BOOK II

CHAPTER X

Csar encourages his Men -- Marches to Thessaly -- Pompey encamps at Pharsalus -- Csar short of Supplies -- Pompey prefers Delay but is overruled by his Council -- Prodigies before the Battle -- The Armies at Pharsalus -- Allies and Mercenaries

Pompey sent letters to all the kings and cities magnifying his victory, and he expected that Csar's army would come over to him directly, conceiving that it was oppressed by hunger and cast down by defeat, and especially the officers because apprehensive of punishment for their bad conduct in the battle. But the latter, as though some god had brought them to repentance, were ashamed of their fault, and as Csar chided them gently and granted them pardon, they became still more angry with themselves and by a surprising change demanded that they should be decimated according to the law of their country. When Csar did not agree to this they were still more mortified, and acknowledged that he had been shamefully treated by them. They cried out that he should at least put the standard bearers to death because they themselves would never have run away unless the standards had turned in flight first. Csar would not consent to this, but he reluctantly punished a few. So great was the zeal excited among all by his moderation that they demanded to be led against the enemy immediately. They urged him vehemently, beseeching and promising to wipe out their disgrace by a splendid victory. Of their own accord they visited each other in military order and took an oath by companies, under the eye of Csar himself, that they would not leave the field of battle except as victors.²²⁸ [sect. 64]

Wherefore Csar's friends urged him to avail himself of the army's repentance and eagerness promptly, but he said in the hearing of the host, that he would take a better opportunity to lead them against the enemy, and he exhorted them to be mindful of their present zeal. He privately admonished his friends that it was necessary first for the soldiers to recover from the very great alarm of their recent defeat, and for the enemy to lose something of their present high confidence. He confessed also that he had made a mistake in encamping before Dyrrachium where Pompey had abundance of supplies, whereas he ought to have drawn him to some place where he would be subject to the same scarcity as themselves. After saying this he marched directly to Apollonia and from there to Thessaly, advancing by night in order to conceal his movements. The small town of Gomphi²²⁹ to which he came refused to open its gates to him, and he took it by storm and allowed his army to plunder it. The soldiers, who had suffered much from hunger, stuffed themselves immoderately and drank wine to excess. The Germans among them were especially ridiculous under the influence of drink. It seems probable that Pompey might have attacked them then and gained another victory had he not disdainfully neglected a close pursuit. After seven days of rapid marching Csar encamped near Pharsalus. It is said that among the notable calamities of Gomphi the bodies of twenty venerable men of the first rank were found lying on the floor in an apothecary's shop, not wounded, and with goblets near them, as though they were drunk, and that one of them, like a physician, was seated in a chair and had dealt out poison to them.²³⁰ [sect. 65]

After Csar had withdrawn Pompey called a council of war, at which Afranius advised that they should make use of their naval force in which they were much superior, and being masters of the sea should harass Csar, who was now wandering and destitute, and that Pompey himself should conduct his infantry with all haste to Italy, which was well disposed toward him and was now free from a hostile army. Having mastered it, together with Gaul and Spain, they could attack Csar again from their own home, the seat of imperial power. Although this was the best possible advice Pompey disregarded it and allowed himself to be persuaded by those who said that Csar's army would presently desert to him on account of hunger, and that there was not much left of it anyway after the victory of Dyrrachium. They said it would be disgraceful to abandon the pursuit of Csar when he was in flight, and for the victor to flee as though vanquished.²³¹ Pompey sided with these advisers partly out of regard for the opinions of the eastern nations that were looking on, partly to prevent any harm befalling Lucius Scipio, who was still in Macedonia, but most of all because he thought that he ought to fight while his army was in high spirits. Accordingly he advanced and pitched his camp opposite to Csar's near Pharsalus, so that they were separated from each other by a distance of thirty stades. [sect. 66]

Pompey's supplies came from every quarter, for the roads, harbors, and strongholds had been so provided beforehand that food was brought to him at all times from the land, and every wind blew it to him from the sea. Csar, on the other hand, had only what he could find with difficulty and seize by hard labor. Yet even so nobody deserted him, but all, by a kind of divine fury, longed to come to close quarters with the enemy. They considered that they, who had been trained in arms for ten years, were much superior to the new levies of Pompey in fighting, but that for digging ditches and building fortifications and for laborious foraging they were weaker by reason of their age. Tired as they were they altogether preferred to perform some deed of valor rather than perish with hunger in inaction. Pompey perceived this and he considered it dangerous to risk everything on a single battle with disciplined and desperate men, and against the amazing luck of Csar. It would be easier and safer to reduce them by want as they controlled no fertile territory, and could get nothing by sea, and had no ships for rapid flight. So he decided on the most prudent calculation to protract the war and wear out the enemy by hunger from day to day.²³² [sect. 67]

Pompey was surrounded by a great number of senators, of equal rank with himself, by very distinguished knights, and by many kings and princes. Some of these, by reason of their inexperience in war, others because they were too much elated by the victory at Dyrrachium, others because they outnumbered the enemy, and others because they were quite tired of the war and preferred a quick decision rather than a sound one -- all urged him to fight, pointing out to him that Csar was always drawn up for battle and challenging him. Pompey answered along this very line of argument by saying that Csar was compelled to do so by his want of supplies, and that they had the more reason to remain quiet because Csar was pushed by necessity. Yet, harassed by the whole army, which was unduly puffed up by the victories at Dyrrachium, and by men of rank who accused him of being fond of power and of delaying purposely in order to prolong his authority over so many men of his own rank -- and for this reason called him derisively king of kings and Agamemnon,²³³ because that general also ruled over kings while war lasted -- he allowed himself to be moved from his own purpose and gave in to them, being deceived now by the god that had misled him on other occasions during the whole of this war. He had now become, contrary to his nature, sluggish and dilatory in all things,²³⁴ and he prepared for battle against his will, to his own hurt and that of the men who had persuaded him to it. [sect. 68]

That same night three of Csar's legions started out to forage; for Csar himself approved Pompey's dilatory proceedings and had no idea that he would change, and accordingly sent them out to procure food. When he perceived that the enemy was preparing to fight he was delighted at the pressure which he conjectured had been put upon Pompey by his army, and he recalled all of his forces at once and made preparations on his own side. He offered sacrifice at midnight and invoked Mars and his own ancestress, Venus (for it was believed that from neas and his son, Ilus, was descended the Julian race, with a slight change of name), and he vowed that he would build a temple in Rome as a thank-offering to her as the Bringer of Victory if everything went well. Thereupon a flame from heaven flew through the air from Csar's camp to Pompey's, where it was extinguished. Pompey's men said that it signified a brilliant victory for them over their enemies, but Csar interpreted it as meaning that he should fall upon and extinguish the fame and power of Pompey. When Pompey was sacrificing the same night some of the victims escaped and could not be caught, and a swarm of bees settled on the altar, the type of weakness.²³⁵ Shortly before daylight a panic occurred in his army. He himself went around and quieted it and then fell into a deep sleep. [sect. 69]

When his friends aroused him he said that he had just dreamed that he had dedicated a temple in Rome to Venus the Bringer of Victory. His friends and his whole army when they heard of this were delighted, being in ignorance of Csar's vow, and they went about their work in a reckless and contemptuous way as though it were already accomplished. Many of them adorned their tents with laurel branches, the insignia of victory, and their slaves prepared magnificent banquets for them. Some of them began already to contend with each other for Csar's office of Pontifex Maximus. Pompey, being experienced in military affairs, turned away from these squabbles with concealed indignation. He remained altogether silent in hesitancy and dread, as though he were no longer commander but under command, and as though he were doing everything under compulsion and against his judgment; such dejection had come over this man of great deeds (who, until this day, had been most fortunate in every undertaking), either because he had not carried his point when he had decided what was the best course but was about to cast the die involving the safety of so many men and also involving his own reputation, until now invincible; or because some presentiment of approaching evil troubled him, presaging his complete downfall that very day from a position of such vast power. After merely saying to his friends that whichever should conquer, that day would be the beginning of great evils to the Romans for all future time, he began to make arrangements for the battle. In this remark some people thought his real intentions escaped him, involuntarily expressed in a moment of fright, and they inferred that if Pompey had been victorious he would not have laid down the supreme power. [sect. 70]

Csar's army (for since many writers differ I shall follow the most credible Roman authorities, who give the most careful enumeration of the Italian soldiers, in whom they place most confidence, but do not make much account of the allied forces or record them exactly, regarding them as foreigners and as contributing to them little real assistance) consisted of about 22,000 men and of these about 1000 were cavalry. Pompey had more than double that number, of whom about 7000 were cavalry. Some of the most trustworthy writers say that 70,000 Italian soldiers were engaged in this battle. Others give the smaller number, 60,00000. Still others, grossly exaggerating, say 400,000.²³⁶ Of the whole number some say Pompey's forces were to those of Csar as one-and-a-half to one, others say that he had two parts out of three. So much doubt is there as to the exact truth. However that may be, each of them placed his chief reliance on his Italian troops. In the way of allied forces Csar had cavalry from both Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul, besides some light-armed Greeks, consisting of Dolopians, Acarnanians, and tolians. Such were Csar's allies. Pompey had a great number from all the eastern nations, part horse, part foot. From Greece he had Lacedemonians marshalled by their own kings, and others from Peloponnesus and Botians with them. The Athenians marched to his aid also, although proclamation had been made on both sides that no harm should be done to them by the soldiers, since they were the priests of the Thesmophor.²³⁷ Nevertheless, they wished to share in the glory of the war because this was a contest for the Roman leadership.²³⁸ [sect. 71]

Besides the Greeks almost all the nations that one meets in making the circuit of the eastern sea sent aid to Pompey: Thracians, Hellespontines, Bithynians, Phrygians, Ionians, Lydians, Pamphylians, Pisidians, Paphlagonians, Cilicians, Syrians, Phnicians, Hebrews, and their neighbors the Arabs, Cyprians, Rhodians, Cretan slingers, and other islanders. Kings and princes were there leading their own troops: Deotarus, the tetrarch of Galatia in the East, and Ariarthes, king of Cappadocia. Taxiles commanded [figure in text: THESSALY & SOUTHERN MACEDONIA]

the Armenians from the hither side of the Euphrates. Those from the other side were led by Megabates, the lieutenant of King Artabazes. Some other small princes took part with Pompey in the work. It was said that sixty ships from Egypt were contributed to him by the sovereigns of that country, Cleopatra and her brother, who was still a boy. But these did not take part in the battle, nor did any other naval force. They remained idle at Corcyra. Pompey seems to have acted very foolishly in this respect in disregarding the fleet, in which he excelled so greatly that he could have deprived the enemy of all the supplies brought to them from abroad, and in risking a battle on land with men who boasted that they were inured to every kind of toil and who were ferocious fighters. Although he had been on his guard against them at Dyrrachium, a certain spell seems to have come over him at a time when it would inure most to Csar's advantage. Under this spell also Pompey's army was most nonsensically puffed up, and rendered insubordinate to its own commander, and hurried into action without previous experience in war. But this was the ordering of divine Providence to bring in the imperial power which now embraces everything.