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LAMARCK, JEAN BAPTISTE PIERRE ANTOINE
DE MONET DE (b. Bazentin-le-Petit, Picardy,
France, 1 August 1744; d. Paris, France, 28 December
1829), botany, invertebrate zoology and paleontology,
evolution.
Theory of Evolution.
“complication” observed in the major classificatory
groupings of animals and plants. It also presents in
more detail Lamarck's two-factor theory of evolution:
the natural tendency toward organic complexity as a
way of explaining the hierarchical organization of the
“masses” and the influence of the environment as the
factor responsible for all variations from this norm.
In the second part of the Philosophie zoologique,
Lamarck developed his views on the physical nature
of life, its spontaneous production resulting in simple
cellular tissue, and its characteristics at the simplest
level, the lower ends of the plant and animal series.
While these two parts were very important in summarizing
many of his evolutionary views, they do not
differ significantly from the positions of 1802.
The third part contains the most important additions
to the earlier theories. In this section Lamarck deals
in great detail with the problem of a physical explanation
for the emergence of the higher mental faculties.
Some of the eighteenth-century materialists, such as
Maupertuis, had attempted to avoid the question of
emergence by making thought a property of matter.
Some religious figures went to the other extreme and
limited thought to man and his soul. Lamarck's
breakthrough was tying a progressive development of
higher mental faculties in a physical way to structural
development of the nervous system. He had already
advanced explanations for the evolution of new
structures and systems, and the theories on the
nervous system were an extension of these earlier
views. Higher mental faculties could emerge precisely
because they were a product of increased structural
complexity, and in all this a physically defined nervous
fluid was crucial. For Lamarck one of the most
important events in the evolutionary process was the
development of the nervous system, particularly the
brain, because at that point animals began to form
ideas and control their movements.
There has been great misunderstanding of
Lamarck's concept of sentiment intérieur, or inner
feeling, as a directing factor in the functioning and
evolution of higher animals. Lamarck never believed
that the giraffe has a longer neck because it consciously
wanted one. Rather, he observed that higher animals
were capable of voluntary motion which might become
habit (as in a search for food or avoidance of danger)
and of involuntary motion, or what we would call
reflex action. Lamarck attempted to account for such
behavior through the mechanism of the sentiment
intérieur, an internal physical feeling resulting from
agitation of the nervous fluid. The brain of an animal
with an internal physical need, such as hunger, would
direct the nervous fluid so as to cause muscular motion
to satisfy that need. If this action were constantly
repeated, new organs would eventually result. On the
other hand, a sudden, strong stimulus, such as a
loud noise, would produce a reflex action because of
a particular perturbation of the nervous fluid.
The concept of the sentiment intérieur included not
only the direct interaction with the physical world but
also a more sophisticated level. It could be affected,
particularly in human beings, by ideas or moral
sensations. Such a view was in keeping with an
extension of Condillac's sensationalist psychology and
epistemology, especially as expressed by Cabanis and
the Idéologues. Moral and aesthetic reactions were thus
as physically caused as instinctive or reflex ones; the
only difference was that between primary or secondary
causation. It is not surprising that Lamarck has many
references to Cabanis on the relationship between
physique and morale. Lamarck felt he had provided a
materialistic account for all the activities involving
the nervous system, including instinct, will, memory,
judgment, understanding, and imagination. He further
developed these views in his last publication, Système
analytique des connaissances positives de l'homme
(1820).
Next to the Philosophie zoologique, Lamarck's
best-known work dealing with evolution is the 1815
“Introduction” to his impressive seven-volume Histoire
naturelle des animaux sans vertèbres (1815-1822).
In this work he summarized his evolutionary views
in four laws. The first law concerns his principle
of the natural tendency toward increasing organic
complexity as observed in the larger groupings of the
plant and animal series. The other three laws explain
how changes occurred and account for irregularities
below the class level. The second law deals with the
way new organs evolve by the indirect influence of the
environment on an animal. The use-disuse principle,
or third law, accounts for changes in the body as a
result of new habits; this principle was not new with
Lamarck but was generally accepted. The last law,
dealing with the inheritance of acquired characteristics,
was necessary after positing a slow, gradual evolution;
without it Lamarck would have been unable to explain
cumulative change and the emergence of new structures.
Too much energy has been spent attacking this
last law; because it represents an assumption not
believed today, it has been said that this disproves
Lamarck's whole theory of evolution. The historical
context of Lamarck's thought has been forgotten.
Most of his contemporaries believed in the inheritance
of acquired characteristics, so much so that they
rarely felt any need to offer proof of it. The above
summary of the four 1815 laws shows that the basic
features of Lamarck's evolutionary theory remained
relatively unchanged from 1802.