The Foreign Wars


The Foreign Wars
By Appian
Edited by: Horace White

New York THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 1899



Perseus Documents Collection Table of Contents



TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

THE MANUSCRIPTS OF APPIAN

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

CONCERNING THE KINGS

Fragments

CONCERNING ITALY

Fragments

THE SAMNITE HISTORY

Fragments

THE GALLIC HISTORY

Fragments

OF SICILY AND THE OTHER ISLANDS

Fragments

THE WARS IN SPAIN

CHAPTER I

CHAPTER II

CHAPTER III

CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER V

CHAPTER VI

CHAPTER VII

CHAPTER VIII

CHAPTER IX

CHAPTER X

CHAPTER XI

CHAPTER XII

CHAPTER XIII

CHAPTER XIV

CHAPTER XV

CHAPTER XVI

THE HANNIBALIC WAR

CHAPTER I

CHAPTER II

CHAPTER III

CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER V

CHAPTER VI

CHAPTER VII

CHAPTER VIII

CHAPTER IX

THE PUNIC WARS

CHAPTER I

CHAPTER II

CHAPTER III

CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER V

CHAPTER VI

CHAPTER VII

CHAPTER VIII

CHAPTER IX

CHAPTER X

CHAPTER XI

CHAPTER XII

CHAPTER XIII

CHAPTER XIV

CHAPTER XV

CHAPTER XVI

CHAPTER XVII

CHAPTER XVIII

CHAPTER XIX

CHAPTER XX

The Topography of Carthage

NUMIDIAN AFFAIRS

MACEDONIAN AFFAIRS

Fragments

THE ILLYRIAN WARS

CHAPTER I

CHAPTER II

CHAPTER III

CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER V

THE SYRIAN WARS

CHAPTER I

CHAPTER II

CHAPTER III

CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER V

CHAPTER VI

CHAPTER VII

CHAPTER VIII

CHAPTER IX

CHAPTER X

CHAPTER XI

THE MITHRIDATIC WARS

CHAPTER I

CHAPTER II

CHAPTER III

CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER V

CHAPTER VI

CHAPTER VII

CHAPTER VIII

CHAPTER IX

CHAPTER X

CHAPTER XI

CHAPTER XII

CHAPTER XIII

CHAPTER XIV

CHAPTER XV

CHAPTER XVI

CHAPTER XVII

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

THE MANUSCRIPTS OF APPIAN

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

CONCERNING THE KINGS

Fragments

CONCERNING ITALY

Fragments

THE SAMNITE HISTORY

Fragments

THE GALLIC HISTORY

Fragments

OF SICILY AND THE OTHER ISLANDS

Fragments

THE WARS IN SPAIN

CHAPTER I

CHAPTER II

CHAPTER III

CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER V

CHAPTER VI

CHAPTER VII

CHAPTER VIII

CHAPTER IX

CHAPTER X

CHAPTER XI

CHAPTER XII

CHAPTER XIII

CHAPTER XIV

CHAPTER XV

CHAPTER XVI

THE HANNIBALIC WAR

CHAPTER I

CHAPTER II

CHAPTER III

CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER V

CHAPTER VI

CHAPTER VII

CHAPTER VIII

CHAPTER IX

THE PUNIC WARS

CHAPTER I

CHAPTER II

CHAPTER III

CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER V

CHAPTER VI

CHAPTER VII

CHAPTER VIII

CHAPTER IX

CHAPTER X

CHAPTER XI

CHAPTER XII

CHAPTER XIII

CHAPTER XIV

CHAPTER XV

CHAPTER XVI

CHAPTER XVII

CHAPTER XVIII

CHAPTER XIX

CHAPTER XX

The Topography of Carthage

NUMIDIAN AFFAIRS

MACEDONIAN AFFAIRS

Fragments

THE ILLYRIAN WARS

CHAPTER I

CHAPTER II

CHAPTER III

CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER V

THE SYRIAN WARS

CHAPTER I

CHAPTER II

CHAPTER III

CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER V

CHAPTER VI

CHAPTER VII

CHAPTER VIII

CHAPTER IX

CHAPTER X

CHAPTER XI

THE MITHRIDATIC WARS

CHAPTER I

CHAPTER II

CHAPTER III

CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER V

CHAPTER VI

CHAPTER VII

CHAPTER VIII

CHAPTER IX

CHAPTER X

CHAPTER XI

CHAPTER XII

CHAPTER XIII

CHAPTER XIV

CHAPTER XV

CHAPTER XVI

CHAPTER XVII


Funded by The Annenberg CPB/Project

 

Ch. 14

CHAPTER XIV

Topography of Carthage -- The Two Harbors -- The Romans repulsed -- Roman Rams destroyed -- Scipio the Younger -- Fleet burned -- Exploits of Phameas

[sect. 95]

The city lay in a recess of a great gulf and was in the form of a peninsula. It was separated from the mainland by an isthmus about three miles in width. From this isthmus a narrow and longish tongue of land, about 300 feet wide, extended toward the west between a lake and the sea. On the sea side the city was protected by a single wall. Toward the south and the mainland, where the citadel of Byrsa stood on the isthmus, there was a triple wall. The height of each wall was forty-five feet without counting parapets and towers, which were separated from each other by a space of 200 feet, and each was divided into four stories. The depth was thirty feet. Each wall was divided vertically by two vaults, one above the other. In the lower space there were stables for 300 elephants, and alongside were receptacles for their food. Above were stables for 4000 horses and places for their fodder and grain. There were barracks also for soldiers, 20,000 foot and 4000 horse. Such preparation for war was arranged and provided for in their walls alone. The angle which ran around from this wall to the harbor along the tongue of land mentioned above was the only weak and low spot in the fortifications, having been neglected from the beginning. [sect. 96]

The harbors had communication with each other, and a common entrance from the sea seventy feet wide, which could be closed with iron chains. The first port was for merchant vessels, and here were collected all kinds of ships' tackle. Within the second port was an island which, together with the port itself, was enclosed by high embankments. These embankments were full of shipyards which had capacity for 220 vessels. Above them were magazines for their tackle and furniture. Two Ionic columns stood in front of each dock, giving the appearance of a continuous portico to both the harbor and the island. On the island was built the admiral's house, from which the trumpeter gave signals, the herald delivered orders, and the admiral himself overlooked everything. The island lay near the entrance to the harbor and rose to a considerable height, so that the admiral could observe what was going on at sea, while those who were approaching by water could not get any clear view of what took place within. Not even the incoming merchants could see the docks, for a double wall enclosed them, and there were gates by which merchant ships could pass from the first port to the city without traversing the dockyards. Such was the appearance of Carthage at that time. [sect. 97]

Now the consuls, having divided their work, moved against the enemy. Manilius advanced from the mainland by way of the isthmus, intending to fill up the ditch, surmount the low parapet overlooking it, and from that to scale the high wall. Censorinus raised ladders both from the ground and from the decks of ships against the neglected angle of the wall. Both of them despised the enemy, thinking that they were unarmed, but when they found that they were provided with new arms and were full of courage they were astounded and took to their heels. Thus they met a rebuff at the very beginning, in expecting to take the city without fighting. When they made a second [figure in text: PLAN OF HARBORS AT CARTHAGE.] attempt and were again repulsed, the spirits of the Carthaginians were very much raised. The consuls, fearing Hasdrubal, who had pitched his camp behind them on the other side of the lake, not far distant, fortified two camps, Censorinus on the lake under the walls of the enemy, and Manilius on the isthmus leading to the mainland. When the camps were finished Censorinus crossed the lake to get timber for building engines and lost about 500 men, who were cutting wood, and also many tools, the Carthaginian cavalry general, Himilco, surnamed Phameas, having suddenly fallen upon them. Nevertheless, he secured a certain amount of timber with which he made engines and ladders. Again they made an attempt upon the city in concert, and again they failed. Manilius, after some feeble efforts, having with difficulty beaten down a little of the outworks, gave up in despair of taking the city from that side. [sect. 98]

Censorinus, having filled up a portion of the lake along the tongue of land in order to have more room, brought up two enormous battering rams, one of which was driven by 6000 foot-soldiers under charge of the military tribunes, and the other by oarsmen of the ships under charge of their captains. Moved by a spirit of emulation among officers and men in the performance of their similar tasks, they beat down a part of the wall, so that they could look into the city. The Carthaginians, on the other hand, drove them back and strove to repair the breaches in the wall by night. As the night time was not sufficient for the work and they feared lest the Roman arms should readily destroy by daylight their moist and newly made wall, they made a sally, some with arms and others with torches, to set fire to the machines. They did not succeed in destroying these entirely (the Romans rallying and not giving them sufficient time), but they rendered them quite useless and regained the city. When daylight returned the Romans conceived the purpose of rushing in through the opening where the Carthaginians had not finished their work and overpowering them. They saw inside an open space, well suited for fighting, where the Carthaginians had stationed armed men in front and others in the rear provided only with stones and clubs, and many others on the roofs of the neighboring houses, all in readiness to meet the invaders. The Romans, when they saw themselves scorned by an unarmed enemy, were still more exasperated, and dashed in fiercely. But Scipio, who a little later took Carthage and from that feat gained the surname Africanus, being then a military tribune, held back, divided his companies into several parts, and stationed them at intervals along the wall, not allowing them to go into the city. When those who entered were driven back by the Carthaginians, who fell upon them from all sides, he gave them succor and saved them from destruction. And this action first brought him renown, as he had shown himself wiser than the consul. [sect. 99]

Now the dog star began to rise and sickness broke out in the camp of Censorinus, who was conducting his operations on a lake of stagnant water with high walls shutting off the fresh air from the sea, for which reason he moved his station from the lake to the sea. The Carthaginians, observing that the wind blew toward the Romans, attached ropes to some small boats and hauled them behind the walls, so that they should not be observed by the enemy, and filled them with dry twigs and tow. Then they pushed them back, and as they turned the corner and came in sight of the enemy, they poured brimstone and pitch over the contents, spread the sails, and, as the wind filled them, set fire to the boats. These, driven by the wind and the fury of the flames against the Roman ships, set fire to them and came a little short of destroying the whole fleet. Shortly afterward Censorinus went to Rome to conduct the election. Then the Carthaginians began to press more boldly against Manilius. They made a sally by night, some with arms, others, unarmed, carrying planks with which to bridge the ditch of the Roman camp, and began to tear down the palisades. While all was in confusion in the camp, as is usual in nocturnal assaults, Scipio passed out with his horse by the rear gates where there was no fighting, moved around to the front, and so frightened the Carthaginians that they betook themselves to the city. Thus a second time Scipio appeared to have been the salvation of the Romans by his conduct in this nocturnal melee. [sect. 100]

Manilius thereupon fortified his camp more carefully. He threw around it a wall in place of the palisade and built a fort on the sea-shore at the place where his supply-ships came in. Then, turning to the mainland, he ravaged the country with 10,000 foot and 4000 horse, collecting wood and forage and provisions. These foraging parties were in charge of the military tribunes by turns. Now Phameas, the chief of the African horse, -- a young man eager for fighting, having small but swift horses that lived on grass when they could find nothing else, and could bear both hunger and thirst when necessary, -- hiding in thickets and ravines, when he saw that the enemy were not on their guard swooped down upon them from his hiding-place like an eagle, inflicted as much damage on them as he could, and took refuge in flight. But when Scipio's turn came he never made his appearance, because Scipio always kept his foot-soldiers in line and his horsemen on horseback, and in foraging he never broke ranks until he had encircled the field where his harvesters were to work, with cavalry and infantry. Moreover, he was always reconnoitring with other troops of horse around the circle, and if any of the harvesters straggled away or passed outside of the circle he punished them severely. For this reason he was the only one that Phameas did not attack.