Works


Works
By Epictetus
Edited by: Thomas Wentworth Higginson

New York Thomas Nelson and Sons 1890


Perseus Documents Collection Table of Contents


The Discourses of Epictetus
   Arrian to Lucius Gellius
   Of the things which are, and the things which are not in our own power.
   In what manner, upon every occasion, to preserve our character.
   How, from the doctrine that god is the father of mankind, we may proceed to its consequences.
   Of progress.
   Concerning the academics.16
   Of providence.
   Of the use of the forms of right reasoning.
   That logical subtleties are not safe to the uninstructed.
   How from the doctrine of our relationship to god we are to deduce its consequences.
   Concerning those who seek preferment at Rome.
   Of natural affection.
   Of contentment.
   How everything may be performed to the divine acceptance.
   That all things are under the divine supervision.
   What philosophy promises.
   Of providence.
   That the art of reasoning is necessary.
   That we ought not to be angry with the erring.
   Of the right treatment of tyrants.
   In what manner reason contemplates itself.
   Of the desire of admiration.
   Of general principles.
   Against Epicurus.
   How we ought to struggle with difficulties.
   On the same subject.
   What the rule of life is.
   Of the varied appearances of things to the mind, and what means are at hand by which to regulate them.
   That we ought not to be angry with mankind. What things are little, what great, among men.
   Of courage.
   Weapons ready for difficult occasions.
   That courage is not inconsistent with caution.
   Of tranquillity.
   Concerning such as recommend persons to the philosophers.
   Concerning a man who had been guilty of adultery.
   How nobleness of mind may be consistent with prudence.
   Of circumstances.25
   Of divination.
   Wherein consists the essence of good.
   That some persons, failing to fulfil what the character of a man implies, assume that of a philosopher.
   How we may infer the duties of life from its nominal functions.
   The beginning of philosophy.
   Of disputation.
   Of anxiety.
   Concerning Naso.
   Concerning those who obstinately persist in whatever they have determined.
   What we do not study to make use of the established principles concerning good and evil.
   How to apply general principles to particular cases.
   How to deal with the semblances of things.
   Concerning those who embrace philosophy only in words.
   Concerning the Epicureans and Academics.
   Of inconsistency.
   Of friendship.
   Of eloquence.
   Concerning a person whom he treated with disregard.
   That logic is necessary.
   What is the test of error.
   Of personal adornment.
   In what a well-trained man should exercise himself; and that we neglect the principal things.
   What is the chief concern of a good man; and in what we chiefly ought to train ourselves.
   Concerning one who made himself improperly conspicuous in the theatre.
   Concerning those who plead illness.
   Miscellaneous.
   Concerning a certain governor who was an epicurean.
   How we are to exercise ourselves in regard to the semblances of things.
   Concerning a certain orator, who was going to Rome on a lawsuit.
   In what manner we ought to bear illness.
   Miscellaneous.
   Of training.
   What solitude is; and what a solitary person.
   Miscellaneous.
   That everything is to be undertaken with circumspection.55
   That caution should be used, as to personal familiarity.
   Of providence.
   That we ought not to be alarmed by any news that is brought us.
   What is the comparative condition of the philosopher, and of the crowd.
   That some advantage may be gained from every outward circumstance.
   Concerning those who readily set up for sophists.
   Of the Cynic philosophy.
   Concerning such as read and dispute ostentatiously.
   That we ought not to be affected by things not in our own power.
   Concerning those who waver in their purpose.
   Concerning those who are in dread of want.
   Of freedom.
   Of complaisance.
   What things are to be exchanged for others.
   Concerning those who earnestly desire a life of repose.
   Concerning the quarrelsome and ferocious.
   Concerning those who are annoyed at being pitied.
   Of fearlessness.
   Concerning such as hastily assume the philosophic dress.
   Concerning a person who had grown immodest.
   What things we are to despise, and what chiefly to value.
   Of purity.
   Of taking pains.
   Concerning such as are too communicative

The Enchiridion

Fragments of Epictetus from Stobaeus, Antonius, and Maximus.86

Other fragments.

Doubtful fragments.

Index.
   A.
   B.
   C.
   D.
   E.
   F.
   G.
   H.
   I.
   L.
   M.
   N.
   O.
   P.
   Q.
   R.
   S.
   T.
   V.
   W.
   Z.

The Discourses of Epictetus
   Arrian to Lucius Gellius
   Of the things which are, and the things which are not in our own power.
   In what manner, upon every occasion, to preserve our character.
   How, from the doctrine that god is the father of mankind, we may proceed to its consequences.
   Of progress.
   Concerning the academics.16
   Of providence.
   Of the use of the forms of right reasoning.
   That logical subtleties are not safe to the uninstructed.
   How from the doctrine of our relationship to god we are to deduce its consequences.
   Concerning those who seek preferment at Rome.
   Of natural affection.
   Of contentment.
   How everything may be performed to the divine acceptance.
   That all things are under the divine supervision.
   What philosophy promises.
   Of providence.
   That the art of reasoning is necessary.
   That we ought not to be angry with the erring.
   Of the right treatment of tyrants.
   In what manner reason contemplates itself.
   Of the desire of admiration.
   Of general principles.
   Against Epicurus.
   How we ought to struggle with difficulties.
   On the same subject.
   What the rule of life is.
   Of the varied appearances of things to the mind, and what means are at hand by which to regulate them.
   That we ought not to be angry with mankind. What things are little, what great, among men.
   Of courage.
   Weapons ready for difficult occasions.
   That courage is not inconsistent with caution.
   Of tranquillity.
   Concerning such as recommend persons to the philosophers.
   Concerning a man who had been guilty of adultery.
   How nobleness of mind may be consistent with prudence.
   Of circumstances.25
   Of divination.
   Wherein consists the essence of good.
   That some persons, failing to fulfil what the character of a man implies, assume that of a philosopher.
   How we may infer the duties of life from its nominal functions.
   The beginning of philosophy.
   Of disputation.
   Of anxiety.
   Concerning Naso.
   Concerning those who obstinately persist in whatever they have determined.
   What we do not study to make use of the established principles concerning good and evil.
   How to apply general principles to particular cases.
   How to deal with the semblances of things.
   Concerning those who embrace philosophy only in words.
   Concerning the Epicureans and Academics.
   Of inconsistency.
   Of friendship.
   Of eloquence.
   Concerning a person whom he treated with disregard.
   That logic is necessary.
   What is the test of error.
   Of personal adornment.
   In what a well-trained man should exercise himself; and that we neglect the principal things.
   What is the chief concern of a good man; and in what we chiefly ought to train ourselves.
   Concerning one who made himself improperly conspicuous in the theatre.
   Concerning those who plead illness.
   Miscellaneous.
   Concerning a certain governor who was an epicurean.
   How we are to exercise ourselves in regard to the semblances of things.
   Concerning a certain orator, who was going to Rome on a lawsuit.
   In what manner we ought to bear illness.
   Miscellaneous.
   Of training.
   What solitude is; and what a solitary person.
   Miscellaneous.
   That everything is to be undertaken with circumspection.55
   That caution should be used, as to personal familiarity.
   Of providence.
   That we ought not to be alarmed by any news that is brought us.
   What is the comparative condition of the philosopher, and of the crowd.
   That some advantage may be gained from every outward circumstance.
   Concerning those who readily set up for sophists.
   Of the Cynic philosophy.
   Concerning such as read and dispute ostentatiously.
   That we ought not to be affected by things not in our own power.
   Concerning those who waver in their purpose.
   Concerning those who are in dread of want.
   Of freedom.
   Of complaisance.
   What things are to be exchanged for others.
   Concerning those who earnestly desire a life of repose.
   Concerning the quarrelsome and ferocious.
   Concerning those who are annoyed at being pitied.
   Of fearlessness.
   Concerning such as hastily assume the philosophic dress.
   Concerning a person who had grown immodest.
   What things we are to despise, and what chiefly to value.
   Of purity.
   Of taking pains.
   Concerning such as are too communicative

The Enchiridion

Fragments of Epictetus from Stobaeus, Antonius, and Maximus.86

Other fragments.

Doubtful fragments.

Index.
   A.
   B.
   C.
   D.
   E.
   F.
   G.
   H.
   I.
   L.
   M.
   N.
   O.
   P.
   Q.
   R.
   S.
   T.
   V.
   W.
   Z.

Funded by The Annenberg CPB/Project

The Discourses of Epictetus
 

Ch. 22

Of general principles.

The same general principles are common to all men, nor does one such principle contradict another; for which of us does not admit that good is advantageous and eligible, and in all cases to be pursued and followed? Who does not admit that justice is fair and becoming? Where, then, arises the dispute? In adapting these principles to particular cases; as when one cries, "Such a person has acted well, - he is a gallant man;" and another, " No, he has acted like a fool." Hence arise disputes among men. This is the dispute between Jews and Syrians and Egyptians and Romans, - not whether the right be preferable to all things, and in every instance to be sought; but whether the eating swine's flesh be consistent with right, or not. This, too, you will find to have been the dispute between Achilles and Agamemnon; for call them forth. What say you, Agamemnon, -ought not that to be done which is fit and right? "Yes, surely." Achilles, what say you, -is it not agreeable to you, that what is right should be done? "Yes; I desire it beyond everything." Apply your principles then. Here begins the dispute. One says, "It is not fit that I should restore Chryseis to her father." The other says, "Yes; but it is." One or the other of them, certainly, makes a wrong conception of the principle of fitness. Again, the one says, " If it be fit that I should give up Chryseis, it is fit, too, that I should take some of your prizes." The other answers, "What, that you should take my mistress?" "Ay; yours." "What, mine only? Must I only, then, lose my prize?"

What, then, is it to be properly educated? To learn how to apply the principles of natural right to particular cases, and, for the rest, to distinguish that some things are in our power, while others are not. In our own power are the will, and all voluntary actions; out of our power, the body and its parts, property, parents, brothers, children, country, and, in short, all our fellow-beings. Where, then, shall we place good? In what shall we define it to consist? In things within our own power. "But are not health and strength and life good? And are not children, parents, country? You talk unreasonably."

Let us, then, try another point of view. Can he who suffers evil, and is disappointed of good, be happy? He cannot. And can he preserve a right behavior with regard to society? How is it possible that he should? I am naturally led to seek my own highest good. If, therefore, it is my highest good to have an estate, it is for my good likewise to take it away from my neighbor. If it is my highest good to have a suit of clothes, it is for my good likewise to steal it wherever I find it. Hence wars, seditions, tyranny, unjust invasions. How shall I, if this be the case, be able any longer to do my duty towards Zeus? If I suffer evil, and am disappointed, he takes no care of me. And what is he to me if he cannot help me; or. again, what is he to me if he chooses I should be in the condition that I am? Then I begin to hate him. What, then, do we build temples, do we raise statues, to Zeus. as to evil demons, as to the goddess Fever? How, then, is he the preserver, and how the dispenser of rain and plenty? If we place the essence of good on any such ground, all this will follow. What, then, shall we do?

This is the inquiry which interests him who philosophizes in earnest, and to some result. Do I not now see what is good, and what is evil, or am I mad? Suppose I place good only in things dependent on my own will? Why, every one will laugh at me. Some gray-headed old fellow will come, with his fingers covered with gold rings, and will shake his head, and say, "Hark ye, child, it is fit you should learn philosophy; but it is fit, too, you should have common-sense. All this is nonsense. You learn syllogisms from philosophers; but how you are to act, you know better than they." Then what displeases you if I do know? What can I say to this unfortunate? If I make no answer, he will burst; so I must answer thus: "Bear with me, as with lovers. Granted; I am not myself. I have lost my senses."