may be
stronger than another; many, than one; and a thief,
than one who is not a thief. Thus I, for instance,
lost my lamp, because the thief was better at keeping awake than I. But for that lamp he paid the
price of becoming a thief; for that lamp he lost his
virtue and became like a wild beast. This seemed to
him a good bargain; and so let it be !
But some one takes me by the collar, and drags me
to the forum; and then all the rest cry out, "Philosopher, what good do your principles do you? See,
you are being dragged to prison; see, you are going
to lose your head-! " And, pray, what rule of philosophy could I contrive, that when a stronger than myself lays hold on my collar, I should not be dragged;
or that, when ten men pull me at once, and throw
me into prison, I should not be thrown there? But
have I learned nothing, then? I have learned to
know, whatever happens, that if it concerns not my
will, it is nothing to me. Have my principles, then,
done me no good? What then; do I seek for anything else to do me good, but what I have learned?
Afterwards, as I sit in prison, I say, He who has
made all this disturbance neither recognizes any
guidance, nor heeds any teaching, nor is it any concern to him to know what philosophers say or do.
Let him alone.
" Come forth again from prison." If you have no
further need for me in prison, I will come out; if you
want me again, I will return. "For how long?"
Just so long as reason requires I should continue in
this body; when that is over, take it, and fare ye
well. Only let us not act inconsiderately, nor from
cowardice, nor on slight grounds, since that would be
contrary to the will of God; for he hath need of such
a world, and such beings to live on earth. But, if
he sounds a retreat, as he did to Socrates, we are to
obey him when he sounds it, as our General.
"Well; but can these things be explained to the
multitude? "
To what purpose? Is it not sufficient to be convinced one's self? When children come to us clapping their hands, and saying, "To-morrow is the
good feast of Saturn;" do we tell them that good
doth not consist in such things? By no means; but
we clap our hands also. Thus, when you are unable
to convince any one, consider hint as a child, and clap
your hands with him; or, ii you will not do that, at
least hold your tongue. These things we ought to
remember; and when we are called to any trial, to
know that an opportunity is come of showing whether
we have been well taught. For he who goes from
a philosophical lecture to a difficult point of practice
is like a young man who has been studying to solve
syllogisms. If you propose an easy one, he says,
" Give me rather a fine intricate one, that I may try
my strength." Thus athletic champions are displeased with a slight antagonist. "He cannot lift
me," says one. Is this a youth of spirit? No; for
when the occasion calls upon him, he may begin crying, and say, "I wanted to learn a little longer first."
Learn what? If you did not learn these things to
show them in practice, why did you learn them?
I trust there must be some one among you, sitting
here, who feels secret pangs of impatience, and says,
" When will such a trial come to my share, as hath
now fallen to his? Must I sit wasting my life in a
corner, when I might be crowned at Olympia? When
will any one bring the news of such a combat for
me?" Such should be the disposition of you all.
Even among the gladiators of Caesar, there are some
who bear it very ill that they are not brought upon
the stage and matched; and who offer vows to God,
and address the officers, begging to fight. And will
none among you appear such? I would willingly
take a voyage on purpose to see how a champion of
mine acts; how he meets his occasion.
This is not the contest I would choose, say you.
Is it in your power, then, to make the selection?
Such a body is given you, such parents, such brothers,
such a country, and such a rank in it; and then you
come to me, to change the conditions! Have
you not abilities to manage that which is given you
You should say to me, " It is your business to propose; mine, to treat the subject well." No; but
you say, "Do not meet me with such a perplexity,
but such a one; do not offer such an obstacle to me,
but such a one." There will be a time, I suppose,
when tragedians will fancy themselves to be mere
masks, and buskins, and long train. These things
are your materials, man, and your stage-properties.
Speak something; that we may know whether you
are a tragedian or a buffoon; for both have all the
rest in common. Suppose any one should take away
his buskins and his mask, and bring him upon the
stage in his common dress, is the tragedian lost, or
does he remain? If he has a voice, he remains.
"Here, this instant, take upon you the command."
I take it; and taking it, I show how a skilful man
performs the part. "Now lay aside your robe; put
on rags, and come upon the stage in that character."
What then? Is it not in my power to express the
character by a suitable voice?
"In what character do you now appear?" As a
witness summoned by God. "Come you, then, and
bear witness for me; for you are a fit witness to be
produced by me. Is anything which is inevitable to
be classed as either good or evil? Do I hurt any
one? Have I made the good of each individual to
rest on any one but himself? What evidence do
you give for God?"
" I am in a miserable condition, O Lord; I am undone: no mortal cares for me; no mortal gives me
anything; all blame me; all speak ill of me."
Is this the evidence you are to give? And will
you bring disgrace upon his summons, who hath conferred such an honor upon you, and thought you
worthy of being produced as a witness in such a
cause?
But some one in authority has given a sentence.
"I judge you to be impious and profane." What
has befallen you? - I have been judged to be impious and profane. - Anything else?- Nothing.--
Suppose he had passed his judgment upon any process of reasoning, and had questioned the conclusion
that, if it be day, it is light; what would have befallen the proposition? In this case, who is judged,
who is condemned, - the proposition, or he who cannot understand it? Does he know, who claims the
power of ruling in your case, what pious or impious
means? Has he made it his study or learned it?
Where? From whom? A musician would not regard him, if he pronounced bass to be treble; nor a
mathematician, if he passed sentence, that lines
drawn from the centre to the circumference are not
equal. And shall he who is instructed in the truth
respect an ignorant man, when he pronounces upon
pious and impious, just and unjust?
"Oh, the persecutions to which the wise are exposed !" Is it here that you have learned this talk?
Why do not you leave such pitiful discourse to idle,
pitiful fellows; and let them sit in a corner, and
receive some little mean pay, or grumble that nobody gives them anything? But do you come, and
make some use of what you have learned. It is not
reasonings that are wanted now, for there are books
stuffed full of stoical reasonings.
"What is wanted, then? "
The man who shall apply them; whose actions
may bear testimony to his doctrines. Assume this
character for me, that we may no longer make use in
the schools of the examples of the ancients, but may
have some examples of our own.
" To whom, then, does the contemplation of these
abstractions belong?"
To any one who has leisure for them; for man is
a being fond of contemplation. But it is shameful to
take only such view of things as truant slaves take
of a play. We ought to sit calmly, and listen,
whether to the actor or to the musician; and not do
like those poor fellows, who come in and admire the
actor, constantly glancing about them, and then, if
any one happens to mention their master, run frightened away. It is shameful for a philosopher thus to
contemplate the works of nature. What, in this parallel case, stands for the master? Man is not the
master of man; but death is, and life, and pleasure,
and pain; for without these, bring even Caesar to
me, and you will see how intrepid I shall be. But, if
he comes thundering and lightening with these, and
these are the objects of my terror, what do I else
but, like the truant slave, acknowledge my master?
While I have any respite from these, as the truant
comes into the theatre, so I bathe, drink, sing; but
all with terror and anxiety. But if I free myself
from my masters, that is, from such things as render
a master terrible, what trouble, what master have I
remaining?
" Shall we then insist upon these things with all
men? "
No. But make allowance for the ignorant, and
say, This poor man. advises me to what he thinks
good for himself. I excuse him; for Socrates, too,
excused the jailer, who wept when he was to drink
the poison, and said, " How heartily he sheds tears
for us !" Was it to him that Socrates said, " For this
reason we sent the women out of the way"? No,
but to his friends, - to such as were capable of hearing it; while he humored the other, as a child.