Ch. 22
Of friendship.
To whatever objects a person devotes his attention, these objects he probably loves. Do men
ever devote their attention, then, to [what they think]
evils? By no means. Or even to things indifferent?
No, nor this. It remains, then, that good must be the
sole object of their attention; and if of their attention, of their love too. Whoever, therefore, understands good, is capable likewise of love; and he
who cannot distinguish good from evil, and things
indifferent from both, how is it possible that he can
love? The wise person alone, then, is capable of
loving.
" How so? I am not this wise person, yet I love
my child."
I protest it surprises me that you should, in the
first place, confess yourself unwise. For in what are
you deficient? Have not you the use of your senses?
Do you not distinguish the semblances of things?
Do you not provide such food and clothing and habitation as are suitable to you? Why then do you confess that you want wisdom? In truth, because you
are often struck and disconcerted by semblances,
and their speciousness gets the better of you; and
hence you sometimes suppose the very same things
to be good, then evil, and lastly, neither; and, in a
word, you grieve, you fear, you envy, you are disconcerted, you change. Is it from this that you confess
yourself unwise? And are you not changeable too
in love? Riches, pleasure, in short, the very same
things, you sometimes esteem good, and at other times
evil. And do you not esteem the same persons too
alternately as good and bad, at one time treating
them with kindness, at another with enmity; at one
time commending, and at another censuring them?
"Yes. This too is the case with me."
Well, then; can he who is deceived in another be
his friend, think you?
"No, surely."
Or does he who loves him with a changeable affection bear him genuine good-will?
" Nor he, neither."
Or he who now vilifies, then admires him?
" Nor he."
Do you not often see little dogs caressing and playing with each other, so that you would say nothing
could be more friendly? But to learn what this friendship is, throw a bit of meat between them, and you
will see. Do you too throw a bit of an estate betwixt
you and your son, and you will see that he will
quickly wish you under ground, and you him; and
then you, no doubt, on the other hand will exclaim,
What a son have I brought up ! He would bury me
alive ! Throw in a pretty girl, and the old fellow
and the young one will both fall in love with her;
or let fame or danger intervene, the words of the
father of Admetus will be yours:--
You love to see the light. Doth not your father?
You fain would still behold it. Would not he? Euripides, Alcestis, v. [691] 701. The second line, as
quoted by Epictetus, is not found in the received editions.
Pheres, the father of Admetus, is defending himself for not
consenting to die in place of his son. - H.
Do you suppose that he did not love his own child
when it was little; that he was not in agonies when
it had a fever, and often wished to undergo that
fever in its stead? But, after all, when the trial comes
home, you see what expressions he uses. Were not
Eteocles and Polynices born of the same mother and
of the same father? Were they not brought up,
and did they not live and eat and sleep, together?
Did not they kiss and fondle each other? So that
any one, who saw them, would have laughed at all
the paradoxes which philosophers utter about love.
And yet when a kingdom, like a bit of meat, was
thrown betwixt them, see what they say,-
Polynices
Where wilt thou stand before the towers?
Eteocles
Why askest thou this of me?
Pol.
I will oppose myself to thee, to slay thee.
Et.
Me too the desire of this seizes. Euripides, Phoenissae 630-631.
Such are the prayers they offer. Be not therefore
deceived. No living being is held by anything so
strongly as by its own needs. Whatever therefore
appears a hindrance to these, be it brother or father
or child or mistress or friend, is hated, abhorred,
execrated; for by nature it loves nothing like its own
needs. This motive is father and brother and family and country and God. Whenever, therefore, the
gods seem to hinder this, we vilify even them, and
throw down their statues, and burn their temples;
as Alexander ordered the temple of Esculapius to be
burnt, because he had lost the man he loved.
When, therefore, any one identifies his interest with
those of sanctity, virtue, country, parents, and friends,
all these are secured; but whenever he places his
interest in anything else than friends, country, family, and justice, then these all give way, borne down
by the weight of self-interest. For wherever I and
mine are placed, thither must every living being
gravitate. If in body, that will sway us; if in our
own will, that; if in externals, these. If, therefore,
I rest my personality in the will, then only shall I be
a friend, a son, or a father, such as I ought. For in
that case it will be for my interest to preserve the
faithful, the modest, the patient, the abstinent, the
beneficent character; to keep the relations of life
inviolate. But if I place my personality in one thing,
and virtue in another, the doctrine of Epicurus will
stand its ground, that virtue is nothing, or mere
opinion.
From this ignorance it was that the Athenians and
Lacedemonians quarrelled with each other, and the
Thebans with both; the Persian king with Greece,
and the Macedonians with both; and now the Romans with the Getes. And in still remoter times
the Trojan war arose from the same cause. Alexander [Paris] was the guest of Menelaus; and whoever
had seen the mutual proofs of good-will that passed
between them would never have believed that they
were not friends. But a tempting bait, a pretty
woman, was thrown in between them; and thence
came war. At present, therefore, when you see that
dear brothers have, in appearance, but one soul do
not immediately pronounce upon their love; not
though they should swear it, and affirm it was impossible to live asunder. For the governing faculty of a
bad man is faithless, unsettled, undiscriminating, successively vanquished by different semblances. But
inquire, not as others do, whether they were born of
the same parents, and brought up together, and
under the same preceptor; but this thing only, in
what they place their interest,- in externals or in
their own wills. If in externals, you can no more
pronounce them friends, than you can call them
faithful, or constant, or brave, or free; nay, nor even
truly men, if you are wise. For it is no principle of
humanity that makes them bite and vilify each other,
and take possession of public assemblies, as wild
beasts do of solitudes and mountains; and convert
courts of justice into dens of robbers; that prompts
them to be intemperate, adulterers, seducers; or leads
them into other offences that men commit against
each other, - all from that one single error, by which
they risk themselves and their own concerns on
things uncontrollable by will.
But if you hear that these men in reality suppose
good to be placed only in the will, and in a right use
of things as they appear, no longer take the trouble
of inquiring if they are father and son, or old companions and acquaintances; but boldly pronounce
that they are friends, and also that they are faithful
and just. For where else can friendship be met, but
joined with fidelity and modesty, and the intercommunication of virtue alone?
"Well; but such a one paid me the utmost regard
for so long a time, and did he not love me? "
How can you tell, foolish man, if that regard be
any other than he pays to his shoes, or his horse,
when he cleans them? And how do you know but
that when you cease to be a necessary utensil, he may
throw you away, like a broken stool?
"Well; but it is my wife, and we have lived
together many years."
And how many did Eriphyle live with Amphiaraus, and was the mother of children not a few?
But a bauble came between them. What was this
bauble? A false conviction concerning certain things.
This turned her into a savage animal; this cut asunder all love, and suffered neither the wife nor the
mother to continue such.43
Whoever, therefore, among you studies either to
be or to gain a friend, let him cut up all false convictions by the root, hate them, drive them utterly out
of his soul. Thus, in the first place, he will be secure
from inward reproaches and contests, from vacillation and self-torment. Then, with respect to others,
to every like-minded person he will be without disguise; to such as are unlike he will be patient, mild,
gentle, and ready to forgive them, as failing in points
of the greatest importance; but severe to none, being
fully convinced of Plato's doctrine, that the soul is
never willingly deprived of truth. Without all this,
you may, in many respects, live as friends do; and
drink and lodge and travel together, and even be
born of the same parents; and so may serpents too;
but neither they nor you can ever be really friends,
while your accustomed principles remain brutal and
execrable.
