Ch. 9
Concerning a certain orator, who was going to Rome on a lawsuit.
A person came to him who was going to Rome
on a lawsuit in which his dignity was concerned;
and after telling him the occasion of his journey,
asked him what he thought of the affair. If you ask
me, says Epictetus, what will happen to you at Rome,
and whether you shall gain or lose your cause, I have
no suggestion as to that. But if you ask me how
you shall fare, I can answer, If you have right principles, well; if wrong ones, ill. For every action
turns upon its principle. What was the reason that
you so earnestly desired to be chosen Governor of the
Gnossians? Principle. What is the reason that you
are now going to Rome? Principle. And in winter
too, and with danger and expense? Why, because
it is necessary. What tells you so? Your principle.
If, then, principles are the source of all our actions,
wherever any one has bad principles the effect will
correspond to the cause. Well, then; are all our
principles sound? Are both yours and your antagonist's? How then do you differ? Or are yours better
than his? Why? You think so, and so thinks he
of his, and so do madmen. This is a bad criterion.
But show me that you have given some attention and
care to your principles. As you now take a voyage
to Rome for the government of the Gnossians, and
are not contented to stay at home with the honors
you before enjoyed, but desire something greater and
more illustrious, did you ever take such a voyage
in order to examine your own principles and to throw
away the bad ones, if you happened to have any?
Did you ever apply to any one upon this account?
What time did you ever appoint to yourself for
it? What age? Run over your years. If you are
ashamed of me, do it for yourself. Did you examine
your principles when you were a child? Did not you
act then as now? When you were a youth, and frequented the schools of the orators, and yourself made
declamations, did you ever imagine that you were
deficient in anything? And when you became a man
and entered upon public business, pleaded causes,
and acquired credit, whom did you then recognize as
your equal? How would you have borne that any
one should examine whether your principles were
bad? What, then, would you have me say to you?
" Assist me in this affair."
I have no suggestion to offer for that. Neither
are you come to me, if it be upon that account you
came, as to a philosopher; but as you would come to
an herb-seller or a shoemaker.
"For what purposes, then, can the philosophers
give suggestions?"
For preserving and conducting the Reason con-
formably to Nature, whatever happens. Do you think
this a small thing?
"No, but the greatest."
Well, and does it require but a short time, and
may it be taken as you pass by? If you can, take it
then; and so you will say, " I have visited Epictetus." Ay; just as you would visit a stone or a
statue. For you have seen me, and nothing more.
But he visits a man, as a man, who learns his principles, and, in return, shows his own. Learn my
principles; show me yours. Then say you have
visited me. Let us confute each other. If I have
any bad principle, take it away. If you have any,
bring it forth. This is visiting a philosopher. No,
but "It lies in our way, and while we are about
hiring a ship, we may call on Epictetus. Let us see
what he says." And then when you are gone, you
say, " Epictetus is nothing. His language was inaccurate, was barbarous." For what else did you come
to criticise? " Well; but if I employ myself in these
things, I shall be without an estate, like you, -without plate, without equipage, like you." Nothing, perhaps, is necessary to be said to this, but that I do
not want them. But if you possess many things, you
still want others; so that whether you will or not,
you are poorer than I.
"What then do I need?"
What you have not, -constancy, a mind conformable to Nature, and a freedom from perturbation.
Patron or no patron, what care I? But you do. I
am richer than you; I am not anxious what Caesar
will think of me; I flatter no one on that account.
This I have, instead of silver and gold plate. You
have your vessels of gold; but your discourse, your
principles, your opinions, your pursuits, your desires,
are of mere earthen ware. When I have all these
conformable to Nature, why should not I bestow
some study upon my reasoning too? I am at leisure.
My mind is under no distraction. In this freedom
from distraction, what shall I do? Have I anything
more becoming a man than this? You, when you
have nothing to do, are restless; you go to the theatre, or perhaps to bathe. Why should not the philosopher polish his reasoning? You have fine crystal
and myrrhine vases; 50 I have acute forms of arguing. To you, all you have appears little; to me all
I have seems great. Your appetite is insatiable;
mine is satisfied. When children thrust their hand
into a narrow jar of nuts and figs, if they fill it, they
cannot get it out again; then they begin crying.
Drop a few of them, and you will get out the rest.
And do you too drop your desire; do not demand
much, and you will attain.