Book 1
Ch. 1
Of the things which are, and the things which are not in our own power.
Of human faculties in general, you will find that
each is unable to contemplate itself, and therefore to approve or disapprove itself. How far does
the proper sphere of grammar extend? As far as the
judging of language. Of music? As far as the judging of melody. Does either of them contemplate itself, then? By no means.
Thus, for instance, when you are to write to your
friend, grammar will tell you what to write; but
whether you are to write to your friend at all, or no,
grammar will not tell you. Thus music, with regard
to tunes; but whether it be proper or improper, at
any particular time, to sing or play, music will not tell
you.
What will tell, then?
That faculty which contemplates both itself and all
other things.
And what is that?
The Reasoning Faculty; for that alone is found
able to place an estimate upon itself, - what it is,
what are its powers, what its value and likewise all the
rest. For what is it else that says, gold is beautiful?
since the gold itself does not speak. Evidently, that
faculty which judges of the appearances of things.1
What else distinguishes music, grammar, the other
faculties, proves their uses, and shows their proper
occasions?
Nothing but this.
As it was fit, then, this most excellent and superior
faculty alone, a right use of the appearances of things,
the gods have placed in our own power; but all other
matters they have not placed in our power. What,
was it because they would not? I rather think that,
if they could, they had granted us these too; but they
certainly could not. For, placed upon earth, and
confined to such a body and to such companions,
how was it possible that, in these respects, we should
not be hindered by things outside of us?
But what says Zeus? " O Epictetus, if it had been
possible, I had made this little body and property of
thine free, and not liable to hindrance. But now do
not mistake; it is not thy own, but only a finer mixture of clay. Since, then, I could not give thee this,
I have given thee a certain portion of myself; this
faculty of exerting the powers of pursuit and avoidance, of desire and aversion, and, in a word, the use
of the appearances of things. Taking care of this
point, and making what is thy own to consist in this,
thou wilt never be restrained, never be hindered; thou
wilt not groan, wilt not complain, wilt not flatter any
one. How, then? Do all these advantages seem
small to thee? Heaven forbid! Let them suffice
thee, then, and thank the gods."
But now, when it is in our power to take care of
one thing, and to apply ourselves to one, we choose
rather to take care of many, and to encumber ourselves with many, - body, property, brother, friend,
child, and slave, - and, by this multiplicity of encumbrances, we are burdened and weighed down. Thus,
when the weather does not happen to be fair for sailing, we sit in distress and gaze out perpetually. Which
way is the wind? North. What good will that do
us? When will the west blow? When it pleases
friend, or when Aeolus pleases; for Zeus has not made
you dispenser of the winds, but Aeolus.
What, then, is to be done?
To make the best of what is in our power, and take
the rest as it occurs.
And how does it occur?
As it pleases God.
What, then, must I be the only one to lose my head?
Why, would you have all the world, then, lose their
heads for your consolation? Why are not you willing
to stretch out your neck, like Lateranus,2 when he
was commanded by Nero to be beheaded? For,
shrinking a little -after receiving a weak blow, he
stretched it out again. And before this, when Epaphroditus,3 the freedman of Nero, interrogated him
about the conspiracy, " If I have a mind to say anything," replied he, " I will tell it to your master."
What resource have we, then, upon such occasions?
Why, what else but to distinguish between what is
ours, and what not ours, - what is right, and what is
wrong? I must die, and must I die groaning too?
I must be fettered; must I be lamenting too? I
must be exiled; and what hinders me, then, but that
I may go smiling, and cheerful, and serene? "Betray a secret." I will not betray it, for this is in my
own power. "Then I will fetter you." What do
you say, man? Fetter me? You will fetter my leg,
but not Zeus himself can get the better of my free
will. " I will throw you into prison; I will behead
that paltry body of yours." Did I ever tell you
that I alone had a head not liable to be cut off?
These things ought philosophers to study; these
ought they daily to write, and in these to exercise
themselves.
Thraseas4 used to say, " I had rather be killed today than banished to-morrow." But how did Rufus5
answer him? " If you prefer it as a heavier misfortune, how foolish a preference ! If as a lighter, who
has put it in your power? Why do you not study to
be contented with what is allotted you?"
Well, and what said Agrippinus 6 upon this account?
"I will not be a hindrance to myself." Word was
brought him, " Your cause is pending in the senate."
"Good luck attend it; but it is eleven o'clock " (the
hour when he used to exercise before bathing),- " let
us go to our exercise." This being over, a messenger
tells him, " You are condemned." " To banishment,"
says he, " or to death? " " To banishment." "What of
my estate? " " It is not taken away." Well, then, let
us go as far as Aricia,7 and dine there."
This it is to have studied what ought to be studied;
to have placed our desires and aversions above tyranny
and above chance. I must die, -if instantly, I will die
instantly; if in a short time, I will dine first, and when
the hour comes, then will I die. How? As becomes
one who restores what is not his own.