Ch. 11
Of natural affection.
When an important personage once came to
visit him, Epictetus, having inquired into the
particulars of his affairs, asked him whether he had a
wife and children. The other replying that he had,
Epictetus likewise inquired, In what manner do you
live with them? "Very miserably," says he. How
so? For men do not marry, and have children, in
order to be miserable, but rather to make themselves
happy. "But I am so very miserable about my
children that the other day, when my daughter was
sick and appeared to be in danger, I could not bear
even to be with her, but ran away, till it was told me
that she was recovered." And pray do you think this
was acting right? " It was acting naturally," said he.
Well, do but convince me that it was acting naturally, and I can as well convince you that everything
natural is right. "All, or most of us fathers, are
affected in the same way." I do not deny the fact;
but the question between us is, whether it is right.
For by this way of reasoning it must be said that
diseases happen for the good of the body, because
they do happen; and even that vices are natural, because all, or most of us, are guilty of them. Do you
show me, then, how such a behavior as yours appears
to be natural.
" I cannot undertake that; but do you rather show
me that it is neither natural nor right."
If we were disputing about black and white, what
criterion must we call in, to distinguish them?
"The sight."
If about hot and cold, or hard and soft, what?
"The touch."
Well, then, when we are debating about natural
and unnatural and right and wrong what criterion
are we to take?
"I cannot tell."
And yet to be ignorant of a criterion of colors, or
of smells, or tastes, might perhaps be no very great
loss; but do you think that he suffers only a small
loss who is ignorant of what is good and evil, and
natural and unnatural to man?
" No, - the very greatest."
Well, tell me; are all things which are judged good
and proper by some rightly judged to be so? Thus,
is it possible that the several opinions of Jews, and
Syrians, and Egyptians, and Romans, concerning food
should all be right?
" How can it be possible? "
I suppose, then, it is absolutely necessary that, if the
opinions of the Egyptians be right, the others must be
wrong; if those of the Jews be good, all the rest must
be bad.
" How can it be otherwise? "
And where ignorance is, there likewise is want of
wisdom and instruction in the most necessary points.
"It is granted."
Then, as you are sensible of this, you will for the
future apply yourself to nothing, and think of nothing
else, but how to learn the criterion of what is agreeable to nature; and to use that in judging of each
particular case. At present the assistance I have to
give you towards what you desire is this: Does affection seem to you to be a right and a natural thing?
" How should it be otherwise? "
Well, and is affection natural and right, and reason
not so?
"By no means."
Is there any opposition, then, between reason and
affection?
"I think not."
Suppose there were; if one of two opposites be natural, the other must necessarily be unnatural, must
it not?
" It must."
What we find, then, to accord at once with love and
reason, that we may safely pronounce to be right and
good.
" Agreed."
Well, then; you will not dispute this, that to run
away, and leave a sick child, is contrary to reason.
It remains for us to consider whether it be consistent
with affection.
" Let us consider it."
Did you, then, from an affection to your child, do
right in running away and leaving her? Has her
mother no affection for the child?
"Yes, surely she has."
Would it have been right, then, that her mother too
should leave her, or would it not?
"It would not."
And does not her nurse love her?
" She does."
Then ought she likewise to leave her?
"By no means."
And does not her preceptor love her?
"He does."
Then ought he also to have run away and left her
- -the child being thus left alone and unassisted, from
the great affection of her parents and her friends, or
left to die among people who neither loved her nor
took care of her?
"Heaven forbid !"
But is it not unreasonable and unjust that what you
think right in yourself, on account of your affection,
should not be allowed to others, who have the very
same affection with you
" It is absurd."
Pray, if you were ill yourself should you be willing
to have your family, and even your wife and children,
so very affectionate as to leave you helpless and alone?
" By no means."
Or would you wish to be so loved by your friends
as from their excessive affection always to be left alone
when you were ill? Or would you not rejoice, if it
were possible, to have such a kind of affection from
your enemies, as to make them thus let you alone?
If so, it remains, that your behavior was by no means
affectionate. But now, was there no other motive that
induced you to desert your child?
"How is that possible? "
I mean some such motive as induced a person at
Rome to hide his face while a horse was running to
which he earnestly wished success; and when, beyond
his expectation, it won the race he was obliged himself to be sponged, to recover from his faintness.
" And what was this motive? "
At present, perhaps, it cannot be made clear to you.
It is sufficient to be convinced, if what philosophers
say be true, that we are not to seek any motive merely
from without; but that there is the same [unseen]
motive in all cases, which moves us to do or forbear
any action; to speak or not to speak; to be elated or
depressed; to avoid or pursue, - that very impulse
which hath now moved us two; you, to come, and sit
and hear me; and me, to speak as I do.
"And what is that? "
Is it anything else than that it seemed right to us
to do so?
"Nothing else."
And if it had seemed otherwise to us. what else
should we have done than what we thought right?
This, and not the death of Patroclus, was the real
source of the lamentation of Achilles, -for every
man is not thus affected by the death of a friend, -
that it seemed right to him. This too was the cause
of your running away from your child, that it then
seemed right; and if hereafter you should stay with
her, it will be because that seems right. You are now
returning to Rome because it seems right to you; but
if you should alter your opinion you will not return.
In a word, neither death, nor exile, nor pain, nor anything of this kind, is the real cause of our doing or not
doing any action, but our inward opinions and principles. Do I convince you of this, or not?
" You do."
Well, then, such as the cause is, such will be the
effect. From this day forward, then, whenever we do
anything wrong, we will impute it to the wrong principle from which we act; and we will endeavor to remove and extirpate that, with greater care than we
would remove wens and tumors from the body. In
like manner, we will ascribe what we do right to the
same cause; and we will accuse neither servant, nor
neighbor, nor wife, nor children, as the cause of any
evil to us, - persuaded that if we had not accepted
certain principles, we should not carry them to such
consequences. The control of these principles lies in
us, and not in any outward things. Of these principles we ourselves, and not things outward, are the
masters.
" Agreed."
From this day, then, we will not so closely inquire
as to any external conditions,- estate or slaves, or
horses, or dogs,- but only make sure of our own
principles.
"Such is my desire," said the visitor.
You see, then, that it is necessary for you to become
a student, that being whom every one laughs at, if you
really desire to make an examination of your own
principles; but this, as you should know, is not the
work of an hour or a day.